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THE WAR ON TERROR
High Court Says Detainees Have Right to Hearing
Los Angeles Times
June 29, 2004
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court on Monday ruled that
the Constitution gives all people held under
U.S. control a right to their day in court,
rejecting President Bush's claim that the war
on terrorism gives him, as commander in
chief, the unchecked power to imprison
"enemy combatants."
"We have long since made clear that a state
of war is not a blank check for the president
when it comes tot he rights o ft he n ation's
citizens," Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
wrote. Even in wartime, the Constitution
"assuredly envisions a role for all three
branches [of government] when individual
liberties are at stake."
U.S. soldiers may capture enemy fighters on
the battlefield and U.S. agents may seize
suspected terrorists at home, but that is not
the end of the matter, the justices said.
Detainees still have a right to challenge the
basis for holding them.
"The great writ of habeas corpus allows the
judicial branch to play a necessary role in
maintaining this delicate balance [between
security and liberty], serving as an important
check on the executive's power in the realm
of detentions," O'Connor said.
In the high court's first review of the
president's constitutional powers in the war
on terrorism, the administration won on one
key point. Five justices agreed that in the
wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, Congress had
given the president special powers to capture
and hold terrorists and their allies -
including U.S. citizens who fight for the
enemy.
But they also said all these detainees,
including about 600 foreigners currently
held at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, have a right to challenge the
government's case against them.
Civil libertarians hailed Monday's decisions
for upholding the principles of due process
of law, and Pentagon officials scrambled to
accommodate what was expected to be a
flood of demands for hearings by detainees
who said they were not fighting for the
Taliban or Al Qaeda.
Although some legal experts said they were
not surprised that the court insisted on
protecting the rights of American citizens,
they expressed delight that a solid majority
of t he court s aid even n oncitizens c aptured
abroad were entitled to a fair hearing.
"The United States can no longer hold
detainees in a 'rights-free zone,' " said
James Fellner of Human Rights Watch.
"They can now have their day in court." The
Bush administration's contention that it
could hold foreigners at Guantanamo
without regard for the protections of the
Geneva Convention or the standards of
international law, Fellner noted, has been
roundly criticized abroad.
Despite the broad setback, the White House
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and Justice Department said Monday that
they were pleased the court had upheld the
president's authority to detain "enemy
combatants" as part of the war on terror.
In one ruling, Rasul vs. Bush, the court said
6-to-3 that the hundreds who were captured
in Afghanistan and elsewhere and held at
Guantanamo Bay have a right to challenge
their imprisonment in an American court. In
a second, Hamdi vs. Rumsfeld, the court
ruled 8 to 1 that a U.S. citizen who was
captured in Afghanistan and held in a
military brig in South Carolina has a right to
a lawyer and to a hearing before a judge.
In a third case, citing a technical error, the
court failed to decide whether American
Jose Padilla, arrested in Chicago, can be
held by the military.
Despite their disagreements on the details,
justices across the ideological spectrum said
the principles of due process of law and
respect for civil liberties cannot be swept
aside by the president or his military
commanders, even in wartime.
"The very core of liberty secured by our
Anglo-Saxon system of separated powers
has been freedom from indefinite
imprisonment at the will of the executive"
branch, wrote conservative Justice Antonin
Scalia in an opinion that also spoke for
liberal Justice John Paul Stevens. "If civil
rights are to be curtailed during wartime, it
must be done openly and democratically, as
the Constitution requires, rather than by
silent erosion through an opinion of this
court."
Scalia and Stevens agreed in the case of
Yaser Esam Hamdi, a Louisiana-born man
of Saudi parentage, that Hamdi should be
freed unless the government intended to
charge him with treason.
Justices David H. Souter and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg also said Hamdi should be freed
because the government did not have the
authority to arrest and hold U.S. citizens
without filing criminal charges.
Four others, led by O'Connor and joined by
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist,
Anthony M. Kennedy and Stephen G.
Breyer, said the government may hold U.S.
citizens such as Hamdi who are captured as
"battlefield detainees." Nonetheless, they
must be given a lawyer and a hearing before
a judge, the court said.
The Constitution says the government may
not deprive a person of liberty without due
process of law, and "Hamdi has received no
process," O'Connor said.
Only Justice Clarence Thomas agreed with
the administration's view that the president
can order the arrest and the indefinite
detention ofA mericans w ho he b elieves to
be terrorists or enemy fighters.
In the Guantanamo case, the court said the
hundreds of people being held there have a
right to challenge their imprisonment before
a judge. Administration lawyers had
maintained these "enemy aliens" captured in
wartime were outside the jurisdiction of the
U.S. courts, in part because they were in
Cuba.
Disagreeing, the high court said their
location doesn't always matter. As long as
the detainees are under the exclusive control
of U.S. authorities, judges have the authority
"to determine the legality of the executive's
potentially indefinite detention of
individuals who claim to be wholly innocent
of wrongdoing."
The court did not say how this would work.
The opinions do not suggest the detainees
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are entitled to a full-blown trial in a federal
Court. Instead, they are likely to be given a
hearing before a military judge at
Guantanamo. However, a federal judge is
likely to oversee the process to ensure its
basic fairness.
In the case of Padilla, who is being held on
suspicion of plotting with Al Qaeda to
explode a radioactive "dirty" bomb, the
court failed to decide whether an American
citizen arrested within the United States can
be held indefinitely by the military. In a 5-4
ruling, the court threw out the case and told
his lawyer to start over in a different court.
Arrested at O'Hare airport, authorities took
Padilla first to New York and then to a
military brig in South Carolina. In Monday's
decision, the court said Padilla's lawyers
erred by filing a suit in New York rather
than in South Carolina.
In the Hamdi case, five justices agreed that
in the wake of Sept. 11, Congress had given
the president special powers to arrest and
hold U.S. citizens who are fighting for the
enemy. They cited the resolution passed by
Congress that, in effect, authorized the
invasion of Afghanistan. It said the president
may "use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations or
persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed or aided the terrorist attacks."
The court said this broad authorization
allowed Bush to order the military to
"detain, for the duration of hostilities,
individuals legitimately determined to be
Taliban combatants who engaged in armed
conflict with the United States."
It was not clear whether the president's
power to order indefinite detention applies
only to citizens who were captured on
foreign battlefields fighting for the enemy -
such as Hamdi -
Americans who were
States and accused
America's enemies.
or, more broadly, to
arrested in the United
of being allies of
The answer may have to await further
rulings. In Monday's decision, Breyer joined
O'Connor's opinion that said the military
may hold "battlefield detainees." However,
he dissented in the case of Padilla. Scalia
also said that in the case of an American
citizen, the government may hold him if it
charged him with treason.
Their opinions suggest a majority of the
justices do not believe the government may
indefinitely hold Americans arrested within
the United States.
But White House officials saw the ruling as
endorsing their position on holding enemy
combatants.
"The president's most solemn obligation is
to defend the American people, and we're
pleased that the Supreme Court upheld the
president's authority to detain enemy
combatants, including citizens, for the
duration ofthe conflict. The administration
is committed to fashioning a process to
review enemy combatant determinations in a
way that addresses the court's concerns and
permits the president to continue to exercise
his constitutional responsibility as
commander in chief to protect the nation in
times of war," said White House
spokeswoman Claire Buchan.
Sen. John F. Kerry of Massachusetts, the
presumed Democratic presidential nominee,
applauded Monday's rulings as upholding
American values. He also faulted the
administration for not giving accused
terrorists a lawyer and a hearing.
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"With respect to detainees, it is vital to
uphold the Constitution of the United States,
to respect civil liberties and civil rights even
as we protect our country," Kerry said. "I
would have wished this administration could
have done ... what was in keeping with our
values and the spirit of our country."
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War of Secrets: Judicial Restraint; The Imperial Presidency
vs. The Imperial Judiciary
New York Times
September 8, 2002
Linda Greenhouse
In its aggressive conduct of the war on
terrorism's domestic front, the Bush
administration has encountered few
obstacles from Congress or public opinion.
Rather, it is federal judges, across the
ideological spectrum, who have responded
with skepticism, alarm or downright
hostility in recent weeks to the
administration's sweeping claims of
unbridled executive authority to hold secret
deportation hearings, label and incarcerate
"enemy combatants" without access to
lawyers or judges, and commingle activities
of counterintelligence agents and criminal
prosecutors.
While it is a fascinating and, in many
quarters, unexpected development, it
actually should come as no surprise to find
the judiciary in a restraining role. The
conflict now unfolding between the two
branches has not only a historical dimension
but an institutional one. Current trends
within each branch may, in fact, have made
the clash between the two inevitable: the
imperial presidency versus the imperial
judiciary.
Throughout American history, each
institution has gone through cycles of
muscle-flexing and relative passivity.
Through some alignment of the stars, last
Sept. 11 found both the White House and
the Supreme Court in alpha mode. From its
earliest days, the Bush administration has
been animated by a belief that in relation to
other Washington power centers, the White
House must reclaim authority previous
occupants h ad I ost. C ompromise i s s een as
weakness. That stance helps explain the
administration's seemingly counter-
productive refusal to hand over various
kinds of information demanded by
Congress, as well as its aversion to a
consultative foreign policy.
It may also explain the administration's so
far self-defeating legal strategy in the
terrorism-related cases, which seems to
amount to driving headlong into a judicial
roadblock. In a legal system that emphasizes
nuance, the administration defends its
positions categorically: no judicial review,
no right to counsel, no public disclosure, no
open hearings. Even judges whose every
instinct is to defer to plausible claims of
national security have recoiled. "If they
would just go through the motions, suggest
that they have some feel for due process,
they would probably win instead of
offending the judges," Professor Rodney A.
Smolla of the University of Richmond
School of Law said of the administration.
As for the courts, the Supreme Court is in an
era of judicial supremacy reminiscent of the
1930's. The justices are invalidating federal
laws at double the rate of the "activist"
Warren Court, curbing Congressional
authority, and propounding novel theories of
immunity for the states from the reach of
federal law. While the federalism revival
may be Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist's most conspicuous achievement,
the court's institutional boldness may be his
legacy. "This is a court that says that judges
are better able than the P.G.A. to define the
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essence of golf," said Walter E. Dellinger,
acting solicitor general during the Clinton
administration, in a wry reference to a case
decided last year concerning a disabled
professional golfer. "This is a court that
decided a presidential election."
How the Supreme Court will rule on the
various terrorism-related controversies now
making their way to its docket is, of course,
unknown. But there is little doubt that the
climate it has created has empowered judges
to defend judicial prerogatives.
The judges of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the
conservative Richmond, Va.-based court
that the administration hand-picked by
sending two American-born "enemy
combatants" to military prisons in its
jurisdiction, expressed doubt about what
they called the administration's "sweeping
proposition" that "any American citizen
alleged to be an enemy combatant could be
detained indefinitely without charges or
counsel on the government's say-so."
Not surprisingly, judges often display a
special sensitivity when they perceive a
challenge to the integrity of the legal system.
Last year, for example, the Supreme Court
struck down a federal law that barred
lawyers paid by the Legal Services
Corporation from making particular
arguments on behalf of clients on welfare.
In the current terrorism c ases, some judges
appear to believe the administration needs
nothing so much as a good civics lesson.
Judge Gladys Kessler of Federal District
Court here, ruling last month that the
government had no right to conceal the
identities of hundreds of people arrested
after Sept. 11, said "the court fully
understands and appreciates that the first
priority of the executive branch in a time of
crisis is to ensure the physical security of its
citizens." Then she added: "By the same
token, the first priority of the judicial branch
must be to ensure that our government
always operates within the statutory and
constitutional constraints which distinguish
a democracy from a dictatorship."
Judge Kessler was particularly scathing in
rejecting the administration's argument that
the names of defense lawyers had to remain
secret for, among other reasons, their own
protection. "It is worth noting that lawyers
are a hardy brand of professionals" with a
"long and noble history of fighting for the
civil liberties and civil rights of unpopular
individuals and political causes," she said,
adding, "the government assumes, without
any support, that citizens do not understand
the role of defense lawyers."
"Maybe we've learned from our mistakes,"
said Prof. David Cole of the Georgetown
University Law Center, reflecting on the
history of courts realizing after the fact that
the trade-off of civil liberties for security in
times of crisis was unnecessary. He said
Vietnam and Watergate "taught us what
secrecy can cover for."
In addition, he explained "we've become a
more rights-oriented society," with a range
of civil liberties groups "giving courts
courage from knowing they're not alone."
Not all such groups offer a traditional liberal
view. The libertarian Cato Institute has been
outspoken in its concern about an
opportunistic growth of government power.
"No one can deny the fact that if the cycle of
terrorist attack followed by government
curtailment of civil liberties continues,
America will eventually lose the key
attribute that has made it great, namely,
freedom," Timothy Lynch, director of
Cato's project on criminal justice, wrote in a
position paper. It concluded: "A free and
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independent people should not expect
supernatural powers from their president."
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Two Out of Three Ain't Bad
Assessing the Supreme Court's Detainee Rulings
The Weekly Standard
July 19, 2004
Peter Berkowitz
Given his constitutional role as commander
in chief, with principal responsibility for the
nation's security, the president might be
expected to overreach occasionally in times
of war, to place the energetic defense of the
country ahead of the meticulous
safeguarding of civil liberties. Equally,
given its constitutional role as guardian of
the fundamental laws of the land, the
Supreme Court might be expected to patrol
zealously the boundaries established by the
Constitution for the protection of individual
liberty, and occasionally even to go to an
extreme to ensure that the executive respects
them. And as a consequence of the wartime
contest between the executive and the Court,
as each seeks to advance the interests and
uphold the honor of its constitutional office,
one could reasonably hope that both national
security and civil liberties would be given
their due to the extent possible.
On the basis of the Court's decisions in the
enemy combatant detention cases, handed
down June 28, it is a pleasure to report that
the system is working more or less as
designed. In waging the war on terror, the
executive branch has certainly pushed the
legal limits of its prerogatives. And the
Supreme Court has responded, pushing
back, at times quite aggressively, in the
opposite direction.
This is certainly not to suggest that the legal
positions of the administration have been
ideal, or that in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, and Rasul v. Bush the
Court achieved an optimal balance between
national security and civil liberties. To the
contrary. The Bush administration, for
example, suffered self-inflicted wounds
when it refused to grant the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay the adequate minimal
process, well grounded in the laws of war,
for determining whether the government had
correctly classified them as enemy
combatants. And in Rasul v. Bush a
provoked Court struck back. It ruled that
noncitizen or alien enemy combatants who
have not set foot in the United States and are
detained outside of the territorial jurisdiction
of any U.S. federal court nevertheless have a
right to challenge their detentions in any
federal district court they please.
Unfortunately, to reach this result the Court
distorted its own cases, arrogating to itself a
scope of review of military detentions it had
not previously been thought to possess.
So, the Supreme Court now having spoken,
there remains work to be done in hammering
out the proper balance between waging the
present war effectively and maintaining the
rule of law scrupulously. This is particularly
challenging as the nation confronts a
shadowy adversary, himself ruthlessly
indifferent to the distinction between lawful
combatants and civilian noncombatants,
who has at his disposal or is bent on
obtaining weapons of great destructiveness.
Still, the United States is at war, and the
constitutional order holds.
Indeed, notwithstanding its overreaching,
the Court's decisions vindicated the core
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constitutional principle that there is no
unreviewable executive power to detain
individuals. To be sure, in none of the cases
did the government deny the right to due
process. What was at issue in all three was
the degree of process due an individual
designated by the military, or the president
directly, as an enemy combatant. In essence,
the government contended that it was
enough to assert facts that, if true, would
warrant such a designation. And the Court
ruled, in sum, that individuals held as enemy
combatants-whether citizens or aliens,
whether held in the United States or abroad-
had the right to challenge before an
impartial tribunal the factual allegations on
the basis of which they had been captured
and incarcerated.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the court struck the
balance nicely. Seized on the battlefield in
Afghanistan in 2001, Yaser Esam Hamdi, a
U.S. citizen, has been detained in the United
States since April 2002 without formal
charges or proceedings. This was necessary,
argued the Bush administration, not only to
prevent him from returning to fight with the
enemy (the internationally recognized
justification for the detention of enemy
combatants) but also in order to subject him
to extended interrogation that could yield
precious information concerning al Qaeda's
whereabouts, intentions, and capabilities.
Hamdi's court-appointed counsel countered
that indefinite military detention without
charge or trial in a war that could last the
detainee's lifetime violated his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights,
in particular the right of all persons detained
in the United States to the writ of habeas
corpus, the legal means by which a detainee
asks a court to review the basis for his
imprisonment.
Writing for a plurality and announcing the
judgment of the Court, Justice O'Connor
recognized the force of both parties'
arguments. Just as there is no bar to holding
a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant, she
reasoned, so too being held as an enemy
combatant should not prohibit a U.S. citizen
from invoking his constitutional rights.
While she rejected the notion that a citizen
held in the United States as an enemy
combatant was entitled to the full panoply of
protections under the Constitution for
citizens charged with criminal conduct,
Justice O'Connor did rule that the
government must give citizens alleged to be
enemy combatants and held in the United
States "a meaningful opportunity to contest
the factual basis for that detention before a
neutral decision maker."
The case of Jose Padilla, who came to the
United States in May 2002 allegedly to lay
the groundwork for a dirty bomb attack,
presented an even stronger challenge to
indefinite military detention without charge
or trial. Padilla not only is a U.S. citizen but
also was seized on U.S. soil. The Court,
however, in a 5-4 opinion authored by
Justice Rehnquist, declined to rule on the
merits on the grounds that Padilla had failed
to bring his challenge to the federal district
court that had jurisdiction to hear it and, in
bringing the suit against Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld, had failed to identify the
correct respondent, namely, the
commanding officer at the South Carolina
Navy brig in which he was imprisoned.
How strange, therefore, that the Court ruled
in favor of the detainees in Rasul v. Bush. In
contrast to Padilla, they were alien enemy
combatants not citizens, held outside the
United States not inside the country, and
they filed suit against the president rather
than the commander at Guantanamo Bay. In
fact, the Court seemed bent on sending a
message to the administration regardless of
the s ettled I aw that it n eeded to trample to
do so.
39
Contrary to University of Chicago law
professor Cass Sunstein, who argued in the
New York Times that the Court in Rasul
decided the issues before it in the "narrowest
possible fashion," the Court reached its
result by silently and tendentiously
overruling the controlling precedent. In
Johnson v. Eisentrager (1950), the Court
held that it is a precondition for the filing of
a writ of habeas corpus by an alien detainee
that he be held within the territorial
jurisdiction of a U.S. court. In keeping with
Eisentrager, the Supreme Court might have
narrowly ruled that the Guantanamo Bay
detainees have a right to challenge their
detentions in U.S. courts because U.S.
control over Guantanamo Bay, by
longstanding agreement with Cuba, amounts
to in all but name the exercise of
sovereignty. In fact, in a 6-3 decision written
by Justice Stevens, the Court appears to
have ruled, extravagantly, that U.S. federal
district courts may hear legal challenges
from alien enemy combatants at
Guantanamo Bay b ecause U.S. courts have
jurisdiction wherever the U.S. military holds
foreign enemy combatants inasmuch as U.S.
courts have jurisdiction over the secretary of
defense and his boss, the president.
The constitutional contest between the
executive and the judiciary over how to
balance the competing claims of security
and liberty is by design perennial. At the
same time, and also by design, there is only
so much the executive and the judiciary,
given their limited powers, can accomplish.
It would be welcome, therefore, in the next
round for the third branch, Congress, to step
in and clarify not only the jurisdiction of
federal courts in the case of alien enemy
combatants held abroad, but also the details
of the procedural protections due citizens
wherever they are held as enemy
combatants. Both the circumstances and the
constitutional system call for this.
Peter Berkowitz teaches at George Mason
University School of Law and is a fellow at
Stanford's Hoover Institution.
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No Blank Check
The Nation
July 19, 2004
David Cole
"A state of war is not a blank check for the
President." The Bush Administration's
claims "would turn our system of checks
and balances on its head." "If civil rights are
to be curtailed during wartime, it must be
done openly and democratically, as the
Constitution requires, rather than by silent
erosion." Nation readers have heard these
kinds of things before-from me, the
Nation 's editors, the ACLU and other usual
suspects. But before now, not from Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, author of the first
two quotes. And certainly not from Justice
Antonin Scalia, author of the third.
These judicial soundbites only begin to
suggest the magnitude of the loss the Bush
Administration sustained in a pair of historic
Supreme Court decisions, issued June 28, on
its asserted power to detain "enemy
combatants." In the case that received the
most complete treatment oft he i ssues, that
of US citizen Yaser Hamdi, the Bush
Administration was able to persuade only a
single Justice-Clarence Thomas-to adopt its
position. And the passion of the decisions
suggests that the Justices may well have
been responding not only to the detention
cases before them but also to the Justice
Department's August 2002 "torture memo,"
which argued-along lines that eerily echo
the government's argument in the detention
cases-that the President in wartime is above
the law. As the Supreme Court has now
formally reminded the Administration, it's
President Bush, not King George.
The extent of the Administration's loss is
brought into relief by comparison with
earlier Supreme Court decisions in wartime.
The Court has historically bent over
backward in deference to claims of national
security, upholding the incarceration of
more than 1 ,000 p eople for antiwar speech
during World War I, and the detention of
120,000 Japanese and Japanese-Americans
on the basis of race during World War II.
The last time the Court confronted the
claims of "enemy combatants," during
World War II, it refused foreign nationals
incarcerated abroad any access to the courts,
and upheld w ithout o pinion death penalties
imposed in a secret trial on several would-be
saboteurs captured here, writing its opinion
only after the defendants had been executed.
This time, the Court pointedly refused to
defer to the Administration during wartime.
It ruled that foreign nationals held at
Guantanamo have a right to file habeas
corpus petitions in federal court to challenge
the legality of their detentions. And in
Hamdi's case, it established that US citizens
are entitled at a minimum to a fair hearing
on whether they are "enemy combatants"
before they can be held for a sustained
period. The Court ducked the third case-that
of Jose Padilla, a US citizen arrested at
O'Hare airport-on jurisdictional grounds;
his lawyers filed their challenge in the
wrong court. But it is clear that when he
refiles in the correct court, Padilla will be
entitled to at least as much as Hamdi, and
perhaps more.
The rulings don ot mean that t he detainees
will necessarily be released anytime soon.
The Court rejected, for example, the
broadest challenge to the detention of US
citizens. In the Hamdi case, a majority ruled
that Congress's authorization of the use of
military force against Al Qaeda and those
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who harbor them permits the executive to
hold in military custody even US citizens
who are fighting for the enemy against us.
But the rulings do make it likely that all the
detainees will get some sort of hearing to
assess their status. In Hamdi's case, the
Court specified what process was due:
notice of the charges and an opportunity to
contest them before an impartial adjudicator.
The Court did not reach the question of what
process the Guantanamo detainees are due,
because the only question before it was
whether the detainees could even file a case
in federal court. But there will be
tremendous pressure now to give them what
the Geneva Conventions require: a hearing
before a military commission to determine
their status.
The broader significance of the rulings lies
in their ringing rejection of the argument
that to defeat terrorism, the executive must
have unfettered discretion. Since September
11, the Administration has repeatedly
insisted that citizens (and indeed the world)
should just "trust us." George W. Bush has
done more than perhaps anyone to
demonstrate the poverty of that theory.
We've been asked to trust him about
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, torture
of detainees, the designation of enemy
combatants, alleged relationships between
Al Qaeda and Iraq, and the privacy and
liberty of American citizens. With any luck,
the Supreme Court's message-that we trust
checks and balances, not imperial
presidents-will be heard far and wide.
David Cole (cole@law.georgetown.edu),
The Nation 's legal affairs correspondent, is
the author of Enemy Aliens: Double
Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in
the War on Terrorism.
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Tribunals to Weigh Detainees' Status
Setup is Response to Supreme Court Ruling on Rights
The Boston Globe
July 8, 2004
Charles Savage
The Bush administration announced
yesterday a new tribunal before which each
accused terrorist at Guantanamo Bay may
challenge his designation as an enemy
combatant, unveiling its response to last
week's Supreme Court ruling that opened
courthouse doors to the military prisoners
who have been held without trial for two
years.
All of the roughly 595 detainees held in
Guantanamo will be informed by July 17 of
their opportunity to come before the new
Combatant Status Review Tribunal, made up
of three military officers who will vote on
whether the prisoner really was an Al Qaeda
or Taliban fighter, according to a four-page
order issued by Deputy Defense Secretary
Paul D. Wolfowitz.
Any detainee who is found not to have been
an enemy combatant will be sent home, a
Defense Department statement said. But the
likelihood of that happening appeared
remote. A companion "fact sheet" noted that
each detainee's status has already been
reviewed several times by military officials,
although not previously by a tribunal.
In many respects, the tribunals resemble the
hearings called for by the Third Geneva
Convention, which says captured fighters
should be given prisoner of war protections
unless a "competent tribunal" determines
they are not entitled to that status.
International law specialists and human
rights advocates have bitterly criticized the
Bush administration for two years, since it
declared that the Guantanamo detainees
broke the laws of war and so are not entitled
to POW status. Officials did so without
granting detainees hearings to rebut the
evidence against them.
A key privilege of POW status is the right to
be free from coercive interrogations, which
has received much greater attention since the
Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal in Iraq.
The Center for Constitutional Rights quickly
denounced the proposal because it does not
give detainees a right to a lawyer or ensure
that coerced interrogation statements would
not be used against them. The center
represented detainees who won a lawsuit
against the Bush administration in last
week's Rasul v. Bush decision, in which the
Supreme Court held that civilian courts have
jurisdiction to hear challenges to prisoners'
continued detention without trial.
"The Supreme Court upheld the rule of law
over unchecked executive authority," said
Rachel Meeropol, an attorney for the center.
"The review procedures for the detainees set
up by the Department of Defense are
inadequate and illegal, and they fail to
satisfy the court's ruling."
The tribunal will consist of three military
officers who have had no prior dealings with
the detainee, at least one of whom must be a
lawyer. Detainees will be assigned a
''personal representative" to review the
government's evidence against them and
assist in preparing their rebuttals, although
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that officer does not have to be a lawyer, the
order says.
Detainees will be allowed to call and
question witnesses "if readily available" and
present evidence to rebut the accusation that
they are Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters, but
the tribunal must presume the government's
evidence is correct unless the detainee can
prove otherwise. Hearsay evidence and
records of interrogations may be used
against detainees.
Wolfowitz's order does not preclude the
right by detainees to file a separate
challenge to their detention in civilian court,
and military officials said detainees would
also be informed that each "has a right to
seek review in US courts."
But the tribunals foreshadow the
government's likely defense to such a
civilian court challenge. The
administration's "fact sheet" says the rules
were drawn up to "reflect the guidance the
Supreme Court provided in its decisions last
week."
Although the 6-to-3 decision in the
Guantanamo case found only that US courts
have jurisdiction to hear challenges, the
court issued a companion decision in the
case of Yaser Esam Hamdi, a US citizen
who has been held without trial in a South
Carolina brig as an "enemy combatant"
since being captured in Afghanistan.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for a
four-vote plurality in that case, found that
the government must give Hamdi greater
safeguards to rebut the evidence against him
before it could legally hold him as an enemy
combatant. Her opinion said he must have a
lawyer, but also suggested that a military
tribunal might be sufficient to meet his right
to due process.
"The Supreme Court recognized the
military's need for flexibility, and indicated
that that streamlined process might provide
all the procedures that were sufficient even
for a US citizen," a senior defense official
said.
44
By Flouting War Laws, US Invites Tragedy
Los Angeles Times
March 25, 2003
Erwin Chemerinsky
On Sunday, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld quickly invoked international law
in condemning Iraq's treatment of American
prisoners of w ar and i ts u se ofcivilians as
human shields. As soon as the Americans
were shown on television, Rumsfeld
denounced Iraq for violating the Geneva
accords, which govern the treatment of
prisoners of war.
But Rumsfeld's hypocrisy here is enormous.
For two years, the Bush administration has
ignored and violated international law and
thus has undermined the very legitimacy of
the treaties and principles that constitute the
law of nations. Though we all hope, of
course, for the quick and safe return of the
American prisoners of war, the fact is that -
unfortunately -Iraq and other nations m ay
feel much freer today to violate international
law i nt he w ay they treat w ar c aptives a nd
the way they wage war.
One clear violation by the United States is
taking place in Guantanamo Bay, where for
the last 15 months the U.S. has held more
than 600 captives in clear violation of
international law.
Under the third Geneva Convention, those
who were caught in Afghanistan are deemed
prisoners of war if they were fighting for the
Taliban. International law prescribes the
way they can be questioned, how they are to
be treated and when they are to be
repatriated. The U.S. government has
ignored all of these requirements.
Rumsfeld has asserted that those held in
Guantanamo are "enemy combatants" and
thus the rules for prisoners of war do not
apply. International law draws a distinction
between "prisoners of war," who were
soldiers fighting for a nation, and "enemy
combatants," who were not acting on behalf
of a country; enemy combatants are
accorded fewer protections than prisoners of
war. Under well-established principles of
international law, only those who fought for
Al Qaeda and not the Taliban government
are enemy combatants. The Geneva accords
are clear that there must be a "competent
tribunal" to determine whether a person is a
prisoner of war or an enemy combatant.
More than a year ago, Secretary of State
Colin Powell expressly recognized this but
nothing has been done despite the
requirements, however ambiguous, in
treaties ratified by the U.S.
Several months ago, top-level administration
officials were quoted as saying they knew
many prisoners were being held in
Guantanamo by mistake because of
inaccurate intelligence from foreign
governments and because of arrests made in
the heat of battle. Therefore, individuals
continue to be held even though it is known
that they did not participate in terrorism and
have no useful information, and even though
it is a clear violation of international law to
continue to detain them.
Many of these individuals have been held in
solitary confinement, some for as long as 15
months, with no charges brought against
them and no end in sight. For a time, many
were held in small cages. They have not
been allowed to speak to an attorney, and
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they have had virtually no outside contact.
This treatment violates basic principles of
human rights law. About 25 of the detainees
have attempted suicide.
Several lawsuits have been brought on
behalf o ft hese d etainees, c laiming that t he
U.S. is violating international law.
Washington has successfully moved to
dismiss each of these and has persuaded
judges that no court has jurisdiction to hear
such claims. This too violates international
law because the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights states: "Anyone
who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
detention shall be entitled to take
proceedings before a court, in order that the
court may decide without delay on the
lawfulness of his detention." The treaty also
provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest and detention."
Rumsfeld has criticized Iraq's use of
civilians as shields against attack at its
ilitary and political facilities. Although he is
right that this is despicable behavior, he
cannot legitimately invoke international law
to govern how a war should be fought when
the war itself is a clear violation of
international law. Nothing in international
law authorizes a preemptive war to
overthrow a government and disarm it. Our
war in Iraq fits in none of the prescribed
situations where it is lawfully permissible.
There are enormous costs to such behavior.
The United States cannot expect other
nations to treat our prisoners in accord with
international law if we ignore it. If the
United States wants other nations to live by
the rule of law, it too must do so.
46
Gitmo' Better Blues
Slate Magazine
March 19, 2004
Neal Katyal
The rush to create the fig 1 eaf of justice at
Guantanamo Bay has begun. Next month,
the Supreme Court will review the Bush
administration's claim that no one at
Guantanamo is entitled to civilian court
adjudication of their detentions. On the eve
of the Supreme Court deadline for filing its
brief defending that policy, the
administration announced a newly minted
procedure for annual reviews of detentions.
The irony of this and other actions
(including the decision announced the day
before another Supreme Court filing
deadline, to allow Jose Padilla, the alleged
dirty bomber, access to a lawyer) should not
be lost: By modifying its policies in the past
months, the administration has made the
definitive case for civilian review of
Guantanamo. The only due process that's
happened there came only after the Supreme
Court agreed to hear the case.
But don't let these initiatives lull you into
thinking that the administration has
suddenly decided to follow the rule of law.
The most dramatic step "and one likely to be
trumpeted by the government at oral
argument" was their decision to bring the
first charges against detainees: charges
based on the offense of conspiracy, to be
heard by the first military commission since
World War II. As some readers of Slate
know, I am a big fan of the conspiracy
doctrine in general. But despite the
tremendous merits of our civilian conspiracy
law, these military charges are
unconstitutional, inconsistent with
international law, and unwise.
They will demonstrate what critics of the
military tribunals have been saying all
along: that the administration has sought to
create an end run around guarantees of
fundamental rights enshrined in our
Constitution and universally accepted
agreements such as the Geneva
Conventions.
There are three main problems with the
conspiracy indictments at Guantanamo. The
first is their targets. One would have thought
that, having decided to rock the
constitutional order and flout international
law, the administration would have at least
reserved the military tribunals for the worst
offenders "Osama Bin Laden and the like.
Instead, charges have been filed against, if
the prosecutor's claims prove accurate,
someone armed with a TV camera (a
videographer of the Cole bombing) and Bin
Laden's accountant" both of whom also
allegedly served as his bodyguards. While
glorifying the Cole bombing and moving al-
Qaida money are certainly bad acts, if there
were any evidence that these two men
actually engaged in serious war crimes, it
would be in the indictment. It's not. Instead,
the government can only allege the
amorphous crime of aiding of al-Qaida.
Contrast these vague indictments with the
position of Assistant Attorney General
Herbert Wechsler during World War II.
Wechsler, perhaps the most important 20th-
century scholar of American criminal law,
deplored a Pentagon proposal to file
conspiracy charges against Germans who
were n ot p rime 1 eaders. To W echsler, such
charges could not be based on ideas drawn
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from American conspiracy law without
proof of personal participation in a specific
crime. In the absence of such proof, he said,
the force of the broad criminal charge
against the leaders may be seriously
weakened in the eyes of the world,
especially if too many individuals are
included in it. Today there is no Wechsler in
the administration advising restraint striking,
in light of America's recent experience with
the Independent Counsel Act, another device
that encouraged overzealousness at the price
of balance and fairness. Fairness and
process, of course, can give way in an
emergency or when the matter concerns Bin
Laden or his close associates. But a
cameraman and an accountant, even if they
double as bodyguards, just don't come close.
The second problem is in the substance of
the conspiracy charges. The Department of
Defense, bowing to the will of the
prosecutors, defined the offense of
conspiracy in the broadest terms possible.
This definition is similar to the one the
United States proposed to use at Nuremberg,
with disastrous results. When the Americans
proposed it then, it was roundly criticized by
our allies. And when a variant of it was used
at trial, the Nuremberg judges ruled that
there could be no such offenses as
conspiracy to commit war crimes or
conspiracy to commit crimes against
humanity. Even U.S. Attorney General
Francis Biddle, who sat as a judge, wanted
to throw out the conspiracy charges
altogether. The result of the Nuremberg
ruling was to confine conspiracy only to
very limited acts and only against high-level
German officials, directly involved in
specific acts of aggression. This glaring
deficiency will pose problems because the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that
military commissions can, at most, only try
violations authorized by Congress or
international law, and the current conspiracy
charges do not fit either category.
To make matters worse, the conspiracy
charges in both of the indictments are based
largely on conduct that occurred before
9/11, yet military commissions can only
adjudicate violations of the laws of war. It is
a tremendous stretch to argue that t his w ar
began in 1999 or 1989. Again, Wechsler is
instructive: Atrocities committed prior to a
state of war.. .are not embraced within the
ordinary concept of crimes punishable as
violations of the laws of war.
There are good reasons why the laws of war,
unlike American civilian law, place
powerful limits on the conspiracy doctrine.
Recall that the civilian offense is based
largely on a theory of deterrence "that
draconian punishments will scare people
into avoiding association with criminal
organizations. But these arguments fail with
respect to the military proceedings at
Guantanamo. For one thing, the idea that
other would-be war criminals are watching
the proceedings at Guantanamo and
modifying their conduct is far-fetched,
especially if, as the Pentagon has asserted,
the proceedings may be closed to public
view. For another, deterrence works best
when the perceived costs of the action
exceed the perceived benefits, and it is very
difficult to make a claim that the speculative
risk of punishment in U.S. military courts
would change the calculus of future war
criminals (particularly when military
operations against them are already
ongoing). This isn't to say that there is no
upside to conspiracy charges, only that the
benefits are more attenuated than they are in
ordinary criminal cases and eroded by
serious risks of error. And if there are cases
in which the advantages of a conspiracy
charge become apparent, then the
administration is free to use the civilian
offense of conspiracy "one written into law
by Congress instead of drafted by a
Pentagon bureaucrat" in a standard criminal
action.
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The third and final problem with the
Guantanamo tribunals lies in the procedural
rules. American criminal law has been able
to develop a vibrant offense of conspiracy
only because of its strong commitment to
criminal procedural guarantees. So, while
charges can be somewhat vaguer in a
civilian conspiracy trial and hearsay
evidence may be admitted, the standard
checks on prosecutorial and judicial abuse
exist" indictment by a grand jury, the right
to a jury trial, the right to confront
witnesses, the right to obtain exculpatory
evidence, and so on. Those of us who defend
a broad substantive offense of conspiracy
treat these procedural rights as preconditions
before such a wide-ranging offense could be
established. Yet the military tribunals offer
no such guarantees.
The administration thus gives birth to a legal
Frankenstein. It picks its jurisdictional
theory that no one can have civilian review
from 1950, before we had earth-shattering
developments in international law (e.g., the
Geneva Convention's ratification and its
worldwide acceptance) and domestic
military law (the 1951 Uniform Code of
Military Justice). It picks its procedural
theory from the same time period "before
the massive revolution in procedural rights
in American criminal trials. And it derives
its substantive law "the offense of
conspiracy "from no real time period at all:
it's inspired by cases brought in the 1970s
against organized crime. This mix-and-
match cannot produce even the closest
approximation to fairness.
The chief criticism of the tribunals has
always b een that t he p resident c annot have
the unilateral power to define offenses, pick
prosecutors, select judges, authorize
charges, select defendants, and then strip the
civilian courts of all powers to review
tribunal decisions. This principle goes all the
way back to the Declaration of
Independence, which listed, among the
founders' complaints against King George,
that he has affected to render the Military
independent of and superior to the Civil
Power; depriv[ed] us, in many Cases, of the
benefits of trial by jury; made Judges
dependent on his Will alone; and
transport[ed] us beyond Seas to be tried for
pretended Offences. For these reasons, the
Supreme Court said during the Civil War
that if tribunals are ever appropriate, it is up
to Congress to define how and when they
are to be used. The current administration
has argued that this constitutional history
and structure is not relevant because military
necessity permitted it to act without explicit
congressional authorization.
But charges aren't being brought against
planners of the Sept. 11 attacks or other
terrorist atrocities. Instead, the president is
using these tribunals against minor
offenders, where the claim of military
necessity is weak. To boot, charges are
being brought nearly two and a half years
after Sept. 11, dramatically undermining the
arguments for avoiding congressional delay.
And if the administration prevails at the
Supreme Court, the rules for the military
commissions "from the definition of
substantive offenses to the procedural rules
and review guidelines" will be slanted even
more in favor of the prosecution than they
already are.
Times of crisis demand special responses.
But when the crises are long in scope,
without a definitive end, and when time
permits national deliberation and decision-
making, both constitutional and pragmatic
values are best served by having our
nation's representatives and judges consider
that response not resorting solely to
executive decree. The conspiracy charges
are the most dramatic step yet in the slide
down a dangerous anticonstitutional spiral.
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Memo Lists Acceptable 'Aggressive' Interrogation Methods
USA Today
June 28, 2004
Toni Locy and John Diamond
The Justice Department spelled out specific
interrogation methods that the CIA could
use against top al-Qaeda members in a still-
classified August 2002 legal memo, issued
as the spy agency pressed terrorism suspects
about possible strikes on the anniversary of
the Sept. 11 attacks, current and former
Justice officials said.
CIA officials had demanded specific
guidance for handling "high-value al-Qaeda
captives," said a former Justice official who
worked on the memo. The techniques
discussed were "aggressive" but "lawful,"
the former official said. A current Justice
official who knows the memo's contents
said it specifically authorized the CIA to use
"waterboarding," in which a prisoner is
made to believe he is suffocating.
The memo has not been made public in the
ongoing investigations of abuse of prisoners
by military and intelligence officials.
Because the document is classified, the
former and current Justice officials spoke on
condition of anonymity. The memo is far
more detailed and explicit than another
August 2002 document generated by
Justice's Office of Legal Counsel
concerning U.S. obligations under anti-
torture law. That document has been made
public.
Initially, the Office of Legal Counsel was
assigned the task of approving specific
interrogation techniques, but high-ranking
Justice Department officials intercepted the
CIA request, and the matter was handled by
top officials in the deputy attorney general's
office and Justice's criminal division.
The CIA has consistently refused to discuss
its i nterrogation t echniques, and it d eclined
to comment on the Justice Department
memos Sunday.
In what was viewed as an attempt to limit
political damage from the abuse
controversy, the administration last week
made public 258 pages of previously
classified documents. The Justice
Department disavowed much of its August
2002 guidance to the White House as an
overly broad assertion of presidential power.
Although the classified Justice Department
memo to the CIA that same month still
stands, the agency has quietly suspended its
use of the harsher interrogation methods,
said a former CIA field officer with
knowledge of current CIA practices,
confirming an account in Sunday's
Washington Post.
White House counsel Alberto Gonzales said
the thrust of the publicly released documents
was that President Bush insisted on humane
treatment of all prisoners, even though legal
opinions from Justice and the Pentagon said
there was wide latitude in wartime within
the limits of anti-torture laws and treaties.
It is a point the Bush administration
emphasized as the president faced repeated
expressions of concern during his trip to
Europe. "It's absolutely clear that the
president never, in any way, condoned the
use of torture," Secretary of State Colin
Powell said Sunday on CBS' Face the
Nation.
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But disclosure oft he detailed memo tot he
CIA suggests there are more documents still
closely held by the Bush administration that
show high-level officials seeking to push the
limits of the law to get warning of terrorist
attacks.
The Senate last week defeated a measure to
demand that the White House disclose all
relevant interrogation documents. Gonzales
argues that disclosing specific interrogation
techniques will help the nation's enemies
defeat those methods. But the CIA is likely
to come under more pressure to disclose
more about its interrogation methods: A CIA
contract employee, David Passaro, was
indicted last week in the beating of an
Afghan detainee who later died.
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A Crucial Look at Torture Law
Los Angeles Times
July 6, 2004
John Yoo
Among the Justice Department memos
released recently by the Bush
administration, the one that generated the
most criticism, dated Aug. 1, 2002,
considered the definition of torture under
federal criminal laws.
Its critics have attacked the differences
between the memo's conclusions and the
definition of torture in the 1984 Convention
Against Torture. They've attacked its
discussion of possible defenses against
prosecution and of the scope of the
commander in chief's power. Most of all,
they have attacked the fact that it did not
consider policy or moral issues.
The Justice Department's Office of Legal
Counsel, in which I served, produced the
memo. It is important to understand the
memo's function so that future
administrations may receive such candid
advice on the most delicate and important
kinds of legal questions.
First, there is a clear and necessary
difference between law and policy. The
memo did not advocate or recommend
torture; indeed, it did not discuss the pros
and cons of any interrogation tactic. Rather,
the memo sought to answer a discrete
question: What is the meaning of "torture"
under the federal criminal laws? What the
law permits and what policymakers chose to
do are entirely different things. Second,
there was nothing wrong-and everything
right-with analyzing a law that establishes
boundaries on interrogation in the war on
terrorism. Unlike previous wars, our enemy
now is a stateless network of religious
extremists. They do not obey the laws of
war, they hide among peaceful populations
and launch surprise attacks on civilians.
They have no armed forces per se, no
territory or citizens to defend and no fear of
dying during their attacks. Information is
our primary weapon against this enemy, and
intelligence gathered from captured
operatives is perhaps the most effective
means of preventing future attacks.
An American leader would be derelict of
duty if he did not seek to understand all his
options in such unprecedented
circumstances. Presidents Lincoln during the
Civil War and Roosevelt in the lead-up to
World War II sought legal advice about the
outer bounds of their power-even if they did
not always use it. Our leaders should ask
legal questions first, before setting policy or
making decisions in a fog of uncertainty.
Third, there are no easy legal answers about
torture, despite the moral certitude displayed
by the administration's critics. The Reagan
and first Bush administrations developed a
strict test for torture-the "specific intent" to
inflict "severe physical or mental pain or
suffering"-that was adopted by Congress
and the Clinton administration in 1994. It
uses words rare in the federal code, no
prosecutions have been brought under it, and
it has never been interpreted by a court.
As a result, the 2002 memo looked to other
federal laws, domestic and international
judicial decisions, legislative history and
presidential and diplomatic records, which
reinforced the conclusion that the United
States intentionally defined torture strictly.
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It is easy now for critics to claim that the
work was poor; they haven't produced their
own analyses or confronted any of the hard
questions. For example, would they say that
no technique beyond shouted questions
could be used to interrogate a high-level
terrorist leader, such as Osama bin Laden,
who knows of planned attacks on the United
States?
Lawyers who must answer such questions
must also explain possible defenses. For
example, if a police officer were to ask
when the use of force is allowed, a lawyer
would first explain that killing constitutes
murder or manslaughter, but he should also
explain when self-defense or necessity
would permit the use of force without
criminal sanctions.
Self-defense and necessity are long-accepted
defenses to criminal prosecution, and
Congress chose n ot to preclude them in Its
statute barring torture, despite language in
the Torture Convention to the contrary.
Similarly, precedent and history support the
idea that the president, as commander in
chief, may have to take measures in extreme
wartime situations that might run counter to
Congress' wishes. To ignore these issues
would deny policymakers a view of the
entire playing field.
Our system has a place for the discussion of
morality and policy. Our elected and
appointed officials must weigh these issues
in deciding on how it will conduct
interrogations. Ultimately, they must answer
to the American people for their choices. A
lawyer must not read the law to be more
restrictive than it is just to satisfy his own
moral goals, to prevent diplomatic backlash
or to advance the cause of international
human rights law.
However valid those considerations, they
simply do not rest within the province of the
lawyer who must make sure the government
understands what the law permits before it
decides what it should do.
John C. Yoo is a visiting scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute.
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Slim Legal Grounds for Torture Memos
Most Scholars Reject Broad View of Executive's Power
The Washington Post
July 4, 2004
R. Jeffrey Smith
Academic seminars including University of
California law professor John Yoo are no
longer apt to be dry discourses on the
primacy of executive branch power. At an
American Enterprise Institute session here
last week, a heckler shouted that Yoo should
apologize for drafting Bush administration
memos that, in the critic's words, condoned
torture.
The questioner was ruled out of order, so
Yoo had no opportunity to say again that he
feels the claim is a distortion of his legal
views. But there is little question that Yoo
and his former colleagues in the government
- a group of conservative legal scholars who
maintain that President Bush has broad
power to pursue the war on terrorism - are
caught in a discomforting spotlight.
The latest in a series of setbacks was the
Supreme Court's rejection on Monday of the
claim that Bush can detain enemy
combatants without independent review.
The court spurned the administration's
request that it defer to the president's
discretion and insisted on what it depicted as
a more careful balancing of national security
needs and individual rights, a test it said is
relevant even in wartime.
Some legal scholars argue that the courts'
decisions - in combination with the
administration's repudiation last week of an
internal memo arguing that the president has
the power to sanction torture - amount to a
permanent rebuke of the expansive view of
presidential power that has underpinned
numerous Bush administration policies,
including an executive order establishing
military tribunals that are not subject to
judicial review.
Georgetown University law professor David
Cole, a longtime critic of the administration,
called the court opinions in particular a
rejection of "this claim of unchecked
presidential authority which has been
advocated in so many areas since September
11" and said, "This is really quite
remarkable." Neal K. Katyal, a counsel to
some of the military lawyers defending
detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, said he
believes recent events mean "the
administration's legal war on terror is utterly
repudiated."
But Viet Dinh, a colleague at Georgetown
and former assistant attorney general who
played a key role in drafting the
administration's USA Patriot Act, said a
more narrow legal shift was possible.
"I would not say [the Supreme Court
decisions were] . . . a victory for the
executive branch," Dinh said to laughter at a
Georgetown symposium last week. But he
and Yoo have expressed optimism that some
powers asserted by the administration - such
as the right of the president to decide which
individuals are enemy combatants based on
evidence that might not be admissible in
court - may be preserved in new hearings on
individual detainees.
Their legal philosophy about presidential
powers, however, is supported at present by
only a minority of legal scholars, a
circumstance that became clear from the
storm of criticism that erupted after the
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disclosure this month of two memos
produced by Yoo and others in the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel.
An August 2002 memo, provoked by a CIA
request for interrogation guidance,
suggested that the president's commander-
in-chief authorities meant that those acting
at his direction would be immune from
prosecution for torture. That memo drew on
a January 2002 memo that suggested, over
the opposition of the State Department's
legal adviser, that the president could
suspend the application of international
protections for detainees.
Taken together, the memos presented a legal
groundwork for aggressive questioning of
foreign detainees. On June 22, White House
counsel Alberto R. Gonzales publicly
discredited the memo, an extremely rare
event for such opinions.
Gonzales called it "irrelevant and
unnecessary to support any action taken by
the president." At the same time, however,
he said the legal analysis "underpinning the
president's decisions" on detainees is not
being reevaluated, making it clear that the
White House is sticking with its expansive
views of Bush's authority.
Yoo, a former 1 aw c lerk to S upreme C ourt
Justice Clarence Thomas and principal
author of the August memo, is a well-known
advocate of strong presidential powers. He
was deputy head of the Office of Legal
Counsel from 2001 to 2003. But others who
worked on the memos, including Jay S.
Bybee, who headed the office during
roughly the same period and who is now a
federal appellate judge, shared Yoo's views
on presidential authority, as did Gonzales.
Yoo, who declined to comment on how the
memos were drafted, said they do not
represent "majority views among
international law academics." He said their
depiction of presidential authority instead
was "squarely within the practices of the
government" and past decisions by the
Supreme Court - a view his critics contest.
The legal ideas supporting the August memo
are part of a broad philosophy holding that
international laws such as the Geneva
Conventions and the Convention Against
Torture are. rules that states need not apply
in absolute terms. Advocates claim that
treaties are more like contracts subject to
"situational" adherence than norms of
conduct b inding on every state, s aid David
B. Rivkin Jr., a White House lawyer in the
Reagan administration who now works at
Baker and Hostetler in Washington.
"It's a minority viewpoint," said Rivkin,
who shares it. "If you line up 1,000 law
professors, only six or seven would sign up
to it." He said some of its adherents are
associated with the Federalist Society, a
conservative legal group formed to combat
what its Web site calls "orthodox liberal
ideology" and judicial interpretations that
fail to safeguard individual prerogatives.
Both Yoo and Bybee, as well as Attorney
General John D. Ashcroft, are close to the
society and frequently speak at its meetings,
as are other lawyers appointed to senior
Bush administration posts at the Defense
Department, Justice Department and White
House.
But criticism of the memos' claims of
presidential powers has come from a wide
range of legal scholars, including past heads
of the Justice Department Office of Legal
Counsel and chief legal advisers to the State
Department under Republican and
Democratic presidents.
Douglas W. Kmiec, a Pepperdine University
law professor who directed the legal
counsel's office under presidents Ronald
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Reagan and George H.W. Bush from 1985
to 1989, termed the August 2002 memo
"unrefined" and said its depiction of
presidential authorities ran "the risk of being
misunderstood." He said it failed in
particular to state clearly that anti-torture
laws could be superseded only "in grave or
unforeseen or imminent" crises that do not
exist at present.
Abraham D. Sofaer, a State Department
legal adviser from 1985 to 1990, said he also
considers the August 2002 memo flawed.
"We in the Reagan and Bush administrations
intended that deliberate violations of the
Convention [Against Torture] should lead to
the criminal prosecution," said Sofaer, who
testified for the executive branch during
Senate hearings on the convention's
ratification.
Sofaer said he believes the notion of
"inherent" presidential authority to ignore
the treaty is vague and has little basis.
Walter Dellinger, who directed the Office of
Legal Counsel in the Clinton administration,
said the memo's assertion of presidential
authority "goes beyond anything OLC has
ever stated" and omitted any reference to a
key Supreme Court decision that
acknowledges congressional power to enact
laws that limit presidential authority. That
decision, barring President Harry S. Truman
from seizing steel mills to stop a strike
during the Korean War, was specifically
cited by the Supreme Court last week in its
rulings on foreign detainees.
Congress has mostly been silent on these
issues. But five Republican senators bolted
from their party June 24 to pass a measure
limiting U.S. interrogation techniques to
those that the United States would consider
legal for other nations to use. It urged the
prompt prosecution or release of detainees to
avoid their "indefinite detention . .. which is
contrary to the legal principles and security
interests of the United States."
The Defense Department had opposed the
measure sponsored by Sen. Patrick J. Leahy
(D-Vt.), saying it would insert Congress
"inappropriately into the executive function
of conducting the war on terrorism" and
potentially diffuse the "national focus on
protecting Americans." But this view was
rejected by Republicans who have been
highly critical of detainee abuses.
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A 'Torture' Memo and Its Tortuous Critics
The Wall Street Journal
July 6, 2004
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule
Recent weeks have seen a public furor over
a Justice Department memorandum that
attempted to define the legal term "torture,"
as used in federal statutes and treaties, and
that p ointed t o c onstitutional questions that
would arise if statutory prohibitions on
torture conflict with the president's powers
as commander in chief An article in the
New York Times quoted legal academics
who criticized the memorandum's authors
for professional incompetence, and for
violating longstanding norms of professional
practice and integrity in the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC). Neither charge is justified.
The academic critics have puffed up an
intramural methodological disagreement
among constitutional lawyers into a test of
professional competence. Although we
disagree with some of the memo's
conclusions, its arguments fall squarely
within the OLC's longstanding
jurisprudence, stretching across many
administrations of different parties, which
emphasizes an expansive reading of
presidential power.
The academic critics say that the
memorandum counsels an unduly narrow
interpretation of "torture" in federal law, and
that it urges an overly sweeping conception
of the commander-in-chief power; the critics
even complain of the memorandum's failure
to cite or emphasize specific precedents -
notably the Youngstown decision of 1953,
in which the Supreme Court rejected
Truman's attempt to seize domestic steel
mills for the Korean war effort.
But the memorandum's arguments are
standard lawyerly fare, routine stuff. The
definition of torture is narrow simply
because, the memorandum claims, the
relevant statutory texts and their drafting
histories themselves build in a series of
narrowing limitations, including a
requirement of "specific intent." The
academic critics disagree, but there is no
foul play here.
As for the constitutional arguments, the
memo explicitly limits their context to the
interrogation (1) outside the U.S. (2) of
identified enemy combatants (3) concerning
the enemy's plans of attack. The logic of the
arguments might be stretched further, but
need not be, and it is routine for executive-
branch lawyers to proceed one step at a
time, just as courts do. Everyone, including
even the most strident of the academic
critics, agrees that Congress may not, by
statute, abrogate the president's commander-
in-chief power, any more than it could
prohibit the president from issuing pardons.
The only dispute is whether the choice of
interrogation methods should be deemed
within the president's power, as the memo
concludes. That conclusion may be right or
wrong - and we, too, would have preferred
more analysis of this point - but it falls well
within the bounds of professionally
respectable argument.
The Justice Department memorandum came
out of the OLC, whose jurisprudence has
traditionally been highly pro-executive. The
office has, for example, a notoriously
expansive view of the president's right to
unilaterally send military forces to other
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countries in order to protect American
citizens and property, without a declaration
of war by Congress. OLC opinions that
justify Bill Clinton's intervention in Kosovo
and George H.W. Bush's intervention in
Somalia are no less one-sided than the
recent memo on interrogation. A Clinton-era
opinion argued that a bill limiting the
president's ability to place military forces
under U.N. control would violate the
president's commander-in-chief power.
Not everyone likes OLC's traditional
jurisprudence, or its awkward role as both
defender and adviser of the executive
branch; but former officials who claim that
the OLC's function is solely to supply
"disinterested" advice, or that it serves as a
"conscience" for the government, arc
providing a sentimental, distorted and self-
serving picture of a complex reality.
There is an important intellectual context
behind the academic critics' complaints. An
older generation of legal academics
developed something like a consensus in
favor of enhanced congressional power over
foreign affairs; support for the War Powers
Act; and a favorable attitude towards
Youngstown and other decisions that restrict
presidential power. That conventional view
has been challenged in recent years by a
dynamic generation of younger scholars
who emphasize constitutional text, structure
and history rather than precedent, a nd w ho
argue for an expansive conception of
presidential power over foreign affairs,
relative to Congress.
Among this rising generation are legal
scholars who have recently held office in the
Justice Department, including John Yoo at
Berkeley. The memorandum thus focuses
not on restrictive Supreme Court precedents,
but on the constitutional text, the structure of
foreign affairs powers and the history of
presidential power in wartime. From this
perspective, the academic critics' complaints
have a distinct methodological valence, one
with intellectually partisan overtones.
The critics also argue that the Justice
Department lawyers behaved immorally by
justifying torture. Although it is true that
they did not, in their memorandum, tell their
political superiors that torture was immoral
or foolish or politically unwise, they were
not asked for moral or political advice; they
were asked about the legal limits on
interrogation. They provided reasonable
legal advice and no more, trusting that their
political superiors would make the right call.
Legal ethics classes will debate for years to
come whether Justice's lawyers had a moral
duty to provide moral advice (which would
surely have been ignored) or to resign in
protest.
For o ur p art, we find ithard to understand
why p eople think that t he l egal technicians
in the Justice Department are likely to have
more insight into the morality of torture than
their political superiors or even the man on
the street. But whatever one's views on the
use of torture on the battlefield, the
memorandum is not "incompetent" or
"abominable" or any more "one-sided" than
anything else that the Justice Department
has produced for its political masters.
Messrs. Posner and Vermeule are professors
at the University of Chicago Law School.
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Bush Pushes for Renewal of Antiterrorism Legislation
The New York Times
April 18, 2004
Richard W. Stevenson and Eric Lichtblau
President Bush on Saturday kicked off a
concerted effort to pressure Congress to
extend expiring provisions of the
antiterrorism law passed after the attacks of
Sept. 11, 2001, saying that failing to keep
them in force would leave the nation
vulnerable.
Mr. Bush used his weekly radio address to
renew and amplify a demand he first made
in his State of the Union address in January,
calling on the House and Senate to act to
extend provisions of the USA Patriot Act
that will otherwise expire at the end of next
year. The provisions include making it
easier for law enforcement and intelligence
agencies to share information about
suspected terrorists, expanding the use of
wiretaps and search warrants and allowing
the government to track who is sending e-
mail to or receiving it from suspected
terrorists.
"To abandon the Patriot Act would deprive
law enforcement and intelligence officers of
needed tools in the war on terror, and
demonstrate willful blindness to a
continuing threat," Mr. Bush said.
The White House's renewed focus on the
issue comes after weeks in which the
independent commission investigating the
attacks assailed the F.B.I. and C.I.A. - and
to some degree the Bush administration -
for f ailing to do more to identify and head
off the terrorist threat. The commission
focused attention on a number of
shortcomings that impeded intelligence and
law enforcement agencies from acting more
aggressively, including a wall that hindered
sharing a lot of information about suspected
terrorists.
In raising the issue again now, Mr. Bush is
hoping to emphasize to the nation the steps
he took after the attacks to ensure that
terrorists could never again operate so freely
within the United States, administration
officials said. The White House has also
been considering other steps in advance of
the commission's recommendations this
summer, including an overhaul of the
nation's intelligence agencies.
Though the Patriot Act passed Congress
with broad bipartisan support soon after the
attacks, it has subsequently become one of
the most heatedly debated pieces of
legislation to come out of Capitol Hill in
decades.
Civil libertarians in particular have fought
hard to have it scaled back or repealed,
asserting that it went too far in sacrificing
individual rights in a rush to ensure that law
enforcement had broad powers to identify
and track potential terrorists. But even some
Republicans who support the White House's
desire for robust legal powers for the fight
against terrorism said the law needed to be
reviewed carefully, and neither the House
nor the Senate is scheduled to consider
extending the expiring provisions anytime
soon.
But Mr. Bush suggested on Saturday that
opponents of the bill were deluding
themselves about the degree of the terrorist
threat and risked leaving law enforcement
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and intelligence officials handcuffed in their
ability to thwart terrorists.
"Key elements of the Patriot Act are set to
expire next year," Mr. Bush said. "Some
politicians in Washington act as if the threat
to America will also expire on that
schedule."
Among those members of Congress critical
of the act has been Senator John Kerry of
Massachusetts, Mr. Bush's Democratic rival
in the presidential race. While supporting
some of the act's main provisions, including
those allowing greater sharing of
intelligence and law enforcement
information, Mr. Kerry has criticized Mr.
Bush and Attorney General John Ashcroft as
using the legislation to limit civil liberties.
In a statement issued Saturday after Mr.
Bush's remarks, Mr. Kerry said, "The radio
address glosses o ver the fact that there h as
been more than sufficient legal authority for
intelligence sharing."
He added, "Senior Bush administration
officials simply failed to exercise leadership
and make certain that their agencies actually
did cooperate with each other."
Anthony Romero, executive director of the
American Civil Liberties Union, a leading
opponent of the legislation, said he believed
the White House was trying to distract
voters from the counterterrorism failings
raised in recent weeks by the Sept. 11
commission hearings.
"President Bush is clearly fighting a
defensive battle for the Patriot Act," Mr.
Romero said. 'This comes on the heels o f
the 9/11 commission and on the heels of
progress seen in Congress by Republicans
and Democrats who say that the Patriot Act
went too far."
But on Capitol Hill, even some Republicans
want to proceed cautiously.
"I think it's important to re-enact the Patriot
Act, but there has to be more balance
between enforcement power and civil
rights," Senator Arlen Specter, the
Pennsylvania Republican who sits on the
judiciary committee, said in an interview on
Friday.
Mr. Specter said an area of deep concern
was a section of the act that gives the F.B.I.
greater power to demand records from
businesses and institutions like libraries.
"There has to be refinement on access to
library records" before he would support the
legislation's renewal, he said. "If you're
talking about someone getting access to
books on bomb-making, that's O.K. But I
don't think they should have carte blanche
on library books."
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Repeal the Patriot Act
The Wall Street Journal
March 10, 2004
Andrew P. Napolitano
Earlier this week when President Bush asked
Congress to re-enact the portions of the
Patriot Act that are due to expire at the end
of next year, he provoked a critical review
of this controversial law. Those who believe
that our freedoms are guaranteed and cannot
be legislated away by Congress remain
committed to the repeal - not the renewal -
of this overreaching legislation.
The Constitution prohibits invasions of
privacy by the government by denying it the
power to engage in unreasonable searches
and seizures absent a warrant issued upon
probable cause. Prior to Sept. 11, 2001, we
could actually enjoy that right. But in
October 2001, the Patriot Act changed all
this. In addition to other violations of the
Constitution which it purports to sanction,
the Act authorizes intelligence agencies to
give what they obtain without probable
cause to prosecutors; and it authorizes
prosecutors to use the information thus
received in ordinary criminal prosecutions.
Even worse, the custodians of the records
are now prohibited from telling you that
your records were sought or surrendered.
This is more than just academic. If the
government can get evidence against you
from your financial institution under the
guise of national security - i.e., without a
showing of probable cause - but use it in a
criminal case against you, then the
Constitution's guarantees have been
shredded. But you know that already.
What most Americans don't know is that on
Dec. 13, 2003, the right to privacy suffered
another serious blow. On that day, after the
capture of Saddam Hussein, President Bush
signed into law the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
This statute expands the term "financial
institution" so as to include travel agencies
and car dealers, casinos and hotels, real
estate and insurance agents and lawyers,
news stands and pawn brokers, and even the
Post Office.
Now, without you knowing it, the Justice
Department can learn where you traveled,
what you spent, what you ate, what you paid
to finance your car and your house, what
you confided to your lawyer and insurance
and real estate agents, and what periodicals
you read without having to demonstrate any
evidence or even suspicion of criminal
activity on your part. And the government
can now, for the first time in American
history, without obtaining the approval of a
court, read your mail before you do, and
prosecute you on the basis of what it reads.
(Of course, if the government doesn't
prosecute you, you'll likely never even
know that it has invaded your privacy.)
None of this was supposed to have
happened. The tools Congress gave to
intelligence agencies are only constitutional
when used just for intelligence purposes -
like watching or deporting foreign spies -
and only against genuine foreign threats.
When criminal prosecution is implicated, the
Constitution's protections are triggered.
Most Americans don't want the government
to know of their personal behavior, not
61
because we have anything to hide, but
because without probable cause, without
some demonstrable evidence of some
personal criminal behavior, the Constitution
declares that our personal lives are none of
the federal government's business.
Government is not reason or eloquence,
George Washington once said, it is force.
That's why we have a Constitution: to
restrain the government's exercise of force
so we can be a free people. Government
surveillance undermines freedom because it
is natural to hesitate to exercise freedom
when the government is watching and
recording. Numerous Supreme Court
decisions have underscored t his b y holding
that freedom needs breathing room. With the
government's eyes in our hotel rooms,
lawyers' offices and mailboxes, freedom
will suffocate.
In his famous dissent in Olmstead, Justice
Brandeis called privacy - which he defined
as "the right to be let alone" - "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men." Brandeis argued
that the framers knew that Americans
wanted protection from governmental
intrusion not only for their property but also
for their thoughts, ideas and emotions. Many
current members of Congress and the Justice
Department, it would appear, disagree, since
they have continued their inexorable erosion
of this most basic right.
Mr. Napolitano, a judge of the Superior
Court of New Jersey from 1987 to 1995, is
the senior judicial analyst with the Fox
News Channel
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The Patriot Act Without Tears
National Review
June 14, 2004
Andrew C. McCarthy
It was m id-August 2 001, the last desperate
days before the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Desperate, that is, for an alert agent o fthe
FBI's Foreign Counterintelligence Division
(FCI); much of the rest of America, and
certainly much of the rest of its government,
blithely carried on, content to assume,
despite the number and increasing ferocity
of terrorist attacks dating back nearly nine
years, that national security w as little more
than an everyday criminal-justice issue.
By October 2001, the world had changed-
and the USA Patriot Act was passed. So
patent was the need for this law that it
racked up massive support: 357-66 in the
House, 98-1 in the Senate. In the nearly
three years since, however, it has been
distorted beyond recognition by a coalition
of anti-Bush leftists and libertarian
extremists, such that it is now perhaps the
most broadly maligned-and misunderstood-
piece of meaningful legislation in U.S.
history. If our nation is serious about
national security, the Patriot Act must be
made permanent; instead, it could soon be
gone-and t he disastrous "intelligence w all"
rebuilt.
Besides paving the way for agents to pool
critical information, Patriot has been
invaluable in modernizing investigative
tools to ensure that more information is
actually captured. While the critics'
persistent caviling misleadingly suggests
that these tools are a novel assault on
privacy rights, for the most part they merely
extend to national-security intelligence
investigations the same methods that have
long been available to law-enforcement
agents probing the vast array of federal
crimes, including those as comparatively
innocuous as health-care fraud.
Among the best examples is the so-called
"roving" (or multi-point) wiretap. As the
telephony revolution unfolded, criminals
naturally took advantage, avoiding wiretap
surveillance by the simple tactic of
constantly switching phones-which became
especially easy to do once cellphones
became ubiquitous. Congress reacted nearly
20 years ago with a law that authorized
criminal agents to obtain wiretaps that,
rather than aim at a specific telephone,
targeted persons, thus allowing monitoring
to continue without significant delay as
criminals ditched one phone for the next.
Inexplicably, this same authority was not
available to intelligence agents investigating
terrorists under FISA. Patriot rectifies this
anomaly.
On the law-enforcement side, Patriot
expands the substance of the wiretap statute
to account for the realities of terrorism. Most
Americans would probably be surprised to
learn that while the relatively trivial offense
of gambling, for example, was a lawful
predicate for a criminal wiretap
investigation, chemical-weapons offenses,
the use of weapons of mass destruction, the
killing of Americans abroad, terrorist
financing, and computer fraud were not.
Thanks to Patriot, that is no longer the case.
Analogously, Patriot revamped other
telecommunications-related techniques.
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Prior law, for example, had been written in
the bygone era when cable service meant
television programming. Owing to privacy
concerns about viewing habits, which the
government rarely has a legitimate reason to
probe, federal law made access to cable-
usage records practically impossible-
creating in service providers a fear of being
sued by customers if they complied with
government information requests. Now, of
course, millions of cable subscribers-
including no small number of terrorists-use
the service not only for entertainment
viewing but for e-mail services.
While e-mail-usage records from dial-up
providers have long been available by
subpoena, court order, or search warrant
(depending on the sensitivity of the
information sought), cable providers for
years delayed complying with such
processes, arguing that their services fell
under the restrictive umbrella of prior cable
law. This was not only a potentially
disastrous state of affairs in terrorism cases,
where delay can cost lives, but in many
other contexts as well-including one
reported case in which a cable company
declined to comply with an order to disclose
the name of a suspected pedophile who was
distributing child pornography on the
Internet even as he bragged online about
sexually abusing a young girl.
(Investigators, forced to pursue other leads,
needed two extra weeks to identify and
apprehend the s uspect.) Recognizing that it
made no sense to have radically different
standards for acquiring the same
information, Patriot made cable e-mail
available on the same terms as dial-up.
Patriot also closed other gaping e-mail
loopholes. Under prior law, for example,
investigators trying to identify the source of
incriminating e-mail were severely
handicapped in that their readiest tool, the
grand-jury subpoena, could be used only to
compel the service provider to produce
customers' names, addresses, and lengths of
service-information often of little value in
ferreting out wrongdoers who routinely use
false names and temporary e-mail addresses.
Patriot solved this problem by empowering
grand juries to compel payment information,
which can be used to trace the bank and
credit-card records by which investigators
ultimately establish identity. This not only
makes it possible to identify potential
terrorists far more quickly-and thus, it is
hoped, before they can strike-but also to
thwart other criminals who must be
apprehended with all due speed. Such
subpoenas, for example, have been
employed repeatedly to identify and arrest
molesters who were actively abusing
children. The Justice Department reports
that, only a few weeks ago, the new
authority prevented a Columbine-like attack
by allowing agents to identify a suspect, and
obtain his confession, before the attack
could take place.
Palpably, the Patriot Act, far from
imperiling the Constitution, went a long way
toward shoring up the perilous state of
national security that existed on the morning
of 9/11. That is why it is so excruciating to
note that, despite all we have been through,
we will be transported right back to that
precarious state if Congress fails to
reauthorize Patriot. Because of intense
lobbying by civil-liberties groups
instinctively hostile to anything that makes
government stronger-even in the arena of
national defense, where we need it to be
strong if we are to have liberties at all-
Patriot's sponsors had to agree, to secure
passage, that the act would effectively be
experimental. That is, the information
sharing, improved investigative techniques,
and several other provisions were not
permanently enacted into law but are
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scheduled to "sunset" on December 31,
2005. Dismayingly, far from grasping the
eminent sense in making these
improvements permanent, the alliance of
Democratic Bush-bashers and crusading
Republican libertarians is actually pushing a
number of proposals to extend the sunset
provision to parts of Patriot that were not
originally covered.
At a time when the 9/11 Commission's
public hearings highlight intelligence lapses
and investigative backwardness-and when
al-Qaeda publicly threatens larger-than-ever
attacks while continuing to fight our forces
and allies on the battlefield and in
murderous attacks throughout the world-it is
remarkable that elected officials would have
any priority other than making the Patriot
Act permanent.
Mr. McCarthy, who led the prosecution of
Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and eleven
others in connection with the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing, is a consultant at the
Investigative Project in Washington, D.C.,
and a contributor to National Review
Online.
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EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Justices' Ruling Postpones Resolution of Cheney Case
The New York Times
June 25, 2004
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme court held Thursday that a
lower court had acted "prematurely" when
it rejected a request from Vice President
Dick Cheney to block disclosure of records
from his energy policy task force.
In a vote of 7-to-2, the court sent the case
back to a federal appeals court, a decision
that will defer any resolution of the
politically sensitive lawsuit until after the
November elections. The lawsuit had the
potential to embarrass the administration,
especially given Mr. Cheney's former role
as chief executive of Halliburton and the
close ties of other administration members
to the energy industry.
In telling the appeals court to be ' 'mindful
of the burdens imposed on the executive
branch in any future proceedings," Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy's majority opinion,
implicitly but not definitively, rejected the
Bush administration's position that the vice
president's activities should not be subject to
pretrial discovery at all. Two members of
the seven-justice majority, Justices Clarence
Thomas and Antonin Scalia, would have
accepted the administration's argument that
the Supreme Court itself should block
discovery at this point.
The dissenting justices, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and David H. Souter, said the
Supreme Court should have permitted the
case to proceed in the district court. In her
dissenting opinion, which Justice Souter
signed, Justice Ginsburg said the lower
courts could have handled the case under
procedures that would "accommodate
separation-of-powers concerns."
Two organizations, the conservative Judicial
Watch and the liberal Sierra Club, sued Mr.
Cheney and his National Energy Policy
Development Group to force it to comply
with an open-government law, the Federal
Advisory Committee Act. The lawsuit has
been stalled at a preliminary phase for more
than two years. The pretrial discovery
dispute that the Supreme Court's decision
keeps alive was generated by uncertainty
over whether the task force was covered by
the disclosure law in the first place.
The F ederal A dvisory C ommittee A ct does
not apply to c ommittees c omposed entirely
of federal officials. With its membership
composed of the vice president, six cabinet
secretaries and four other government
officials, the energy task force appeared to
fall outside the law's coverage.
But the plaintiffs argued that officials of
Enron and other private energy companies
had played such an active role in the group's
deliberations that they should be considered
as de facto members, bringing the task force
within the disclosure law.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the
plaintiffs were entitled to enough discovery
to show whether that was in fact the case.
As it went to the Supreme Court, the case,
Cheney v. United States District Court,
No.03-475, was a mix of high-stakes politics
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and complex issues of federal jurisdiction.
It was clear that the justices, while resolving
the jurisdictional questions, were fully aware
of the broader context as well.
While the appeals court had ruled that the
Bush administration had to include a claim
of executive privilege as part of any effort to
block discovery, Justice Kennedy said that
was incorrect as a matter of law and not
sensitive enough to the constitutional
separation of powers.
"Executive privilege is an extraordinary
assertion of power not to be lightly
invoked," Justice Kennedy said, adding,
"Once executive privilege is asserted,
coequal branches of the government are set
on a collision course." A court should
"explore other avenues short of forcing the
executive to invoke privilege," he said.
While pretrial discovery issues are not
ordinarily subject to appeal, "this is not a
routine discovery dispute," Justice Kennedy
said. He said the court going back to John
Marshall had recognized the special position
of president and vice president. While these
officials were not "above the law," Justice
Kennedy said, it did mean that courts should
recognize "the paramount necessity of
protecting the executive branch from
vexatious litigation that might distract it
from the energetic performance of its
constitutional duties."
The appeals court had relied for its analysis
in part on the Supreme Court's 1974
decision in United States v. Nixon, which
rejected Nixon's claim of executive
privilege and ordered him to turn over the
Watergate tapes to the special prosecutor.
But there were "fundamental differences"
between the cases, Justice Kennedy said.
The Nixon case was a criminal case; this is a
civil suit.
"The need for information for use in civil
cases, while far from negligible, does not
share the urgency or significance of the
criminal subpoena requests in Nixon,"
Justice Kennedy said, indicating that the
interests to be served in the suit against Mr.
Cheney were much less pressing.
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg
said there was no indication that the federal
district court would ignore the majority's
separation-of-powers concerns as discovery
proceeded. She noted that the trial judge had
invited the administration to make specific
objections and in other ways limit the
government's exposure. She said she would
"allow the district court, in the first
instance, to pursue its expressed intention
tightly to rein in discovery" if the
government, instead of resisting all
discovery, requested it to do so.
It could now be many months before the
lower courts sort o ut t he next phase oft he
lawsuit. The majority suggested that the
court of appeals might reconsider its
precedent holding that private citizens acting
as "de facto" members of a government
panel can bring the group within the
coverage of the disclosure law.
Administration officials said that the ruling
vindicated their position and protected the
president's ability to seek confidential
advice.
Shannen W. Coffin, a former deputy
assistant attorney general, who handled the
case in district court, said that the decision
was a "huge victory for executive
authority" that would help the White House
regain legal prerogatives in the courts.
At the same time, by returning the case to
the lower courts, the ruling kept alive for
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Democrats the secrecy issue they had seized
on.
"George Bush and Dick Cheney have
forgotten that the White House belongs to
America, not Enron, and they owe it to the
public to disclose this information," Phil
Singer, a spokesman for Senator John Kerry,
the presumptive Democratic presidential
nominee, said in a statement.
The majority opinion was joined by Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices
Sandra Day O'Connor, Stephen G. Breyer
and John Paul Stevens, who also wrote a
concurring opinion.
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At the Court, Inflating the White House's Power
The Washington Post
July 4, 2004
Joan A. Lukey
On this Fourth of July, it is somehow fitting
that we are awash in a sea of important
Supreme Court decisions addressing
fundamental constitutional issues. Yet, the
ruling that may prove to be the most critical
of all seems to be garnering the least
attention.
I'm referring to Cheney v. U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia, the case
in which two public interest groups are
striving to gain access to the records of
President Bush's energy task force, chaired
by Vice President Cheney. Ten days ago, the
high court sent the case back to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia with
instructions that essentially rewrote 50 years
ofjudicial history.
You're probably thinking: What on earth is
she talking about? In the last week and a
half, we've had decisions on U.S. citizens
who are considered enemy combatants and
on the rights of Guantanamo Bay detainees.
How could an opinion with which the
justices put off making a final decision until
after the presidential election possibly be so
important? Well, think again. With this
decision, the Supreme Court has just re-
landscaped the constitutional terrain
between the White House and the judiciary
in a manner that seems to hand off a portion
of the judiciary's power to the executive
branch.
Understanding the difference between
"executive privilege" and "executive
powers" is the key to understanding the
Cheney decision. So bear with me here.
"Executive privilege" is the doctrine under
which the president contends that he does
not have to turn over, in judicial or other
proceedings, evidence concerning his
performance of his executive branch duties.
"Executive powers" are those powers
assigned in the Constitution to the president,
rather than Congress or the courts.
In a nutshell, here's what happened:
Throughout the Cheney litigation, the
administration took the novel position that it
would not assert "executive privilege" as
grounds for withholding the information
sought by the Sierra Club, the liberal
environmental group, and by the
conservative Judicial Watch. Instead, the
White House insisted on relying on the
somewhat amorphous (some might even say
squishy) notion that the task force
documents were protected because the vice
president was operating pursuant to his
"executive powers."
The administration therefore took the
position that if it did not assert executive
privilege and the vice president was carrying
out the duties conferred on the executive by
the Constitution, the documents relating to
those duties did not have to be turned over -
and the courts did not have the right to
review that decision. But is it indeed the
case that the courts cannot review an
executive decision to withhold documents
produced in the performance of executive
duties? Until the Supreme Court's ruling 10
days ago, constitutional scholars would have
said the answer was clear. If an
administration wanted to withhold
information pertaining to domestic policies
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in the midst of a lawsuit, its only viable
option was to invoke "executive privilege"
and take its chances with judicial review,
meaning the courts would decide whether
the privilege was properly claimed.
Only in those relatively rare instances where
the shrouded information related to defense
or international affairs could an
administration avoid invoking executive
privilege (and the consequent judicial
review). Those areas were perceived to fall
so squarely within a president's powers that
no other branch, including the judiciary in
the context of a lawsuit, had the right to
second-guess the president. (And since suits
pending in our courts are much more likely
to relate to domestic matters than defense or
foreign affairs, a president who wanted to
withhold documents typically had to assert
the privilege and await a judicial
determination.)
It comes as no surprise that the
administration did its darnedest in the
Cheney case to avoid asserting executive
privilege. But, the District Court and the
Court ofAppeals apparently read the same
cases that I did, and therefore reached the
same conclusion: Energy is a domestic
matter, and it was therefore incumbent on
the vice president to invoke executive
privilege and submit the information being
withheld to the courts for review.
Alternatively, he could simply produce the
information to the plaintiffs.
The high court clearly disagreed. In one
quiet little line, on the 20th page of a 21-
page majority opinion, the seven justices in
the majority undid decades of evolving
doctrine with this: "[the Court of Appeals]
labored under the mistaken assumption that
the assertion of executive privilege is a
necessary precondition to the Government's
separation-of-powers objections."
Translation: The administration need not
invoke a doctrine that would subject the
decision to withhold information to judicial
review, even regarding matters of domestic
policy.
With barely a nod to precedent (except to
explain why the Nixon tapes case, which
came out the other way, wasn't similar at
all), the majority endorsed the
administration's position on this point,
pretty much lock, stock and barrel. If the
White House wants to withhold information
when members of the public seek it, the
White House may simply do so. No claim of
executive privilege is required. And if there
is a process for judicial review in the
absence of a privilege claim, I'm not seeing
it.
The history of the doctrine of executive
privilege, coupled with the current
administration's reputation for a lack of
openness, casts this decision in a particularly
ironic light. Although the evolution of
executive privilege is generally believed to
have begun with President Dwight
Eisenhower's 1954 dispute with a
congressional committee investigating the
Defense Department, most of the contextual
evolution of executive privilege and
executive powers occurred during the Nixon
years, particularly in the Watergate era.
When President Richard Nixon, who was
renowned for his penchant for secrecy,
sought to assert an absolute, non-reviewable
executive privilege as justification for
withholding his Oval Office tapes, his
efforts were thwarted in 1974 by a Supreme
Court that retorted that the president could
not remove from the Court the "province
and duty . . . to say what the law is." Even
so, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger was
careful to note, the decision requiring Nixon
to turn over the tapes would likely have been
quite different if the subpoenaed materials
had contained "military or diplomatic
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secrets," for which "the courts have
traditionally shown the utmost deference" to
the president.
Almost exactly 30 years later, the court has
reached the opposite conclusion regarding
the right to withhold documents by an
administration that some consider as
secretive as Nixon's. I find this particularly
ironic, given the anecdotal evidence that no
administration has shrouded itself in
executive privilege more frequently, or for a
broader variety of reasons, than has the
current one. One feels compelled to ask: Of
all times, why is the court doing this now?
As Boston Globe reporter Anne E. Kornblut
wrote on Feb. 11, 2002, "During his first
year in office, Bush has delayed the release
of presidential papers from the Reagan
White House, imposed limits on public
access to government documents, refused to
share revised data from the 2000 Census,
and shielded d ecades-old F BI records from
scrutiny."
Make no mistake: The White House's
assertion of executive powers in the Cheney
case i sn ovel. No previous p resident, when
confronted with a judicial demand for
documents related to a domestic issue, has
ever responded with a claim of executive
power. That the Supreme Court has accepted
that assertion is stunning. The majority has
excused the administration from complying
with the only process that assures the courts
the right of review when an administration
refuses to honor a subpoena and has
accepted the argument that the vice
president was acting under his executive
powers, a realm into which the judiciary
cannot intrude. Against the backdrop of this
decision, the question now is this: If the vice
president is ordered by the lower courts to
reveal documents, will the administration
honor such orders?
Or, has the balance of power in the realm of
executive secrecy now truly shifted to a new
final arbiter?
Joan Lukey is a senior partner at Wilmer
Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP in
Boston. In the 1980s, as a Massachusetts
special assistant attorney general, she
represented the administration of Michael
Dukakis in its unsuccessful efforts to
establish executive privilege in the
commonwealth.
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Refusal to Testify Has Precedent
The Washington Post
March 27, 2004
Charles Lane
The White House's refusal to permit
national security adviser Condoleezza Rice
to testify publicly and under oath before -the
commission investigating the Sept. 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks is not unprecedented in the
practices of both the Bush administration
and previous administrations, according to
legal analysts and a report by the research
arm of the Library of Congress.
Presidential advisers and other White House
staff members have on occasion testified
about policy matters before congressional
committees since the end of World War II -
but far less frequently than Cabinet
secretaries, who are subject to Senate
confirmation.
Whatever their political or other motivations
may have been, presidents have generally
cited the separation of powers, and the need
for confidential and candid executive
deliberations, in explaining their resistance
to testimony by those White House staff
members who, like Rice, serve the president
and are not confirmed by the Senate.
But these distinctions and justifications
remain relatively undefined and have never
been ruled on by the Supreme Court. Such a
court battle would probably occur only if the
commission sent Rice a subpoena, as some
members have suggested, and she resisted it.
Historically, clashes over White House staff
testimony have been settled through
compromise between the executive and
legislative branches, with each side vying
for advantage in the same forum where the
dispute over Rice is being played out: the
court of public opinion.
"It depends on the situation and the politics
and the leverage Congress has and how
embarrassing it is for the president not to
comply," said Louis Fisher, senior specialist
in separation of powers at the Congressional
Research Service.
In a letter Thursday to Thomas H. Kean and
Lee H. Hamilton, the chairman and vice
chairman of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Counsel to the President Alberto R.
Gonzales articulated the "principles" he said
make it impossible for Rice to offer
anything more than a second private
question-and-answer session with the
commission. Rice was interviewed privately,
and not under oath, on Feb. 7.
"In order for President Bush and future
presidents to continue to receive the best and
most candid possible advice from their
White House staff on counterterrorism and
other national security issues, it is important
that these advisers not be compelled to
testify publicly before congressional bodies
such as the Commission," Gonzales wrote.
This is the second time the White House has
taken such a position in an election-year
battle over congressional access to a key
White House anti-terrorism official. Tom
Ridge, then the White House's homeland
security director, refused to testify before
the Senate Appropriations Committee in
2002 but ultimately appeared for public
72
"informal" sessions before two House
committees.
President Jimmy Carter's White House
appears to have taken a similar position. An
internal 1979 directive advised staffers that
they had "immunity" from compelled
congressional testimony because of
separation of powers, according to a 2002
report by the Congressional Research
Service.
The main exception, historically, appears to
be in cases of alleged wrongdoing. When
scandal strikes, White House aides testify.
Several Nixon White House aides testified
before the Senate Watergate committee, as
did Carter's national security adviser,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, during the Senate's
investigation of alleged lobbying by the
president's brother, Billy Carter, on behalf
of Libya.
President Bill Clinton's national security
adviser, Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger,
testified before a Senate committee
investigating the Clinton campaign's
fundraising practices in 1996. Berger, as
deputy national security adviser, testified on
Haiti policy in May 1994, but that testimony
was behind closed doors.
So it ultimately may be important whether
the current commission, created by Congress
to "make a full and complete accounting of
the circumstances surrounding the attacks,
and the extent of the United States'
preparedness for, and immediate response
to, the attacks" and to recommend
''corrective measures," is conducting a probe
similar to investigations of such scandals.
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Charlie McCarthy Hearings
The New York Times
April 1, 2004
Maureen Dowd
Following is the text of a letter sent
yesterday to Thomas H. Kean and Lee H.
Hamilton of the Sept. 11 commission from
Alberto R. Gonzales, counsel to President
Bush.
While we continue to hold to the principles
underlying the Constitutional separation of
powers, that the appropriate and patriotic
action f or t he C ommission i s to shut d own
and stop pestering us, the President is
prepared, in the interest of comity and
popularity, to testify, subject to the
conditions set forth below.
The President at all times, even on trips to
the men's room, will be accompanied by the
Vice President.
The Commission must agree in writing that
it will not pose any questions directly to the
President. Mr. Bush's statements will be
restricted to asides on Dick Cheney's
brushoffs, as in "Just like he said," "Roger
that" and "Ditto."
Another necessary condition, in keeping
with the tenets of executive privilege: Mr.
Cheney will require that the Commission
observe the rules of his favorite show from
the Eisenhower Administration, "What's
My Line?" The panelists, in the manner of
Dorothy Kilgallen and Bennett Cerf, must
try to guess what the President and Vice
President didn't know and when they didn't
know it through questions that elicit a
"yes" or "no."
After 10 "no" answers, the panel will not
be allowed to question Mr. Cheney or
anyone else in the Administration ever
again. In the mystery-guest round, Richard
Ben-Veniste, Bob Kerrey and other
Democrats on the Commission will be
blindfolded.
(Or Mr. Cheney is willing to follow the
precedent of Garry Moore and Bess
Meyerson, using "I've Got A Secret" rules:
The Vice President will whisper a secret
about the Administration's inadequate
response to terrorism in the President's ear
and each panelist will have 30 seconds to
question Mr. Cheney in an attempt to guess
the secret, which he will not reveal even if
they guess right.)
As an additional accommodation, the
President and Vice President have now
agreed to take a "pinkie oath," looping little
fingers with each other, while reserving the
right to cross the index and middle fingers of
their remaining hands and hide them behind
their backs.
We must deny your request that Mr. Cheney
bring along a PowerPoint presentation
depicting who was in and out of the loop, in
accordance with separation-of-PowerPoint
principles. The Vice President has decreed
that the loop of influence is under the cone
of silence.
The White House is taking the extraordinary
step of bowing to public opinion - even
though Mr. Cheney states that he doesn't
give two hoots about public opinion.
Therefore, the Vice President will only
entertain questions about negligence in
fighting terrorism concerning the critical
period between Jan. 21, 1993, and Jan. 20,
2001. As President Bush stated on Tuesday,
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March 30, the Commission must gain "a
complete picture of the months and years
before Sept. 11."
The Vice President will not address any
queries about why no one reacted to George
Tenet's daily "hair on fire" alarms to the
President about a coming Al Q aeda attack;
or why the President was so consumed with
chopping and burning cedar on his Crawford
ranch that he ignored the warning in an Aug.
6, 2001, briefing that Al Qaeda might try to
hijack aircraft; or why the President asked
for a plan to combat Al Qaeda in May and
then never followed up while Richard
Clarke's aggressive plan was suffocated by
second-raters; or why the President was
never briefed by his counterterrorism chief
on anything but cybersecurity until Sept. 11;
or why the Administration-in-amber made
so many cold war assumptions, such as
thinking that terrorists h ad to be sponsored
by a state even as terrorists had taken over a
state; or why the President went along with
the Vice President and the neocons to fool
the American public into believing that
Saddam had a hand in the 9/11 attacks; or
why the Administration chose to undercut
the war on terrorism and inflame the Arab
world by attacking Iraq, without a plan to
protect our perilously overextended forces
or to exit with a realistic hope that a
democracy will be left behind.
The Commission must not, under any
circumstances, ask the Vice President why
American soldiers and civilians in Iraq are
being greeted with barbarous infernos rather
than flowery bouquets.
Finally, we request that when the President
finishes with this painful teeth-pulling visit,
the Commission shall offer him a lollipop.
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President's Privilege;
Why Bush Didn't Want Condoleezza Rice to Testify Before the September 11 Commission
- and Why She's Going to do so Today
The Daily Standard
April 8, 2004
Terry Eastland
To allow National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice to testify under oath
before the September 11 commission today,
President Bush had to stand down from a
claim of executive privilege. Bush was right
to do that, but let's give the privilege its due.
Bush has described executive privilege as a
"principle" of separation of powers. That's
an all too brief way of putting it. The
framers oft he Constitution understood that
there are three kinds of power-legislative,
executive and judicial-and that good
government lies in the distribution of at least
the bulk of each kind of power to
(respectively) Congress, the president and
the courts.
So in the Constitution, we find the different
powers "separated" into branches, with each
branch structured in such a way as to enable
it to carry out its different task. Regarding
the two elective branches, the president is to
provide the "energy" that government needs
for laws to be administered and-a point
relevant at the moment-wars to be fought,
while Congress is to provide the
"deliberation" required for the enactment of
necessary legislation.
The framers understood that the elective
branches might clash. Indeed, you could say
that clashes between the two are inevitable.
After all, a Congress that wants from a
president information that it regards as
necessary to its legislative task is within its
rights to insist that he give it up. And a
president who wants to maintain his ability
to carry out his executive function is equally
within his rights to assert a privilege to hold
back the information.
Bush justified his claim, as past presidents
have, by citing the need for receiving
confidential and candid advice from staff
members: "A president and his advisers,
including his adviser for national security
affairs, must be able to communicate freely
and privately, without being compelled to
reveal those communications to the
legislative branch." It would be nice to have
a tidy solution when the two branches so
fundamentally disagree. But the framers
failed to provide one. Not that they could
have, for disputes between branches can't be
governed by rules drawn up in advance. As
University of Texas political scientist
Jeffrey Tulis has observed, "There is no
formula independent of political
circumstance with which to weigh such
competing institutional claims." Ordinarily,
things are worked out through some sort of
compromise acceptable to both branches.
In February, the commission interviewed
Condoleezza Rice in private. She wasn't
under oath, and the interview wasn't
recorded. When the commission asked her
to return for a public interview under oath,
the president's lawyers countered by
offering her for another private interview
that would be recorded and then transcribed
and made public. But the commission stood
its ground, and the president yielded.
"Political circumstances" surely affected
Bush's change of mind. Consider that if
there is one case in which the national
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security adviser's public testimony before
Congress is absolutely essential, it would
have to be the one at hand. For here we have
a body created by Congress and sanctioned
by the president himself that's probing what
went wrong before the September 11 attacks
and what changes should be made.
Consider, too, that the commission has
demonstrated that it isn't embarked on some
effort to undermine executive power. In
return for her public, sworn testimony, the
commission was willing to agree not to
request any additional testimony of that kind
from Rice or other White House aides, nor
to regard her appearance as setting a
precedent for making future requests for
such testimony.
Though Bush won't concede the point, his
claim of privilege wasn't helped by another
"political circumstance"-Rice's frequent
media appearances in which she sought to
rebut a former counterterrorism aide's
criticism of the administration. Had Rice
stayed off television, the president's
assertion of the need for strictly private
communications with his advisers would
have been more persuasive.
When Rice takes her seat today before the
commission, the debate will shift from what
the president's spokesman calls "process" to
"substance" from the dispute over executive
privilege to the issues involving September
11. Yet given our g overnment of separated
powers, process questions inevitably will
return, with this president and this Congress
and with future ones. Executive privilege
will be back.
Terry Eastland is publisher of The Weekly
Standard. This article appeared originally in
the Dallas Morning News.
77
Power Plays
The National Journal
April 17, 2004
Alexis Simendinger
When Condoleezza Rice took her place at
the bright-red witness table in front of the
9/11 commission last week and raised her
hand to take a public oath to tell the truth,
the president's foreign-policy adviser
became the neatly dressed embodiment of
the limits of a president's power to do
exactly as he pleases.
In March, to avoid testifying while still
counterpunching, Rice had done everything
but appear on the Home Shopping Network
to defend the White House. Constitutional
principle began to pale under the TV lights,
so Bush instructed White House Counsel
Alberto Gonzales and other aides to steer the
administration out of the mess. "We
addressed many of the concerns the
president had," Card said. "It was a
compromise that we were not looking for.
When you have executive privilege, you are
not looking for an excuse to give it up."
There's a small irony in Bush's embrace of
what Card called "the reality" of "the tug of
immediate gratification": That's exactly
what Bush found disquieting about the
reactions of the investigation-plagued
Clinton White House to congressional and
independent-counsel demands for all manner
of behind-the-scenes staff advice and
communication to the president.
As far back as Bush's 2001 transition, "there
was a recognition, and I think it was kind of
a sad recognition, that the previous
administration allowed for the erosion of
some executive authority," Card said. "And
I'm not casting aspersions on them, because
the dynamics of the moment do have an
impact."
Card said Bush was determined, as
president, to undo the damages of the
Clinton era and leave the presidency
stronger for his efforts: "The president
wanted to restore, not just accept ... the
executive authority that presidents had
traditionally been able to exercise."
Asserting Power, Whetting Appetites
Bush has had a notable run at flexing his
executive muscles for more than three years.
He took the nation to war in Afghanistan
and Iraq and called up the military Reserves
under his authority as commander-in-chief.
Bush controlled U.S. intelligence about
Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction
and required the nation to trust his instincts
about the virtues of toppling Iraq's
government. He declared war on terrorism
worldwide and said he had the sole authority
to incarcerate U.S. citizens - most
prominently, Jose Padilla - without charge
or legal representation, if the government
designated them as "enemy c ombatants" in
that war.
Bush used the power of his pen to issue
executive orders reconsidering some of his
predecessor's safety and environmental
regulations, and he is using the Office of
Management and Budget to scrutinize (some
critics assert OMB is manipulating) the
scientific rationale for regulating business
and industry. Bush also used executive
orders to create new federal offices in
response to the terrorist attacks of 2001, as
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well as a White House office devoted to
helping faith-based and community
organizations. And when the president
couldn't get Congress to back his plan to
make federal dollars flow to those
religiously leaning organizations, he used an
executive order to command the federal
government to go as far as possible without
new legislation.
When the Senate blocked confirmation of
judicial nominees that Democrats found too
conservative, Bush used his decree to
temporarily fill two vacancies on the bench
by taking the unusual step of recess-
appointing judges who had been blocked. In
another matter, the president said he would
rather go to court than allow the General
Accounting Office or Congress to compel
the White House to surrender documents
and other details of his energy task force,
chaired by the vice president. Bush has also
seized on executive discretion to remove or
withhold government information from the
public - with little accountability, as it
happens - on the basis of national security.
And Bush has asserted by executive order
that he, along with former presidents and
their heirs or family members, should be
able to invoke executive privilege to block
the government's release of presidential
papers under provisions of Watergate-era
reform law.
Because of Bush's assertive use of his
unilateral powers during his term, the
constitutionally mandated checks on his
authority have come knocking on the Oval
Office door - via Congress, the courts, and,
in an election year, the voters. On April 27
and 28, the U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled
to hear oral arguments in three cases that go
to the heart of the executive's power under
the Constitution: Cheney v. U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia (the
energy task force records dispute); Rumsfeld
v. Padilla; and Hamdi v.Rumsfeld (another
enemy-combatant challenge). Bush can
declare that Padilla can be held indefinitely
in a military lockup because Padilla
allegedly conspired with a terrorist group,
but the Supreme Court will affirm or deny
that power.
"The administration has been vigorous in
reasserting the constitutional powers of the
presidency," wrote John Yoo, a former
deputy assistant attorney general under John
Ashcroft in Justice's Office of Legal
Counsel, in an e-mail response to a
reporter's question. "This extends from the
president's war powers, to claims of
executive privilege, to efforts to preserve
executive discretion in the operations of
government... Even should the
administration lose these cases, it will still
have several achievements to point to in the
effort to restore presidential power, most
notably in foreign affairs." Yoo, who is now
a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise
Institute, offered examples such as Bush's
decision to withdraw the United States from
the International Criminal Court, and to
terminate the Antiballistic Missile Treaty
with Russia, without seeking congressional
approval.
But if Bush is fond of invoking the long
view on the issue of presidential
prerogatives when it suits his purposes, he is
hardly an absolutist, as the investigations
into the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and their
aftermath have made clear. Perhaps he will
regret this course of action. Buying itself
short-term tension relief, the White House
opted to compromise with the commission
by allowing Bush and Cheney to testify,
permitting the commission to privately view
classified documents of presidential
briefings, and yielding on the issue of
allowing the president's national security
adviser to testify.
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Both Card and Gonzales argue that the
challenges to Bush's exercise of power are a
reflection of the constitutional separation of
powers, not a unique reaction to Bush's
leadership. "Every president has had to go
through this," said the chief of staff, who has
served three presidents. "When I was in the
Reagan White House, President Reagan
went through it on Iran-Contra and
depositions... And then former President
Bush had the same challenges."
The president's counsel, who was a Texas
Supreme Court judge before Bush brought
him to Washington, said history suggests
there has always been a "dance" between the
president and Congress about the limits of
power. "It goes through cycles," said
Gonzales, known inside the White House as
"the judge." "In this particular point in time,
we have a strong-willed president, we have
an evenly divided Congress, we are in a time
of war; and some would say those
circumstances lead to, certainly, a
perception of a shift to the executive
branch."
"This is not a story about Bush," agrees
William G. Howell, an assistant professor of
government at Harvard University and
author of the 2003 book Power Without
Persuasion: The Politics of Direct
Presidential Action. "More and more, we see
presidents acting unilaterally, and that's
absolutely true of Bush." The downside is
that presidents may find it difficult to drive
their legislative agendas through the
gridlock of an increasingly decentralized
and partisan Congress, Howell said, but the
benefit to a president is that when the chief
executive decides to seize the national
agenda, Congress "has a hard time taking
apart his unilateral action."
Bush has prospered by having a Republican
majority of both houses of Congress, but
even some loyal members of his own party
find that the president and his aides hoard
information when it's to their benefit, or
they work to prevent disclosure by not
sharing their intentions.
In many ways, congressional Democrats are
torn - they're unhappy with Bush's
penchant for what they consider secrecy,
and they're somewhat relieved that they
were cut out of Republicans' Iraq
discussions. If creating a stable democracy
in Iraq is not an achievable goal, Democrats
want to distance themselves and their party
from any unpopular outcome. It's too soon
to write the history of Bush's attack on Iraq,
but the president's "my-way" posture
throughout his assault could hurt him if he
comes to need the friends he previously
shunned.
Angst Over Iraq
If a public consensus builds, either before or
after Election Day, that Bush exceeded his
authority only to achieve a failed or tragic
outcome in Iraq, public outcry might compel
Congress to adopt new checks on executive
authority - which would amount to the
dramatic undoing of Bush's efforts to
expand executive authority. This scenario is
hypothetical, but the aftershocks from
Vietnam and Watergate loom large as
lessons.
John Samples, director of the Center for
Representative Government at the libertarian
Cato Institute, said that "one of the things
that might come out of [Iraq] is the sense,
the idea, that the president has enormous
power to take us to war. And if [the decision
to go to war] turns out to be wrong or a
mistake, then it has to, in my view, usefully
lead us to re-evaluate whether we want that
much discretion in a president and whether
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we can figure out ways to constrain [future
presidents] in an effective way."
Card discounts the suggestion that Bush's
style of leadership and reliance on unilateral
authority - his penchant for swift action
rather than long analysis, his impatience
with recriminations, and his desire to control
information by keeping it tightly held - is
undercutting public appreciation for that
leadership. "I think the president is actually
admired for his leadership and maybe not
always respected for the policy that follows
it," he conceded.
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THE SOCIAL CONSERVATIVE AGENDA
A New Meaning for 'Bully Pulpit'
Los Angeles Times
April 12, 2004
Susan Jacoby
One of the pious maxims of American
politics for the last 40 years has been that a
candidate should never be attacked on
religious grounds. This stricture is eminently
fair insofar as private faith is concerned. But
when personal faith begins to determine
public policy, then the issue becomes fair
game.
When John F. Kennedy was running in
1960, he was called on, as the second
Roman Catholic to seek the nation's highest
office, to affirm his support for the
separation of church and state. In aspeech
regarded as a turning point of his campaign,
Kennedy memorably declared, "I do not
speak for my church on public matters - and
the church does not speak for me."
President Bush's candidacy deserves the
same level of scrutiny - not because of what
he might do in the future but because of
what he has already done on behalf of an
ultraconservative, mainly Christian
constituency that has no qualms about trying
to turn its faith into the law of the land.
There is no precedent in American history
for the Bush administration's determination
to infuse government with a highly specific
set of religious values. Thomas Jefferson, a
champion of strict separation of church and
state even though his private religious
beliefs remain a subject of debate, refused
the request of evangelical religious
supporters that he issue a presidential
proclamation of thanksgiving to God for his
blessings on America. James Madison
vetoed a bill to grant public land in
Mississippi to a Baptist church. And in the
1870s, Ulysses S. Grant made what would
be an unthinkable suggestion for a president
today - that all church property be subject to
taxation.
For nearly all American presidents before
the current era of political piety, it would
have been truly unimaginable to endorse a
constitutional amendment dealing with any
divisive religious issue. If gay marriage was
not a hot issue in the past, the Constitution's
omission of God was.
When Abraham Lincoln was approached
during the Civil War by Protestant ministers
demanding that he support an amendment to
declare Jesus Christ the supreme
government authority, the president cagily
promised to take such action as "my
responsibility to my Maker and our country
demands." His action was to take no action
at all.
The Bush administration, by contrast, has
consistently taken aggressive measures to
favor the most conservative religious
elements in American society.
It is well known that the administration's
anti-abortion policies are responsible for
restricting embryonic stem cell experiments
in ways that leading scientists believe are
already causing the U.S. to fall behind the
rest of the world in potentially lifesaving
biomedical research. But that is only one
segment of a wide-ranging assault on secular
policies at every level of government.
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Last September, for example, Bush
announced changes in federal rules - all
accomplished by executive orders
circumventing Congress - that allow "faith-
based" groups to compete with secular
organizations for federal funds subsidizing
everything from the renovation of churches
to drug rehabilitation. Religious
organizations may now receive tax money
even if they discriminate against job
applicants of other faiths. They may also
promote religious conversions with public
dollars.
Liberals usually shy away from challenging
such practices because polls show that 75%
of the public supports faith-based funding.
But they - and John F. Kerry - should take a
close look at a 2001 poll by the Pew Forum
on Religion and Public Life that found that
80% of Americans disapprove of any tax
subsidies for groups refusing to hire workers
of other faiths, which many of these
evangelical organizations do. Taxpayers
may like the idea of faith-based funding, but
they have serious, practical reservations
about what specific churches might do with
the money.
Of even greater importance are the views of
judicial appointees, who will shape policy
long after Bush is gone. Alabama Atty. Gen.
William Pryor, recently named by Bush to
the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in a
"6recess appointment" bypassing Senate
confirmation, has displayed unabashed
contempt for the Ist Amendment's
establishment-of-religion clause.
Pryor was an ardent defender of former
Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore, who
defied court orders to remove a Ten
Commandments monument from the state
courthouse. At a pro-Moore rally, Pryor
declared that "God has chosen, through his
son Jesus Christ, this time, this place, for all
Christians - Protestants, Catholics and
Orthodox - to save our country and save our
courts." That statement alone ought to
disqualify anyone for a federal judgeship.
There is a religious issue facing the country
today: whether, in the 21st century, political
leaders will continue to devalue the
separation of church and state that has been
the glory of our nation since the founders
wrote a constitution assigning governmental
power not to any deity but to "We the
People."
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A Senator's Call to 'Win This Culture War'
The New York Times
September 1, 2004
David D. Kirkpatrick
At a closed, invitation-only Bush campaign
rally for Christian conservatives yesterday,
Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas called
for a broad social conservative agenda
notably different from the televised
presentations at the Republican convention,
including adopting requirements that
pregnant women considering abortions be
offered anesthetics for their fetuses and
loosening requirements on the separation of
church and state.
"We must win this culture war," Senator
Brownback urged a crowd of several
hundred in a packed ballroom of the
Waldorf-Astoria hotel, reprising a theme of
a speech by Patrick J. Buchanan from the
podium of the 1992 Republican convention
that many political experts say alienated
moderate voters in that election.
Called "the Family, Faith and Freedom
Rally" in e-mail invitations sent to Christian
conservatives in New York for the
convention, the event was organized by the
Bush-Cheney campaign "to celebrate
America and President George W. Bush,"
according to a copy of the invitation. The e-
mail called Mr. Bush "a conservative leader
who shares our values, who takes a strong
stand for his faith."
Ralph Reed, a senior campaign adviser and
liaison to conservative Christians, also
addressed the crowd. Several campaign staff
members, including the deputy political
director, Christian Myers, attended, along
with Timothy Goeglein, the White House
liaison to Christian groups. One invited
participant said the rally, which was closed
to the news media, was the main event
sponsored by the campaign for social
conservatives attending the convention.
The rally struck a very different tone from
the speakers behind the lectern inside the
Republican convention, where talk of
national unity and cultural inclusiveness has
been the rule. Last night, Mr. Brownback
himself spoke on the subject of the
president's compassionate conservatism and
efforts to alleviate AIDS. "A fundamental
principle of our democracy and our
Republican Party is respect for the inherent
dignity, equality and sanctity of every
human life," he said from the podium.
The difference highlights a balancing act the
Bush campaign faces in staging its
convention. The spotlight on the party's
national convention is a chance to project a
welcoming, pluralistic face to moderate or
undecided voters. But, anticipating a close
election, the campaign has also made it a
priority to motivate the socially conservative
evangelical Christians among its base to go
the polls.
At the afternoon rally, Mr. Brownback
singled out several subjects of special
interest to conservative evangelical
Protestants that have been largely omitted
from the presentations at the convention,
including opposition to abortion and same-
sex unions, the plight of Christians and other
victims of violence in Sudan, human
trafficking, and events in Israel.
"I fear for the Republic, I really do,"
warned Mr. Brownback, a favorite of party
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conservatives. "We are accused of having a
radical agenda for saying that marriage is
between a man and a woman and it is the
best way for children to be raised. It is not
about being hateful. It is about being
truthful."
President Bush, for his part, also opposes
legalized abortion and recognizing same-sex
marriage. But he has said he supports the
separation of church and state and the ability
of states to create other forms of recognition
for gay unions. He has pointedly avoided
deprecating gay men and lesbians or
engaging in talk of a "culture war."
Representatives of the Bush campaign did
not respond to several calls for comment on
other aspects ofthe rally. But inane-mail
message to The New York Times, Nicolle
Devenish, the campaign's communications
director, criticized the newspaper for
covering an event that "was closed to the
press" as "not professional or appropriate."
A New York Times reporter was invited to
the event by participants who accompanied
him.
Mr. Reed also addressed the crowd,
recalling Mr. Bush's response to a question
about his favorite philosopher during the
2000 Republican primary. "The President
said, 'Jesus Christ,"' Mr. Reed recalled.
And amid rousing applause, he repeated Mr.
Bush's distinctively evangelical follow-up:
"The president said, as only he can say, 'If I
have to explain it to you, then you don't
understand it."'
Mr. Bush's most important accomplishment,
Mr. Reed argued, was greater than any
legislative achievement: "He has returned to
us an office that was occupied by George
Washington, Abe Lincoln, and Ronald
Reagan. He has restored the honor and
dignity of the highest office in the land."
But it was Mr. Brownback who laid out
more specific policy goals. On the subject of
opposition to abortion, Mr. Brownback
argued that many women who choose
abortion were unaware of what he said was
the pain the procedure caused a fetus. His
call for women contemplating abortions to
be offered anesthetics for the fetus referred
to a bill, "The Unborn Child Pain
Awareness Act," that he has discussed
introducing in Congress. "We are going to
keep moving this agenda forward," he
vowed.
Mr. Brownback argued the importance to
the culture of appointing more conservative
judges, asserting that courts have conducted
"a 40-year assault on the Constitution."
Courts, he argued, had wrongly
overstretched "separation of church and
state" to mean "removal of church from
state."
Urging action to alleviate violence in Sudan,
he argued that the "strategic interest" of the
United States was ' 'that there are b eautiful
individuals there suffering, that many of you
have prayed for for a long time."
"You are the heart and soul of the party,"
Mr. Brownback said. "And the press hits
you all the time, like there is something
wrong with 'faith, family and freedom."'
Recalling the motto "In God We Trust,"
Mr. Brownback asked, "Is it still true? I say
it is, and I say we fight."
Before the television cameras inside the
convention, the campaign has relied on a
combination of moderate, pluralistic words
and resonant religious atmospherics to
appeal to both moderate voters and
conservative Christian at once. On the first
night of the convention, for example,
Senator John McCain praised Islam as an
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honorable religion - a statement many
evangelical Christians consider heretical -
and two Muslim speakers invoked Allah
from the stage.
But at times the staging of the evening
resembled an evangelical Protestant church
service. Personal testimonials from the
widows of Sept. 11 victims with heartfelt
allusions to prayer were followed directly by
a performance of the hymn "Amazing
Grace," and other performances have
included a Christian rock group, a church
choir from Queens and the Boys Choir of
Harlem.
Calibrating its appeals to both conservative
Christians and more secular or socially
liberal voters is a longstanding challenge for
the party. Although Mr. Buchanan's 1992
speech may have alienated moderate voters
by taking aim at the popular culture,
political advisers to Mr. Bush believe his
2000 campaign failed to adequately
mobilize conservative Christian v oters. M r.
Bush's political adviser, Karl Rove, has
often said that conservative Christian
turnout in 2000 was about four million votes
below his projections in the last elections,
and anticipating another close race they are
counting on regular churchgoers, who tend
to vote Republican, to help Mr. Bush come
out ahead.
Yesterday, Mr. Reed urged the crowd at the
Waldorf to do everything possible to ensure
Mr. Bush's re-election, especially reaching
out to acquaintances at their "churches,
veterans halls and rotary clubs." In the last
election, he warned, "we got out-hustled the
last weekend."
Other Christian conservatives at the
convention were already doing their part. At
a hotel near the convention, the independent
film production company, Grizzly Adams
Productions, was screening a film dedicated
to reaffirming Mr. Bush's credentials as a
sincere evangelical Christian and to
criticizing the separation of church and state.
A recurring theme of the film is that Mr.
Bush's opponents dislike him mainly
because of his forthright faith. "The notion
that our leaders should have God in their life
has suddenly become threatening," a
narrator says.
"Will the faith of George Bush be sufficient
to keep us in God's hands today?" the film
concludes, "Perhaps if we all join our faith
to his."
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Winning While Losing
The New York Times
July 15, 2004
Richard W. Stevenson
From the beginning, gay marriage has been
an issue that President Bush has tried to
finesse.
Under election-year pressure from his social
conservative base, Mr. Bush endorsed the
effort to adopt a constitutional amendment
that would ban gay marriage. In the last few
days he has turned up the volume on the
issue, talking about it in his weekly radio
address on Saturday and calling wavering
senators over the last day or two in an effort
to shore up support for the measure as it
headed toward a crucial procedural vote on
Wednesday.
But after endorsing the measure in February,
he would often go weeks without
mentioning it in public, suggesting either a
personal or political reluctance, or both,
about pushing it too hard. And when he did
raise the topic, he was careful to modulate
his message to avoid alienating moderate
voters, warning in particular against
allowing the issue to become an excuse for
gay bashing.
"What they do in the privacy of their house,
consenting adults should be able to do," Mr.
Bush said during a campaign stop in
Pennsylvania on Friday, seeking to
distinguish between private behavior and
giving legal sanction to same-sex marriages.
"This is America. It's a free society. But it
doesn't mean we have to redefine traditional
marriage."
By hedging his position, if only a bit, Mr.
Bush may have insulated himself somewhat
from the sting of the defeat the proposed
amendment suffered in the Senate on
Wednesday. But the way in which the
proposal went down with a whimper - short
of a simple majority, much less the two-
thirds of the Senate needed for approval -
raised questions about whether the White
House had fundamentally misjudged the
nation's attitude on the issue. And the vote
left even some of Mr. Bush's own advisers
wondering if his backing of the amendment
did not hurt him politically more than it
helped by further stoking opposition to him
from the left.
"It's a net loss for Republicans politically,"
said one prominent Republican in
Washington who works closely with the
White House. "It does nothing for our base,
because they're grumpy about not having it,
and it energized a significant portion of their
base. I guarantee you that the gay
community will give twice as much money
and work harder for Kerry now, not so much
because they care about marriage per se, but
because this effort plays to their fears that
we're homophobic."
While polling has generally found that most
Americans are opposed to gay marriage, it
has also shown that few people see the issue,
or the proposal for a constitutional
amendment that would define marriage as
being only between a man and a woman, as
being a priority for the country. Polls and
focus groups have repeatedly found that the
subject barely registers with voters, if it
registers at all, at a time when most people
are primarily concerned with Iraq, terrorism
and jobs.
But wading into the issue was in keeping
with the White House's overriding political
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priority, keeping Mr. Bush's base happy and
energized, even at the risk of alienating
moderate and swing voters who might see it
as anti-gay.
It also provided an opportunity for the White
House to maneuver Senator John Kerry into
a position where it could again accuse him
of taking both sides of an issue, the central
theme in its effort to portray Mr. Kerry as so
lacking in conviction that he would be an
unreliable leader. Mr. Kerry has said he
opposes gay marriage, but he also opposed
the amendment, largely on the grounds that
the issue was one for states to decide.
In the end, neither Mr. Kerry nor his running
mate, Senator John Edwards, voted. But Mr.
Bush appears to have been more successful
in convincing social conservatives that he is
steadfastly with them on the issue.
"This is where you see President Bush
taking a political risk," said Deal W.
Hudson, an informal adviser to the White
House and the publisher of Crisis, a
conservative Catholic magazine. "I think he
knew there would be fallout among the
swing voters who respond to the perception
of political leaders being moralistic in their
stands. Given that he knew that, for him to
support the amendment to the degree he has
is evidence of his conviction."
Mr. Bush won a big round of applause at a
campaign rally in Wisconsin on Wednesday
when he alluded to the "debate" in
Washington over the subject. "I believe that
a traditional marriage - marriage between a
man and woman - is an important part of
stable families," he said.
In a statement issued by the White House,
Mr. Bush said he was "deeply
disappointed" that the amendment had been
"temporarily blocked" in the Senate, and he
urged the House to take it up.
Some Republican strategists said the focus
on the issue was part of a temporary
diversion into a broader battle over values
between Mr. Bush and Mr. Kerry before the
campaign returns to the defining issues of
the election - Iraq, terrorism and the
economy.
But other Republican strategists said that in
an election that is as likely to be decided by
how successful each party is in getting its
loyalists to go to the polls on Election Day
as by their appeals to swing voters, gay
marriage is proving to be a powerful issue
that will not fade.
"To what I would call the moralist portion
of the president's base, this issue has
become in some ways the new abortion,"
said Tony Fabrizio, a Republican pollster.
"It generates passion."
James Thurber, director of the Center for
Congressional and Presidential Studies at
American University, said Mr. Bush had
used the issue skillfully to reassure
conservatives without alienating voters in
the center.
"It was a classic way to appeal to the
conservative values base, knowing full well
that it wouldn't pass but that he would still
get credit," Mr. Thurber said. "He can say
it was the first step, and that he is on the side
of his base, but he is not making it a major
strategy, theme and message of his
campaign nationally."
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George W., Judicial Activist
Slate Magazine
February 25, 2004
Timothy Noah
Q: So if a state were voting on gay marriage,
you would suggest to that state not to
approve it?
A: T he s tate c an do what they want tod o.
Don't try to trap me in this state's [rights]
issue like you're trying to get me into. In my
state of Texas, if we tried to have gay
marriage, I would campaign against it.
Candidate George W. Bush, in a presidential
debate moderated by Larry King in
Columbia, S.C., Feb. 15, 2000
Peter Singer cites this exchange in his new
book, The President of Good and Evil: The
Ethics of George W. Bush, in order to
demonstrate the hypocrisy of Bush's
subsequent support for a constitutional
amendment banning gay marriage (which
Bush formalized today). No genuine
advocate of small government would seek to
take from the states the right to decide
whether people of the same sex can marry,
Singer observes. Singer is an awkward ally
for the gay rights movement, given his past
support for interspecies sex (which
prompted this dissent from Chatterbox and
this somewhat more thoughtful reply from
Slate's William Saletan). But this time out,
the Princeton bioethicist's logic is
unassailable. Bush is a fair-weather
federalist.
In his remarks explaining his endorsement
of t he a mendment, B ush also demonstrated
that he's blundered into a second type of
hypocrisy as well, denouncing judicial
activism while at the same time practicing it.
On the one hand, Bush wants to curse the
judiciary because it's mainly judges who
have pressed for recognition of gay civil
unions and/or marriages. (Even in Vermont,
the first state to enact a civil-union law,
legislators didn't act until a state Supreme
Court ruling compelled them to.) Everything
was fine until some activist judges and local
officials made an aggressive attempt to
redefine marriage. In Massachusetts, four
judges on the highest court have indicated
they will order the issuance of marriage
licenses to applicants of the same gender in
May of this year. After more than two
centuries of American jurisprudence, and
millennia of human experience, a few judges
and local authorities are presuming to
change the most fundamental institution of
civilization.
Hoping to prevent this, Congress had in
1996 passed the Defense of Marriage Act,
written by the thrice-married Rep. Bob Barr,
R-Ga., and signed cravenly into law by the
adulterous president whom Barr was bent on
destroying, Bill Clinton. The law defined
marriage as a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife and
said no state could be forced to grant legal
recognition to a same-sex marriage in
another state. Thirty-eight states passed
similar laws. Bully for them, Bush says: On
a matter of such importance, the voice of the
people must be heard. My administration
will vigorously defend this act of Congress.
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If the voice of the people must be heard,
though, what else need Bush do? The state
laws, and the question of whether or not
state courts will uphold them, are none of
Bush's business, because he opposes
Washington meddling in local affairs. At the
federal level, Congress in its wisdom has
spoken and enjoys Bush's unqualified
support.
But that isn't good enough for the religious
right, which is disaffected with the Bush
administration and may conceivably support
a third-party challenge to Bush's presidency.
So Bush must support the constitutional
amendment, too.
He is doing this, Bush explains, because the
Defense of Marriage Act, that righteous and
democratic expression of the people's will,
is, um, unconstitutional:
The Constitution says that full faith and
credit shall be given in each state to the
public acts and records and judicial
proceedings of every other state. Those who
want to change the meaning of marriage will
claim that this provision requires all states
and cities to recognize same-sex marriages
performed anywhere in America.
Note the grudging and exaggeratedly
passive will claim. Hey, he's saying, if it
were up to me, I'd leave well enough alone.
Unfortunately, those interfering judges just
might agree that the Defense of Marriage
Act really can't be squared with the
Constitution. And that leaves me no choice
but to capitulate:
[T]here is no assurance that the Defense of
Marriage Act will not, itself, be struck down
by activist courts. In that event, every state
would be forced to recognize any
relationship that judges in Boston or
officials in San Francisco choose to call a
marriage. F urthermore, even if the Defense
of Marriage Act is upheld, the law does not
protect marriage within any state or city.For
all these reasons, the Defense of Marriage
requires a constitutional amendment.
Those damned activist judges! They're so
powerful that they've got me doing what
they want before they even tell me to!
If Bush really believed marriage was
something to be decided legislatively, he'd
wait until a judge struck down the statute
before waving the white flag on its
constitutionality. And he'd certainly avoid
dictating what any state or city should do.
That's what Barr, now retired from
Congress, is doing. The Constitution is no
place for forcing social policy on states,
especially in this case, he's said.
Instead, Bush is doing the courts' work for
them, declaring the Defense of Marriage Act
unconstitutional while at the same time
portraying himself as judicial activism's
victim. He's like Cleavon Little in that scene
from Blazing Saddles where he whips out
his gun and takes himself hostage. In fact,
it's his fundamentalist supporters who've
taken Bush hostage, and they couldn't be
less interested in helping Bush remain
consistent about the proper role of the
federal government. The only real belief
animating this political discussion is the
bigoted one that homosexuality is an
abomination. President Bush may not
subscribe to that belief, but he's more than
happy to cater to it.
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The Politics of Piety;
Bush's Public Religiosity Connects with America -
and That Will Win Him Votes
Los Angeles Times
July 11, 2004
Charlotte Allen
It's a meme typically favored by liberal,
Democratic-leaning pundits: Religion - or
rather, the public expression of religious
belief in political life - is dangerous to
America. The idea's propagators are usually
talking specifically about President Bush, an
unabashed Christian who lards his speeches
with biblical allusions and once declared
that Jesus Christ was his favorite political
philosopher.
In a column titled "Bush's God" in this
month's American Prospect magazine,
Robert Reich, secretary of Labor during the
Clinton administration, declares that religion
is a graver threat to America than terrorism.
Reich predicts that the great battle of the
21st century won't be between terrorists and
the West but between "those who believe in
the primacy of the individual and those who
believe that human beings owe their
allegiance and identity to a higher authority
... between those who believe in science,
reason and logic and those who believe that
truth is revealed through Scripture and
religious dogma."
Reich isn't the only one anxious about
religion invading politics. Last year, Barry
Lynn, executive director of Americans
United for Separation of Church and State,
complained that Bush was sending a secret
message of solidarity to fellow Christians
when he used the phrase "wonder-working
power" - taken from a Christian hymn - in a
sentence praising Americans' faith and
idealism in his State of the Union address.
And in a review of several books on the
president's family for the current New
Yorker magazine, David Greenberg
contends that because the inspiration of God
and the Bible "is purely personal or
subjective, it's not open to debate - and
decisions based on it become immune from
scrutiny." In other words, it's downright
undemocratic for the president to mention
God in public.
There's an obvious response to Greenberg's
argument: Given that we've got a
presidential election in November, offering
voters a chance to boot out the Bible-
thumping president if they wish, where's the
threat to democracy?
But that's beside the point, which is:
Although the Constitution explicitly requires
separation of church and state, most
Americans don't mind - indeed many
demand - that their president not only honor
religious faith, an American hallmark, but
function in some sense as a religious leader.
Bush's predecessor, Bill Clinton, who did
not strike most observers as devout, carried
his Bible to a Washington church nearly
every Sunday morning while president. And
Sen. John F. Kerry favorably mentions his
Catholic faith, despite his opposition to his
church's moral teachings on abortion. It is
safe to say that no one who possesses
Reich's level of hostility to religion is likely
to be elected president soon.
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This is not just "ceremonial deism," the
purely formalistic civil religion that Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor discussed in her
concurring opinion in the Pledge of
Allegiance case. It is a genuine civil
religion, lending credence to G.K.
Chesterton's observation that America "is a
nation with the soul of a church." About
83% of Americans define themselves as
Christians, and nearly all believe in a deity.
True, only 38% attend weekly religious
services, according to an ABC News poll in
2002 - but that's startlingly high for a First
World nation (and observers say it leaves
out the millions who attend church, but less
frequently).
Paradoxically, contends Baylor University
sociologist Rodney Stark, America owes its
high level of religious intensity to the
separation of church and state. In contrast
with Europe, with its fading government-
supported churches, "We have a competitive
religious economy here, where churches
have to work to get members," Stark says.
Not surprisingly, religion - Christianity and
Judaism, in particular - fueled both the
antislavery movement of the 19th century
and the civil-rights movement of the 20th.
The leaders of both movements didn't
hesitate to quote Scripture to remind their
listeners that what they stood for was
morally grounded in the Bible, as well as in
secular philosophy. Religion was not only a
"purely personal" matter but also one of
grave public import.
That is as it should be. Religion, by nature,
is a public thing, because it acknowledges a
reality that is outside the private realm of the
inner heart. Individuals' faith and religious
experiences are private matters, but religion
itself, whether it be Wicca, Buddhism or
Roman Catholicism, is shared and
communal. Those who would banish
religion to the realm of the strictly private in
effect contend that religion has no relevance
to public life. This notion fatally trivializes
religion by treating it as essentially
meaningless.
More important, religion recognizes there is
inherent meaning, order and purpose in the
universe. It thus induces humility, a
recognition that our puny ideas about how
things are and ought to be may not be the
final word. The horror of 20th century
totalitarianism was the insistence of
atheistic, militantly secularist intellectuals,
from Germany to Russia to China to Cuba,
that they had a right to impose their pet
utopian schemes at the point of a gun or
threat of the gulag. Professing "allegiance ...
to a higher authority," as Reich puts it, is a
check on such murderous egotism.
Most Americans believe that God orders the
universe, and so they resonate to
declarations that this is true. Ronald
Reagan's popularity rested in part on his
religious faith. Many people who would
never vote Democratic admired Al Gore's
running mate in 2000, Sen. Joe Lieberman,
for his observant Orthodox Judaism. In
politics, it never hurts to represent your
constituents. So why shouldn't Bush - or
Kerry, or any other politician or president -
declare openly the extent to which religious
beliefs inform his positions and policies?
The problem isn't really religious beliefs or
religion per se, but the deep American
cultural divide over moral issues - abortion
and gay marriage are the most contentious -
informed by religious beliefs, and that a
sizable voting bloc, evangelical Christians,
shares many of Bush's beliefs. Bush's
religiosity frightens the Reichs of this world,
not because it promises theocratic tyranny,
but because it speaks to a specific world
view shared by millions of other Americans.
If Bush happened to invoke Jesus in the
name of, say, abortion rights or nuclear
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disarmament, we would not be hearing
lectures from intellectuals on the dangers of
religion.
Religious people, certainly Christians, have
over the centuries committed many a mortal
wrong in the name of their faith. But those
wrongs pale in comparison with the
mountains o f corpses generated by t he t wo
most ghastly 20th century experiments in
turning governments over to irreligious
intellectuals and social theorists - Nazi
Germany a nd t he S oviet Union - a nd t heir
bloody epigones, some of which are still
around today. There is some value to the
humility inherent in deferring to something,
or Someone, beyond yourself
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Look Left
The New Republic
March 15, 2004
Jonathan Chait
"With President Bush's embrace yesterday
of a marriage amendment, the
compassionate conservative of 2000 has
shown he is willing, if necessary, to rekindle
the culture wars in 2004," began a front-
page story in The Washington Post last
week. The sentence betrays an assumption
that has characterized most of the coverage
of the gay marriage debate: that the culture
wars are being "rekindled" not by those who
are revolutionizing the way society thinks
about gay rights and marriage but by those
who stand in their way. For many in the
media, that is, efforts to expand gay rights
simply constitute progress; efforts to arrest
that expansion constitute culture w ar. (You
see a similar dynamic in the way the press
uses the phrase "class warfare"-i.e., not to
describe those who want to redistribute
wealth upward but, rather, to their critics.) In
both cases, the coverage is a function of the
kind of people-affluent, educated, and
secular-who tend to work in the national
media. Indeed, press coverage of the gay
marriage d ebate o ffers a p erfect case s tudy
of the degree to which journalists'
socioeconomic assumptions influence their
reporting.
The operating premise of most of the recent
news coverage has been that Bush's support
for a constitutional amendment banning gay
marriage is an extreme move that may
satisfy his conservative base but risks
alienating voters in the middle. "It's a
cardinal rule of politics," The New York
Times declared in a front-page story last
week. "Pay attention to the party's base. In
recent weeks, on a variety of fronts,
President Bush has done just that. [. . .] His
impassioned endorsement on Tuesday of a
constitutional amendment banning same-sex
marriage, after weeks of intensive lobbying
by social conservatives, was the culmination
of this rapprochement. But will he pay a
price with the centrist voters who so often
decide presidential elections, as the
Democrats hope?" USA Today chimed in,
"Bush's support of a proposed amendment
had long been sought by conservative
Christians, who are among the Republican
Party's most loyal supporters." And the Post
story quoted above asserted, "So when gay
marriages advanced in Massachusetts and
San Francisco, Bush felt a need to respond
to the cries of social conservatives-even if it
meant losing some swing voters he needs in
November."
But what if Bush's support for the
amendment banning gay marriage is not just
a sop to his base but a way of appealing to
swing voters? I should say here that, for my
part, I believe gays should have the right to
marry, and I find the amendment morally
abhorrent. But I'm far less confident than
others in the press that most Americans
share my view.
When you look at the polling data, you
discover that Americans are divided even on
the legality of gay relationships-not
marriages, mind you, just relationships.
When asked by a CNN/USA Today/Gallup
poll last July if "homosexual relations
between consenting adults should or should
not be legal," "should" edged out "should
not" by just 48 to 46. An identically worded
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question, posed by a CBS/New York Times
poll in December, resulted in just 41 percent
replying yes and 49 percent no.
Unsurprisingly, the public rejects gay
marriage by a far wider margin. Last month,
the Annenberg Center conducted a poll
asking, "Would you favor or oppose a law in
your state that would allow gays and
lesbians to marry a partner of the same sex?"
Thirty percent said they favored it; 64
percent opposed it. This finding is pretty
typical: In most polls, about one-third of
respondents favor gay marriage, and two-
thirds oppose it.
Support for amending the Constitution-
which people are generally more reluctant to
do t o-is naturally I ower. B ut, here t oo, t he
results are at best ambiguous. Only one poll
has shown a plurality opposed to the
amendment. That was the Annenberg poll,
which found opposition by a 48-to-41
margin. But this was an anomalous result,
probably deriving from the wording of the
question, which described the amendment as
"saying that NO [emphasis original] state
can allow two men to marry each other or
two women to marry each other." A few
other polls have found public sentiment
evenly split: A February Time/CNN poll
resulted in 47 percent supporting the
amendment versus 46 percent opposing. An
ABC News/Washington Post poll found 46
percent in favor and 45 percent opposed.
Moreover, polls that measure support for the
amendment without mentioning the
alternative of letting every state decide for
itself produce consistent support. A
February Gallup poll asked, "Would you
favor or oppose a constitutional amendment
that would define marriage as being between
a man and a woman, thus barring marriages
between gay and lesbian couples?" Among
respondents, 53 percent supported it, and 44
percent opposed it. CBS's February poll had
a similar (51 to 42 percent) result. And,
when CBS changed the wording to describe
the amendment as "allow[ing] marriage
ONLY [emphasis original] between a man
and a woman"-without explicitly saying it
would ban gay marriages-support grew to
59 to 35 percent. So there's no majority
opposed to the amendment, and there may
well be a majority who support it, perhaps
even a substantial one, depending upon how
the issue is framed.
Needless to s ay, this is not the p icture one
gets from media accounts of the
controversy, which have tended to focus on
the possibility that Bush's support for the
amendment will cost him among swing
voters. As this week's Time magazine
contends, "Many swing voters are also the
suburbanites who abandoned the GOP in the
past when it got too wild-eyed about culture
wars." This may be true as far as it goes. But
the voters that Time is referring to-i.e.,
upperincome, socially moderate,
economically conservative folks-don't make
up the entire swing vote or even the largest
portion of it. A larger bloc of swing voters
has essentially the opposite sensibility-
culturally traditional and economically
populist. "The greatest bloc of contested
voters watching politics from a distinct
perspective is noncollege and blue-collar
America," writes Democratic pollster
Stanley Greenberg in his new book The Two
Americas. "These are the voters for whom
church and faith are important and who
think values and family are under pressure
too."
These downscale swing voters are
substantially more likely to support an
amendment banning gay marriage than the
more libertarian suburbanites Time focuses
on. A nd, while m ost of the recent polls on
gay marriage are not broken down into
useful demographics, such information as
there is supports this assumption. The
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Annenberg poll-which, again, was an outlier
in showing overall opposition to the
amendment-shows voters with advanced
degrees overwhelmingly opposed to the
amendment and all others essentially split.
It's not hard to understand why the national
media fails to grasp the continued strength
of cultural traditionalism: In Washington
and New York, where many journalists
dwell, gay marriage is an increasingly
mainstream proposition. Unfortunately, in
most of the country, it's not. And, even if
the media doesn't realize this, it's a good bet
Karl Rove does.
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THE SUPREME COURT AS AN ELECTION ISSUE
Fighting Over the Court
It's Tough to Make the Supreme Court into an Election Issue
The Legal Times
October 9, 2000
William G. Ross
There are signs that the U.S. Supreme Court
may be emerging as a significant election
issue for the first time in more than 30 years.
During the televised debate between George
W. Bush and Al Gore last week, both
candidates discussed the criteria they would
use in making judicial nominations. With
the retirement of more than one justice
likely during the next several years, and with
the Court closely divided on many
controversial issues, Democrats and
Republicans agree that the upcoming
election could have a critical impact on the
Court's direction.
If history is any guide, however, judicial
issues will produce much campaign b luster
but will affect few ballots.
Uncertain Impact
A long and largely forgotten line of
presidential candidates and political activists
have attempted to make the federal courts a
decisive issue in many presidential elections
during the past century. Their efforts have
nearly always failed: The courts are not
institutions that ignite the passion of voters.
Bob Dole learned this lesson in our last
presidential election, after voters responded
with indifference when he attacked Clinton-
appointed federal judges for allegedly
coddling dangerous criminals.
Only three times-in 1924, 1964, and
1968-has the federal judiciary emerged as
an issue that actually may have swayed
votes. Even in those elections, the issue's
impact remains uncertain.
In 1924, campaigning as a third-party
Progressive nominee, Sen. Robert LaFollette
of Wisconsin attacked the Supreme Court
for its decisions striking down social and
economic regulatory legislation, and
proposed allowing Congress to override the
Court's decisions by a two-thirds vote. H is
campaign withered, however, when
President Calvin Coolidge and his fellow
Republicans vigorously accused LaFollette
of seeking to sabotage constitutional
government. (Republicans made a similar
charge with much less effect against
President Franklin Roosevelt during the
1940 campaign, in an attempt to exploit
popular opposition to Roosevelt's
unsuccessful 1937 Court-packing proposal.)
The decisions of the Warren Court-
particularly those involving the rights of
criminals, school prayer, and
reapportionment-were prominent in both the
1964 and 1968 elections. In 1964,
Republican nominee Barry Goldwater
frequently attacked these decisions and
promised to make more conservative
appointments to the Court. During the 1968
campaign, after the Warren Court had
continued to expand criminal rights in the
wake of a major increase in crime, both
Richard Nixon and George Wallace
repeatedly promised to appoint justices who
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would be more solicitous of what Wallace
called "law and order." Discontent over the
Court's decisions may have helped Nixon
win his close race against Hubert
Humphrey.
There are indications that the Court is more
prominent in this year's election than it has
been since 1968, with 36 percent of voters in
a recent Newsweek poll indicating that they
regard Supreme Court appointments as a
significant election issue. Democrats are
attempting to cultivate this issue by warning
voters that the fate of abortion rights,
affirmative action, gun control, and gay
rights all hinge upon judicial appointments
that the next president is likely to make.
Meanwhile, Republicans may be more
hesitant to discuss the Court, possibly
because they fear their judicial preferences
will risk alienating moderate voters.
Even so, judicial issues are unlikely to have
much direct impact on the election. There
are several reasons for this. First, many of
the most significant and divisive issues that
confront the Court are too abstruse for most
voters to grasp. For example, few voters are
likely to comprehend the subtleties of the
Court's recent division over profound issues
of federalism. Even those voters who know
that the Court recently shielded states from
lawsuits arising under the federal age
discrimination statute are unlikely to fathom
the Court's complex interpretation of the
11th and 14th amendments in its decision.
Moreover, the Court itself today is not a
subject of unusual controversy, in contrast to
past elections when the judiciary emerged as
a major issue. Since the present Court is
difficult to peg as "liberal" or
"conservative," the general direction of the
Court no longer provides a lightning rod for
criticism. Controversies instead revolve
around individual decisions of the Court,
which run the gamut from conservative to
moderate to liberal. In this environment,
Democrats must w am a bout the perils of a
conservative take-over of the Court, a stance
that is less likely to capture voter enthusiasm
than a call to reverse the Court's direction.
As in previous elections, moreover, the
impact of the Court issue also may be muted
because the issue is often little more than a
reflection of how voters already feel. about
candidates. For example, a voter whose
support for Gore is based largely on his or
her perception that Gore is more pro-choice
than Bush is not likely to prefer Gore more
merely because Gore may be more likely
than Bush to appoint pro-choice judges to
the federal courts.
In an era of low voter turnout, however, the
judicial issue may motivate some voters to
show up at the polls because they perceive
that judicial appointments raise the stakes of
the election. The prospect of upcoming
Supreme Court nominations also stimulates
political activists to greater commitment and
provides an incentive for fund raising. The
People for the American Way, for example,
has issued a 78-page report entitled Courting
Disaster, which warns about the dangers of
"a Scalia-Thomas Supreme Court."
The issue of judicial appointments also may
be attaining more prominence in presidential
elections because the increased scrutiny of
judicial candidates has reduced the
traditional risk that judges will defy the
expectations of the presidents who appoint
them. Of course, there will always be a high
degree of unpredictability in judicial
performance. As the late Yale Law
Professor Alexander Bickel once observed,
"you fire an arrow into a very distant future
when you appoint a Justice." The
performance of judges today, however, is
more predictable because candidates for the
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Supreme Court as well as the lower courts
receive far more intense scrutiny both during
the presidential nominating process and
Senate confirmation proceedings. Of course,
even now the process is not flawless-when
President Bush appointed David Souter to
the Court, he surely did not expect the new
justice to become so liberal.
The importance of judicial issues , in this
year's elections also reflects a growing
sophistication about the Court. The highly
publicized brawls over the 1987 Bork
nomination and the 1990 Thomas
nomination helped to stimulate greater
awareness of the Court, as have improved
news coverage of judicial issues and the
growing ubiquity of legal issues in
American life. Although polls consistently
show that few voters pay careful attention to
judicial decisions and that even the names of
most of the justices are unknown to the
overwhelming majority of Americans, few
voters are unaware of the Court's vast power
to affect significant public issues. Voters
seem to understand generally that the Court
can affect such highly charged issues as
abortion, school vouchers, school prayer,
and violence against women. Many voters
also recognize that Supreme Court
appointments are likely in the near future
because of the average age of the justices.
Unanimity on Validity
The debate over the Court this year also
helps to underscore the resilience of public
respect for the Court and acceptance of the
Court's power to review the constitutionality
of state and federal legislation. In contrast to
the virile populist attacks on judicial power
in so many campaigns of yesteryear, no
major candidate or political movement today
questions the validity of judicial review or
attacks the Court as an institution. (Of
course, politicians on both sides of the
political divide demonize individual judges
and justices.) Nearly everyone seems
content to allow the Court to exercise vast
powers, either because they support such
powers or because they recognize the
political impracticability of reining them in-
which would include measures such as
abolishing life tenure, abrogating judicial
review, curbing jurisdiction, or
implementing any of the other remedies
widely advocated by two-fisted critics of
judicial power until relatively recent times.
The issue today, therefore, is not the validity
of judicial power itself, but rather who will
exercise that power. In a variation on the old
adage "if you can't beat them, join them,"
voters and politicians of all persuasions
today seek to elect presidents and senators
who will appoint judges who will serve their
agendas. Although few votes may pivot on
judicial appointments, voters are rightly
giving more consideration to the types of
judicial nominations that the next president
will make.
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Bush's Justice
The Weekly Standard
Monday, June 23, 2003
Terry Eastland
President Bush may or may not get the
opportunity to name a Supreme Court
Justice this summer. But if he does, who
would be the right choice? Bush himself has
told us. In 1999, Fred Barnes asked Bush
what kind of judge he'd select. "I have great
respect for Justice Scalia," he said, "for the
strength of his mind, the consistency of his
convictions, and the judicial philosophy he
defends." There you have it. Someone like
Scalia, assuming all other qualifications are
met, would be the best choice for the Court.
In fact, we'd drop the word "like" in
thinking about who should replace Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, were he to step
down. In that case, Scalia would be the
logical choice, assuming he is willing to
take the center seat. And then, of course,
Bush could backfill with someone like
Scalia. Likewise, if John Paul Stevens or
Sandra Day O'Connor-next to Rehnquist,
the oldest and longest-serving justices-were
to leave the Court, Bush will surely want to
select a replacement who shares Scalia's
judicial philosophy.
We commend to Bush his own standard, not
simply because he articulated it but because
the Court needs more judges like Scalia. On
race, religion, criminal justice, and national
power, the Rehnquist Court is an
improvement on the Burger Court, which
was only slightly better than the Warren
Court. Yet the Rehnquist Court has in
important respects been a disappointment.
Consider Roe v. Wade, the 1973 decision
that invented the abortion right, thus
destroying self-government on an issue
previously left to the people. The Rehnquist
Court has not only declined to overrule Roe
but also reaffirmed it in the 1992 case of
Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Too many
times the Rehnquist Court, notwithstanding
its dominance by appointees of Republican
presidents, has regarded Supreme Court
precedents like Roe as sacrosanct, placing
them above the Constitution itself. Against
the anti-constitutional tendency of judicial
supremacy, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Clarence Thomas, has consistently
dissented.
Fortunately, for a Court that needs judges
who will abide by the Constitution, there is
no shortage of qualified people who would
be available for appointment. They include
appellate judges Sam Alito of the Third
Circuit, J. Michael Luttig and Harvie
Wilkinson III of the Fourth Circuit, Edith
Jones of the Fifth Circuit, Danny Boggs of
the Sixth Circuit, and Michael McConnell
of the Tenth Circuit. We'd add to this (non-
exhaustive) list two individuals who aren't
judges-Solicitor General Theodore B.
Olson and Sen. Jon Kyl of Arizona.
Will Bush choose an Alito or a Luttig or an
Olson? His generally excellent choices for
the circuit courts suggest he might. But it's
hardly a sure thing. He might be tempted
simply to "trade up"-to get someone who is
better at the margins than, say, Stevens, the
lone Ford appointee who long ago joined
the Court's liberal bloc. Or better than
O'Connor, Reagan's first appointee who
often votes with Scalia and Thomas (and
Rehnquist and Justice Anthony Kennedy),
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but whose opinions sometimes lack a rule of
law clear enough to provide useful
guidance. Simply to trade up, however-
unless the trade is all the way up-is to waste
an opportunity to influence the direction of
the court. And Republican presidents since
Nixon have wasted too many of these
opportunities. What's amazing is how many
they've had-eight of the last ten vacancies
occurring on their collective watch. Bush
surely will not want to waste the first one he
gets.
There is also the temptation to nominate
White House counsel Alberto Gonzales,
who since Austin days has been a member
of Bush's inner circle. Were Bush to
appoint Gonzales, he would be the Court's
first Hispanic, and as such, Bush might be
told, a signal to the growing Hispanic
population that its home is in the
Republican party. But Gonzales would be a
problematic choice for the Court. His legal
career so far doesn't justify confidence that
he would turn out to be a justice having the
"strength of mind," "consistency of
convictions," and "judicial philosophy"
Bush admires. If Bush wants to engage in
diversity politics, he can confine that
enterprise to the executive branch and not
extend it to the judiciary, where the
appointments are for life. He could, for
example, name Gonzales his next attorney
general, in which case he would be the first
Hispanic in that post.
A third temptation is to nominate someone
without much of a paper trail who, the
candidate's advocates would claim, will
prove Scalia-like on the bench. In other
words, a "stealth" nominee. For a president
who has endeavored not to repeat his
father's mistakes, we would hope the
sufficient answer to that suggestion is the
name David Souter. Appointed by George
H.W. Bush in 1990, Souter is no longer a
blank slate but a jurist of whom the most
partisan Democratic president could be
proud.
Stealth is the strategy of those who imagine
that a fight on principle with Senate
Democrats can be avoided. It can't be. Even
from a nominee with the dullest, offensive-
to-no-one resume, Senate Democrats will
demand a confession of belief in the
Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence.
Here it must be said that the entire point of
the Democrats' strategy on Bush's circuit
nominees-whether as the majority, delaying
and not holding hearings, or as the minority,
engaging in filibusters-has been to
influence the kind of choices the p resident
makes for the circuits and, especially, the
Supreme Court. Already Democrats are
offering Bush advice on his Supreme Court
choices. Last week Charles Schumer
suggested that Bush pick his Senate
colleague, liberal maverick Arlen Specter!
The president can't avoid conflict with
Senate Democrats, not if he is going to
name someone like Scalia. And indeed,
were Rehnquist to step down, we would like
to see the Democrats try to oppose Scalia as
his replacement and to get the fight over
principle well joined. Scalia is abundantly
on the record on the issues that matter,
including Roe v. Wade and Planned
Parenthood v. Casey. ("If only for the sake
of its own preservation," Scalia wrote in a
2000 case, "the Court should return
[abortion] to the people-where the
Constitution, by its silence on the subject,
left it-and let them decide, State by State,
whether this practice should be allowed.
Casey must be overruled.") We can think of
no one more able to stand his ground, and
for right principle, than Scalia.
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Yet Scalia should n ot have to stand a lone.
Nor should any other nominee. The great
lesson of the Bork nomination is that a
president must fight for his Supreme Court
nominees. Bush should be ready to engage.
So should his aides, though it is unclear
who would do the job. Attorney General
John Ashcroft has been oddly silent on
judges. Perhaps Vice President Cheney,
whose vote might be needed, could rise to
the occasion. In addition, why not let the
nominee make his own case? Surely it is
time to move beyond the antiquated custom
in which the nominee is required to keep
silent while interest groups and senators
slander him.
In any case, it will be important to make
arguments that go beyond the shopwom
phrases, "strict construction" and "judicial
restraint." Specifically, the administration
will have to explain why we need justices
who construe the Constitution fairly, who
recognize its powers but also enforce its
limits, who decline to extend or create
rights that aren't found in the Constitution,
and who are willing to overrule holdings at
odds with the Constitution. Let Senate
Democrats argue for j ustices who embrace
unlimited national power and create new
"constitutional" rights whose enforcement
necessarily leaves less room for self-
government.
A presidency is always defining itself. So
far the Bush presidency-though no one
could have predicted this before September
11-has defined itself largely in terms of
national security and foreign policy. If a
vacancy on the Supreme Court occurs,
another defining moment for this president
will present itself, and the choice Bush
makes will reveal his true commitment to
constitutional self-government.
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Admit the Obvious: It's a Political Process
Ideology Governs Judicial Confirmations. Let's Say So
The Washington Post
Sunday, July 18, 2004
David Greenberg
Foreign policy and the economy have
emerged as the themes of this year's
presidential campaign. B ut in the next four
years we're less likely to see another
terrorist attack or recession than a different
potentially life-changing event: the
retirement of a Supreme Court justice. The
current crop of justices has been together for
a record 10 years. It includes the 84-year-old
John Paul Stevens, the oldest member of the
court, and others who have had health
problems. Given the Rehnquist Court's
penchant for 5-4 decisions, a new justice
could alter American society for decades.
Whoever wins the White House, it probably
won't change the disingenuous pattern of
partisan warfare that now takes place
surrounding such nominations. Even while
battling each other, the two parties collude
in promoting a fiction: Both profess, against
all evidence and common sense, that they
choose and evaluate nominees not on the
basis of ideology, but on professional merits.
To base one's opposition or support solely
on ideology is seen as politicizing the
judiciary, the branch of government that's
supposed to stand above the messy fray of
partisan politics. So party leaders contrive to
find extra-political reasons to oppose a
nominee. They root their objections in a
reputed character flaw, or performance of
some unsavory act long ago, or lack of
professional merit. Despite the illusions put
forward, it's clear that ideology is at work in
both appointment and confirmation.
No justice is apt to retire until the election is
finished. But when one does, the pattern will
reassert itself. Already, President Bush is
spoiling for a fight. In his 2000 campaign,
he pledged to appoint justices in the mold of
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, the
court's most conservative jurists. Last
summer, he rebuffed Senate Minority
Leader Tom Daschle's idea that he confer
with Senate Democrats before selecting any
nominee. Some of his choices for appellate
court judges - notably Brett Kavanaugh,
whose chief professional distinction has
been to help write the Starr Report - are
hard to interpret as anything but acts of
partisan aggression. And earlier this month,
Bush visited North Carolina and Michigan
to blast the Democrats for holding up his
lower court appointments.
Senate Democrats, numbering 48, constitute
a large enough minority to block any
appointment (if they stick together), since it
takes 60 senators to end a filibuster and
bring a nomination to a vote. During Bush's
presidency, Democrats have united to
oppose several of Bush's choices. They
filibustered last year to block the
appointment of Miguel Estrada to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. Estrada's conservative
views regarding due process rights earned
him the opposition of most black and
Hispanic groups.
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November's election won't change much;
neither party is going to gain enough Senate
seats to have a filibuster-proof margin. The
Democrats, even if they were to regain
control, won't be able to do more than
obstruct the GOP agenda if Bush wins. And
if John Kerry wins? Republicans proved
during Bill Clinton's presidency that they,
too, can thwart an appellate court
nomination. Clinton dodged fights at the
Supreme Court level by vetting his potential
nominees beforehand with Senate GOP
leaders. Still, when Byron White and Harry
Blackmun retired, in 1993 and 1994, danger
filled the air. Had Clinton followed his heart
and nominated former New York governor
Mario Cuomo, he would certainly have
ignited a firestorm. Instead, he put Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and later Stephen G. Breyer
on the high court.
Although a few senators have recently
begun arguing for letting friends or foes of a
nominee frame their support or objections in
honestly ideological terms, they have yet to
alter the dynamic. That's because five deep
historical developments - the decline of the
imperial presidency, the prevalence of
divided government, the rise of expertise,
the advent of identity politics and the
emergence of a culture of scandal - have
conspired over the last generation to bring
us to where we are today.
This unacknowledged partisanship was not
the norm for court appointments in earlier
eras. In the nation's first century, senators
were deeply involved in the appointments,
often objecting to a president's nominees for
unabashedly political reasons. Between
1789 and 1894, 22 of 81 presidential
Supreme Court nominees failed to reach the
bench. They were either rejected, withdrawn
or left unacted upon by the Senate. The
reasons senators gave were sometimes
baldly political. For example, George
Washington's nomination of John Rutledge
to be chief justice in 1795 foundered
because Rutledge opposed the newly
negotiated Jay Treaty with Great Britain.
Nathan Clifford, James Buchanan's choice
for the bench in 1858, was rejected for being
too pro-slavery. And radical Senate
Republicans beat back Ulysses S. Grant's
effort in 1870 to place on the court Ebenezer
Hoar, who had opposed the impeachment of
Andrew Johnson.
In the 20th century, a different pattern
emerged. Senators mostly deferred to the
president's wishes. From 1895 to 1968, only
one high court nominee - John J. Parker, in
1930 - met defeat. Although a few others
faced some rough weather, the strong
presidency that emerged with William
McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt allowed
the chief executive generally to shape the
Supreme Court.
The collapse of the unchallenged
presidential prerogative did not start with
Ronald Reagan's ill-fated 1987 nomination
of Robert Bork. Rather, it began in 1968,
when an alliance of Republicans and
Southern Democrats, furious about the
liberal rulings of the Warren Court,
filibustered to keep Lyndon Johnson from
elevating his friend Abe Fortas to the chief
justiceship. (It's often recalled that Fortas
was blocked because of shady financial
dealings, but those arrangements didn't fully
emerge until the next year, when they
precipitated his resignation altogether.)
Since the Fortas imbroglio, most presidents
have faced difficulty in getting their
appointments through the Senate. Richard
Nixon lost two battles (Clement Haynsworth
and G. Harrold Carswell) and so did Reagan
(Bork and Douglas Ginsburg). And both
those presidents had trouble confirming
William Rehnquist, first to the court and
then as chief justice. George H.W. Bush
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won a fierce fight over Clarence Thomas.
All along, ideological warfare - under the
increasingly untenable guise of a debate on
the merits - intensified.
Several profound shifts in American culture
combined to create this new politics of
appointments. First, the late 1960s and early
'70s witnessed a broad assault on the
presidency from the New Left and the New
Right alike, and, with the Nixon
administration's abuses of power, liberals
also began to fear an "imperial presidency."
Responding to such concerns, senators
revived their advise-and-consent mandate as
a way to check executive power.
Divided government also shaped the new
dynamic. Nixon was the first president since
1848 to take office with the opposition party
controlling both houses of Congress, and
many Democrats, angry over Fortas's
treatment, resolved not to let the new
administration steer the high court into
conservative terrain. Reagan, the first B ush
and Clinton also lacked Senate majorities,
complicating nominations.
Expertise and identity became innovations
in public relations - ways of winning the
battle by setting the terms of debate.
Senators responded with innovations of their
own. Notably, the enthusiasm for personal
scandal that engulfed politics in the
Watergate era provided a way to shoot down
unpalatable nominees without invoking
ideology. Since Fortas, nominations have
turned - superficially - on questions of
alleged financial impropriety (Haynsworth),
racist behavior (Carswell, Rehnquist), sexual
harassment (Thomas), drug use (Ginsburg),
blindness to conflicts of interests
(Haynsworth, Carswell) or other scandals,
real or inflated.
Even the apparent exception to this rule -
the 1987 defeat of Bork - reinforced the
unspoken ban on ideology. Bork's critics
described him not as too conservative, but as
"out of the mainstream." ... His foes seemed
to be decrying the bearded nominee's
character or even his sanity, rather than his
opinions. (Bork asked the White House if he
should sacrifice the beard for the team, but it
was decided that shaving off a 20-year-old
personal trademark would attract more
criticism than the facial hair.)
Bush spoke in what has become familiar
code during his July 7 campaign stop in
North Carolina. "When the nominees come
before people in my administration, we
don't say, what is your specific position on
that issue or another issue. What we say to
the person is, what is your judicial
temperament?" Bush said. "And I don't
believe in litmus tests. [. . .] I do believe in
making sure that we share a philosophy."
It's perfectly natural that Supreme Court
appointments should be political issues, and
it's time to stop pretending otherwise.
Justices do not shed their politics when they
join the bench. Senators shouldn't be
embarrassed to say that they care whether
the court is liberal or moderate or
conservative. And candidates for president
should be pressed to talk about it a lot more.
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Dismissed in Boston
Why won't the Democrats talk about judges?
Slate
Wednesday, July 28, 2004
By Dahlia Lithwick
The American Constitution Society hosts a
panel at the Boston Public Library titled
"The Constitution at the Crossroads: 2004
and the Future of American Law." The first
question after the formal presentation goes
to the perennial election problem: "How do
we get the issue ofjudges to matter to the
American voter?" Why don't people care
what kinds of judges the president puts on
the bench?
I have read my share of overheated articles
this month-the ones about the possibility of
four Supreme Court vacancies over the next
four years-and if I hear one more person
characterize Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg as
teetering on death's door I will smack them.
But the truth is that no one cares who
appoints the next four justices, or three
justices, or seven. We just don't. So, the
lawyers are, quite reasonably, wondering
why.
In a sense, it's an unfair question to ask at
this convention, because the
environmentalists, the stem cell folks, and
the labor people are all in the same fix: This
isn't the year to get any one issue before
voters, who are having enough trouble
deciding what to think about the war. But, if
you can ignore the war for a moment, this
should have been the year in which judicial
appointments mattered a whole lot. For one
thing, if you cared about gay marriage, or
abortion, or the right to die, or civil liberties,
as much as they say you do, almost nothing
else matters but who's on the federal bench.
But more important, wasn't this election
supposed to be a referendum on Bush v.
Gore? Weren't the majority of American
voters who felt that they'd been shafted by a
partisan Supreme Court four years ago going
to rise up this time and say "no" to
ideological justices and their origami
Constitution?
Apparently not, agrees the panel. People just
don't track judicial appointments as an
issue, and we just don't consider the power
to appoint judges a truly important one.
Professor Pam Karlan, of Stanford Law
School, suggests that the remedy for this
judicial apathy is that individuals whose
lives have been affected by the courts need
to speak out. She's right. We hear nothing
about judges who refuse to grant abortion
waivers. We hear nothing about judges who
refuse to be bound by civil rights law. The
fact that Bill Pryor, President Bush's recess
appointee to the 11th Circuit Court of
Appeals, just cast the deciding vote not to
hear a case challenging the Florida law
preventing gay couples from adopting went
almost completely unnoticed in the national
media.
Something magical happens when judges
are confirmed to the bench. They become
oracles, and we as a nation just stop caring
about their activities. (Strangely, however,
some liberal jurists need only burp at oral
argument before the cries of "liberal
activist" ring out.) Someone in the audience
suggests that we need to do a better job of
demystifying the Supreme Court. Someone
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else adds that it would be "nice to know who
these guys and gals go fishing with on
weekends." Big laugh.
Another audience member makes a really
nice point: We tend to think of election
cycles in manageable four-year units. If we
don't like the job he's doing, we can boot
him in a few short years. We forget that
judicial terms are measured in decades.
These bombs have extremely long fuses.
Professor Charles Ogletree of Harvard Law
School points out that Republicans have
simply done a better job than Democrats of
articulating, committing to, and selling a
coherent judicial philosophy. Democrats
have used the presidency to create diversity
on the bench but never to promote a unitary
philosophy. Those chickens are now coming
home to roost.
This is all a double-edged sword, of course.
One of the very best things about the
American electorate is its reverence for the
judiciary. By refusing, for the most part, to
be drawn into campaigns to smear, slander,
and second-guess our judges, we have given
them the space and independence to be fair.
But by failing to care who gets a lifetime
appointment to the federal bench, or to
scrutinize what they do there, we have
dropped the ball on the very same social
issues we claim to care about most.
I keep thinking that one speaker at this
convention needs to stand up at that podium
tonight and say: "Ladies and Gentlemen.
Abu Ghraib. Thank you. Goodnight."
Because shouldn't this election ultimately be
a referendum on the rule of law? Shouldn't
the only issue before us be whether or not
there w ill b e l egal c onstraints on executive
power? Walter Dellinger, former acting
solicitor general under Bill Clinton and star
Slate contributor, puts this far more
eloquently when he warns that if we don't
cast our votes about Guantanamo, and Abu
Ghraib and those torture memos, we will
someday look back on this election as
emblematic of a national moral failure.
What is at stake, in this election, is whether
we value the notion of being a nation that's
ruled by law as opposed to rulers. This isn't
just a voting issue. It's what used to launch
revolutions.
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APPOINTMENTS
The Right-Wing Assault
What's at stake, what's already happened and what could yet occur
The American Prospect
March, 2003
Cass R. Sunstein
Since the election of President Reagan, a
disciplined, carefully orchestrated and quite
self-conscious effort by high-level
Republican officials in the White House and
the Senate has radically transformed the
federal judiciary. For more than two
decades, Republican leaders have had a
clear agenda for the nation's courts: to
reduce the powers of the federal
government; to scale back the rights of those
accused of crime; to strike down
affirmative-action programs and campaign-
finance laws; to diminish privacy rights,
including the right to abortion; and to
protect commercial interests, including
commercial advertisers, from government
regulation. They have sought judicial
candidates who would interpret the
Constitution and other federal statutes in a
way that would promote this agenda. And
their nominees have been appointed to the
bench.
To a degree that has been insufficiently
appreciated, and is in some ways barely
believable, the contemporary federal courts
are fundamentally different from the federal
courts of just two decades ago. What was
then in the center is now on the left; what
was then in the far right is now in the center;
what was then on the left no longer exists.
Conservative thought itself h as c hanged no
less radically. In the 1960s and 1970s,
principled conservatives were committed to
a restrained and cautious federal judiciary.
Their main targets included Roe v. Wade and
Miranda v. Arizona, which they saw as
unsupportable judicial interference with
political decisions. They wanted courts to
back off. But the goal has increasingly been
to promote "movement judges" - judges
with no interest in judicial restraint and with
real eagerness to strike down the acts of
Congress and state governments. On the
central issues of the day, many conservative
judges seem to think that the Constitution
should be interpreted to overlap with the
latest Republican Party platform.
(Sometimes they call this "strict
construction.")
In transforming the federal judiciary,
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush
Senior were critical figures, seeking to
populate the bench with young judges
committed to the preferred view of the
Constitution. Many of their appointees
remain active - and will so remain for many
years. But the effort to reshape the federal
judiciary has not been limited to Republican
presidents. Republican senators have been
equally single-minded. Showing
extraordinarily little respect for presidential
prerogatives, right-wing senators did
whatever they could to block President
Clinton's judicial nominees. Sometimes the
obstructionists justified their actions by
labeling Clinton nominees, whatever the
facts, as "liberal activists." Sometimes they
offered no reasons at all and simply refused
to schedule confirmation hearings. One
result was that many moderate Clinton
nominees received no serious consideration
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from the R epublican-led S enate Committee
on the Judiciary.
In contrast with their single-minded
Republican counterparts, Democrats in the
White House and the Senate have been
astonishingly passive. To high-level
Democrats, the composition of the federal
judiciary has rarely been a major priority.
Clinton chose two centrist justices, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer, whose
views are far more cautious and moderate
than those of such liberals as William
Brennan and Thurgood Marshall. Ginsburg
and Breyer are exceptionally distinguished
choices (and, in my own view, their caution
and moderation are entirely appropriate).
But they cannot be counted as the
Democratic counterparts to Justices Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas. And with a
few prominent exceptions, including the
nominations of Robert Bork and Thomas,
Democratic senators have usually deferred
to Republican presidents. Under Reagan and
Bush Senior, immoderate "movement"
judges have been confirmed to the lower
courts without the slightest protest.
Judicial Robes, Political Swords
The result of this one-sided political battle is
that America now has an ideologically
reconstructed federal judiciary that has taken
a strong stand, in many cases, against both
Congress and the states. The Rehnquist
Court has struck down at least 26 federal
enactments since 1995 - a record of
activism against the national legislative
branch. In terms of sheer numbers of
invalidations of acts of Congress, the
Rehnquist Court might well qualify as the
all-time champion.
What about the lower courts? Many people,
including some Democrats, have urged that
judges on those courts simply vote in
accordance with "the law." In their view, it
doesn't really matter whether appointees
come from Democratic or Republican
presidents. This claim might have been true
in previous periods in American history. But
because of the efforts of recent Republican
presidents, the argument is ludicrous. My
own studies show stunningly sharp
differences between the votes of judges
appointed by recent Republican presidents
and the votes of judges appointed by recent
Democratic presidents. Consider a few
examples: Republican-appointed judges
almost always vote to strike down
campaign-finance laws, whereas
Democratic-appointed judges usually vote to
uphold those laws; Republican-appointed
judges generally vote to strike down
affirmative-action programs while
Democratic-appointed judges
overwhelmingly vote to uphold those
programs; Democratic judges are much
more likely to vote to strike down
restrictions on the right to choose than
Republican judges, who are far more likely
to s trike d own an environmental regulation
that has been challenged by industry in
court.
Many defenders of right-wing judicial
activism contend that they are really
behaving neutrally. Often they say that they
are simply following "originalism" - an
approach that interprets the Constitution in a
way that fits with the original
understandings of those who ratified it.
Originalism is a principled and honorable
position. Unfortunately, the current right-
wing activists aren't practicing it. The
original understanding of the 14th
Amendment, passed during Reconstruction,
strongly suggests that affirmative-action
programs are acceptable. But because the
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right-wing activists on the bench and in the
Department of Justice are on the warpath
against affirmative action, they don't consult
the original understanding when it doesn't
suit them. In ruling that Congress lacks the
power to allow citizens to sue to enforce the
law, the Rehnquist Court said not a word
about the original understanding, which
indicates that Congress has exactly that
power. Too often, the views of
contemporary federal judges are closer to
the Republican Party platform than to those
of the framers.
I don ot s uggest that t he c onstitutional 1 aw
of 2010 will look at all like the
constitutional law of 1935. Courts move
slowly; usually they respect their own
precedents. But significant changes are
continuing to occur. Amid those changes,
what is most alarming is the large-scale shift
in conservative commitments. I believe -
indeed, I argued in the first issue of this
magazine 13 years ago [see "The Future of
Constitutional P olitics," TAP, Spring 1 990]
- that in the 1960s and 1970s, conservative
critics were right to object, on democratic
grounds, to some of the Court's liberal
decisions, including Roe v. Wade itself.
They were right to say that the Court should
be reluctant to wield ambiguous
constitutional provisions as a kind of
weapon against reasonable judgments from
Congress and the states. But in the current
period, President Bush and others are asking
the Court to do exactly that. Right-wing
activists even appear to have convinced
themselves that, by remarkable coincidence,
there is a close fit between their own
political commitments and the Constitution
itself. In a way, they're right: By appointing
judges who see things their way, the fit is
becoming closer every day.
Is there any possible response? It would be
good to begin with a sustained objection by
those who understand the problem. The
nation is in the midst of a period of right-
wing judicial activism, more extreme than
any such period since the New Deal itself A
great deal has already happened, but much
worse may be on the way unless far more
people - moderate and even conservative
Republicans, as well as Democrats - come
to see what the nation stands to lose.
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Remarks by the President During Federal Judicial Appointees Announcement
The East Room
May 9, 2001
Thank you all very much. Attorney General,
it's good to see you, sir, and happy birthday.
Today is his birthday. Also, Judge Al
Gonzales. Judge Gonzales is a great friend
of mine who, fortunately, is my lawyer and
is a part of the process, judicial selection
process. Thank you for being here, Judge.
I'm also honored to welcome members of
the United States Senate who are here to
welcome the nominees to Washington: of
course, Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of
the Judiciary; as well as Senator Patrick
Leahy, ranking member on the Judiciary.
It's good to see you men, thank you both for
coming.
John Warner, George Allen, George
Voinovich and last, but not least, Senator
Strom Thurmond. Welcome. (Applause.)
Thank you all for coming.
I'm pleased to welcome my judicial
nominees to the White House. And I'm
pleased to welcome their family and friends,
as well.
This is a proud moment for all of you, and
it's a proud moment for me, as well. A
President has fewer greater responsibilities
than that of nominating men and women to
the courts of the United States. A federal
judge holds a position of great influence and
respect, and can hold it for a lifetime.
When a President chooses a judge, he is
placing in human hands the authority and
majesty of the law. He owes it to the
Constitution and to the country to choose
with care. I have done so.
With me this afternoon are my first 11
judicial nominees, individuals of experience
and character. Four of them serve as United
States district judges, all four confirmed by
unanimous votes. Two others are sitting
judges on state supreme courts. Four have
served as law clerks in the Supreme Court of
the United States. One has served here as an
associate counsel to the President. One
already holds the position for which I
nominate him, by recess appointment of
President Clinton.
These men and women have followed
different paths to this nomination. They
come from diverse backgrounds, and will
bring a wide range of experience to the
bench. All have sterling credentials and have
met high standards of legal training,
temperament and judgment.
As a group, they command broad, bipartisan
support among those who know them and
who have served with them. I submit their
names to the Senate with full confidence
that they will satisfy any test of judicial
merit.
These first nominations are also an
opportunity to outline the standards by
which I will choose all federal judges. The
American people expect judges of the
highest caliber, and my nominees will meet
that test. A judge, by the most basic
measure, has an obligation shared by the
President and members of Congress. All of
us are constitutional officers, sworn to serve
within the limits of our Constitution and
laws. When we observe those limits, we
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exercise our rightful power. When we
exceed those limits, we abuse our powers.
Every judge I appoint will be a person who
clearly understands the role of a judge is to
interpret the law, not to legislate from the
bench. To paraphrase the third occupant of
this house, James Madison, the courts exist
to exercise not the will of men, but the
judgment of law. My judicial nominees will
know the difference. Understanding this will
make them more effective in the defense of
rights guaranteed under the Constitution, the
enforcement of our laws, and more effective
in assuming that justice is done to the guilty
and for the innocent.
My standard is informed by the oath that
each judge will take: to administer justice
without respect to persons, and to do equal
right to poor and to the rich. A good judge
exercises these powers with discernment,
courage and humility. These are
commitments, not just to philosophy, but of
character.
My nominees today and in the years to come
will be notable for their distinction and
accomplishments. And all will be
exceptional for their humanity and their
integrity. With today's 11 nominees, we
continue a constitutional process that
involves all three branches of government.
For many w eeks now, w e have sought and
received advice from senators of both
parties. I now submit these nominations in
good faith, trusting that good faith will also
be extended by the United States Senate.
Over the years, we have seen how the
confirmation process can be turned to other
ends. We have seen political battles played
out in committee hearings - battles that have
little to do with the merits of the person
sitting before the committee.
This is not good for the Senate, for our
courts or for the country.
There are, today, over a hundred vacancies
on the federal courts, causing backlogs,
frustration and delay of justice. I urge
senators of both parties to rise above the
bitterness of the past, to provide a fair
hearing and a prompt vote to every nominee.
That should b et he c ase for no m atter w ho
lives in this house, and no matter who
controls the senate.
I ask for the return of civility and dignity to
the confirmation process. And with this
distinguished group of nominees awaiting
confirmation, t here i s no b etter opportunity
than right now. I congratulate all of you on
your service past, and for your service to
come.
God bless. (Applause.)
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Stop the Madness
In the judicial nominations war, do unto others as you would have them do unto you.
Legal Times
May 27, 2003
Stuart Taylor Jr.
Republicans and Democrats are nearing the
brink of nuclear warfare over President
George W. Bush's judicial nominations.
Unless both sides c ompromise, the damage
to the government and the nation could be
profound.
Hostilities have raged on and off since the
1987 Battle of Bork, resulting in a
downward spiral of partisan bitterness and
recriminations. The latest and biggest
escalation has been Senate Democrats' all-
but-unprecedented filibusters of
professionally well-qualified Bush nominees
who are simply too conservative for the
Democrats' taste. And now, as both sides
prepare for a climactic battle in the event of
any Supreme Court retirements, Republicans
are threatening the so-called nuclear option.
Here's how it would work: Republican
leaders would ask Vice President Dick
Cheney, as the Senate's presiding officer, to
rule that the Constitution requires the Senate
to hold up-or-down majority votes on all
presidential nominees. Such a ruling would
trump any contrary advice from the Senate's
parliamentarian. And unless vetoed by a
Senate majority, such a Cheney ruling
would override both the Senate rule
requiring 60 votes to break a filibuster and
the one requiring 67 votes to amend the
rules themselves. It would also weaken the
counter-majoritarian role that the Senate has
proudly played since the founding of the
nation.
The Republicans could then ram all of
Bush's nominations through with 51 votes.
But such a ruling, Senate Democrats have
made clear, would mean Armageddon. They
would and could use parliamentary devices
to b ring t he chamber to a grinding halt for
weeks or months, bottling up Bush's entire
legislative program and slowing down all
other business. The fallout would bring
partisan bitterness to a nadir unseen in
recent history.
Time to be Statesmen
It's time for a statesmanlike compromise to
take us back from the brink, like the one that
President John Kennedy and Soviet leader
Nikita Khrushchev crafted to step back from
the brink of nuclear war during the Cuban
missile crisis of 1962.
The key would be for Republicans and
Democrats alike to recognize that only a
blinkered partisan or an artificial-
intelligence supercomputer could calculate
with real confidence which party deserves
more blame for bringing the judicial
appointment process to an ever-somier state
over the past 16 years.
President Ronald Reagan arguably
overreached when he nominated
archconservative Robert Bork in 1987 to fill
the seat of moderate centrist Justice Lewis
Powell Jr. This effectively asked a
Democratic-controlled Senate to help move
the Supreme Court - as closely divided then
as now - sharply to the right; just for
starters, Bork's confirmation would
probably have doomed Roe v. Wade.
Democrats understandably balked. But
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rather than confining themselves to
challenging Bork's conservative views, they
demonized the distinguished former solicitor
general as a monster bent on destroying our
constitutional rights.
Then, during the first Bush administration,
came t he equally bitter battle of 1991 over
another archconservative, Clarence Thomas,
which would have been a partisan
extravaganza even if Anita Hill had never
shown up. Senate Democrats could not stop
Thomas. But below the radar, they used
stalling tactics to bottle up some well-
qualified lower-court nominees.
Senate Republicans greatly escalated such
stalling tactics during President Bill
Clinton's second term. Despite Clinton's
conciliatory efforts to consult with them,
and his avoidance of provocative
nominations - most of his picks were closer
to being moderates than crusading liberal
activists - Republicans used "secret holds"
and other gimmicks to deny votes to many
Clinton nominees and demagogic attacks to
defeat one [Ronnie White] on the floor.
One result was to save for the current
President Bush lots of lower-court vacancies
that would, but for Republican
obstructionism, have previously been filled
by Clinton nominees. Although Bush made
a brief conciliatory gesture by renominating
one of those Clinton choices, he has
otherwise treated his narrow election victory
as a mandate to mount the most determined
push of any president in recent history to
change the ideological balance of the lower
federal courts.
Senate Democrats understandably felt
justified in resorting to stalling tactics of
their own to bottle up some of Bush's more
conservative choices. And after a bare 51-
seat Republican majority took control in
January, the Democrats had to choose
between seeing Bush's nominees confirmed
en masse and resorting to the filibuster.
Never before has this parliamentary weapon
been used to kill nominations solely because
of ideological disagreements. But now,
Democrats are filibustering two
professionally well-qualified Bush nominees
to federal appeals courts, Miguel Estrada
and Priscilla Owen. They plan to filibuster
others, and are threatening to filibuster any
Supreme Court nominee they consider too
conservative.
Unhealthy Precedent
If this tactic succeeds, it will set an
unhealthy precedent. While the Senate has
confirmed 124 of Bush's judicial nominees,
any 41 senators could henceforth kill any
judicial [or executive branch] nomination,
no matter how admirable the nominee's
character and qualifications. The result
would be to unduly sap the power of Bush
and future presidents to shape the judiciary -
and to doom almost any nominee who has
ever dared express a controversial thought.
So it's not hard to understand the
Republicans' temptation to go nuclear. Their
argument that the Constitution requires the
Senate to confirm any presidential nominee
who has majority support is plausible,
although far from compelling. And Bush
might profit politically by the GOP's going
nuclear, especially if the Democrats seek to
filibuster a Supreme Court nominee who
comes across at his or her confirmation
hearing as likable, unthreatening, and
telegenic.
But resorting to the nuclear option would
drive the last nail in the coffin of Bush's
pledge to be a uniter, not a divider. It would
also be bad for the country, which needs less
partisan warfare, not more.
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The president should invite Senate
Democrats to pull back from the brink. The
best way to do that might be an informal
compromise along these lines: Bush would
promise to consult seriously with
Democratic senators before making any
judicial nomination, as the Constitution's
"advice and consent" clause contemplates.
In addition, in light of the Senate's slim
Republican majority, he would pledge not to
try to swing the Court's ideological balance
by naming a strong conservative to replace
any of the four liberal or two centrist justices
who may retire during this Congress.
These Bush pledges would be conditioned
on a commitment by Democratic leaders to
end their current filibusters and not to
filibuster any other judicial nominees on
ideological grounds as long as Bush keeps
his part of the bargain. Bush could make the
deal more palatable by giving a bit of
ground to the Democrats who seek access to
Miguel Estrada's internal memos from when
he worked in the solicitor general's office.
The logic of such a compromise would be a
mutual recognition that filibustering a
Supreme Court nominee would be a far
more defensible tactic than filibustering a
lower-court nominee. The reason is that -
especially when the justices are as closely
divided as now - one or two Supreme Court
appointments could engineer dramatic
changes in the law on big national issues
including abortion, affirmative action,
religion, campaign finance, and civil
liberties. Arguably, the president should not
be able to engineer such a change with a
mere 51 votes in the Senate. The 800-odd
judges on the lower federal courts,
other hand, have far less latitude and
more constrained by Supreme
precedents.
on the
are far
Court
No more Provocations
Any such compromise would quickly
unravel unless Bush and Senate Democrats
avoided unnecessary provocations. If
conservative Chief Justice William
Rehnquist retires, for example, it would not
do for Bush to try to promote Justice
Antonin Scalia, a slightly more
conservative, ferociously brilliant polemicist
who is a red flag to liberals. Such a
nomination would not tip the Court's
balance [Scalia would still have only one
vote]. But it would send liberal groups into a
frenzy that would make it hard for Senate
Democrats to resist liberal demands for a
filibuster.
Perhaps the most formidable obstacle to any
compromise is that Republicans and
Democrats alike seem to believe
passionately that their adversaries' tactics
have been uniquely outrageous. There may
be less trust between them than there was
between Kennedy and Khrushchev in 1962.
Before it's too late, they should all ask
themselves this question:
If the shoe were on the other foot - if a
President Al Gore were trying to ram a slate
of liberal judicial nominees past a 48-seat
Republican minority - wouldn't we be doing
about the same things that our adversaries
are doing now?
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Checkmate in the Judges Game?;
For democracy's sake, President Bush should threaten a recess appointment,or two.
Legal Times
September 8, 2003
Randolph J. May
Quick! Name President Dwight
Eisenhower's three recess appointments to
the Supreme Court.
C'mon, fess up. You didn't know that Chief
Justice Earl Warren [1953] and Justices
William Brennan Jr. [1956] and Potter
Stewart [1958] took their seats by virtue of
appointments made during Senate recesses.
Each was subsequently confirmed by the
Senate, but not before participating in
deciding cases during their recess service.
More recently, three weeks before leaving
office, President Bill Clinton appointed
Roger Gregory to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 4th Circuit, after Gregory's
nomination had stalled in the Senate for six
months.
So, here's my not-so-modest - and
admittedly politically risky - suggestion for
President George W. Bush: Now that
Congress is back from its August recess, he
should promptly announce that if the Senate
fails to vote on the nominations of Priscilla
Owen and William Pryor Jr. before it next
leaves town, he will give them recess
appointments. And he should try to convince
Miguel Estrada, who has informed the
president that he wishes to withdraw his
nomination, to accept a recess appointment
too.
Estrada and Owen were both nominated,
along with Roger Gregory, in May 2001 in
Bush's first batch of judicial nominations.
Gregory was confirmed within three months,
becoming the first African-American to sit
on the 4th Circuit. More than two years
later, both Estrada and Owen still have been
denied confirmation votes, and, along with
Pryor, have faced filibusters mounted by
Senate Democrats.
A Good Firestorm
I understand that in today's supercharged
judicial nominations environment, recess
appointments - which would allow Estrada,
Owen, and Pryor to sit on the bench until the
Senate either confirmed them or the next
congressional session ended - will ignite a
political firestorm stoked by Sens. Patrick
Leahy of Vermont, Edward Kennedy of
Massachusetts, and Charles Schumer of
New York and their fellow Senate Judiciary
Committee Democrats. I don't purport to
know how the politics would play out. But I
do contend that if Bush believes his
nominees are qualified for the bench and
have been treated unfairly in the Senate, a
few recess appointments will provoke a
constitutional dialogue in the country that
can actually contribute to our nation's
political health.
There is always the risk, and not a small
one, that this tactic would further politicize
the already overly partisan judicial
nominations process. But we may already
have reached the limits of nasty
partisanship. There can be no doubt that
many well-qualified men and women who
would distinguish themselves as federal
judges are discouraged from accepting
nominations for fear of having to run the
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Senate gantlet. Witness Estrada's bitter
experience with the broken process.
If, in response to the political firestorm
ignited by the recess appointments, Bush
were committed to vigorously defending his
action, the nation could benefit from the
ensuing debate. The president would have to
explain why, in his view, his nominees are
well-qualified to be judges by virtue of their
professional and personal attributes, why he
believes they are not the "judicial
extremists" their Democratic opponents
proclaim them to be, and why circuit court
judges are not free to disregard Supreme
Court precedent in a system governed by the
rule of law.
And the president would have to articulate
his views concerning the Senate's proper
advice and consent role, and the degree of
deference that he believes should be
accorded a president's nominations. He
would have to explain the circumstances, if
any, under which he thinks it appropriate for
Senate filibusters to be mounted to deny
judicial nominees up-or-down votes on their
nomination.
Finally, he would be forced to explain why
he believes recess appointments to Article
III courts are proper in the face of the likely
charge that such appointments compromise
not only the Senate's advice-and-consent
role, but also the independence of the
appointees who have not been granted life
tenure by virtue of Senate confirmation.
After all, it might be argued that a recess
appointee may tailor his or her decisions to
enhance prospects for ultimate confirmation.
My point here is not to argue in favor of
specific nominees, or against the use of
Senate filibusters to block an up-or-down
vote on their nominations - although, based
on what I know, I think that the nominees
I've mentioned should be confirmed, and
that the filibusters preventing votes on their
nominations are inappropriate. Rather, my
point is that because Bush surely believes
they should be confirmed and are being
treated inappropriately, he should escalate
the fight for them in a way that will engage
the American people in a constitutional
dialogue.
Talk to the People
Some may argue that a spirited debate
between the president and the Senate
Democrats, and the defenders of each,
concerning the issues of constitutional
principle and philosophy involved in the
nomination fights is too esoteric for the
public to follow. I give the American people
more credit, and see no reason to leave this
debate to inside-the-Beltway pundits and the
nation's law professors.
Our democracy's ongoing vitality depends
on widespread understanding of our
constitutional system by a broad swath of
the American citizenry, especially in an era
when we are absorbing so many immigrants
from lands with far different political
systems and constitutional cultures. Such
understanding can be enriched when our
elected leaders engage in serious debate
about fundamental constitutional issues.
Of course, Bush should follow my
suggestion only if he believes that the recess
appointments are constitutional. It would not
serve his interests, or the nation's, to
instigate a constitutional debate by acting in
an unconstitutional manner. This is where
some more constitutional history and
precedent are useful.
Recess appointments of Article III judges
are not a recent phenomenon. To the
contrary, the practice dates from the
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republic's earliest days. George Washington,
who had served as president of the
Constitutional Convention, made three
recess appointments of federal judges in his
first year in office. There is no evidence that
his recess appointments to the Supreme
Court of Justice Thomas Johnson [1791] and
Chief Justice John Rutledge [1795] were
challenged by any of the Founders then
serving in his Cabinet or in Congress.
Perhaps, most tellingly, by the end of 1823,
during a period when most Founders were
still alive, there had been five recess
Supreme Court appointments, without
engendering constitutional controversy.
All in all, there have been more than 300
recess appointments to Article III courts.
[For more on the historical record, see the
September 2001 paper, Recess
Appointments of Federal Judges, by Louis
Fisher of the Congressional Research
Service, and the unsigned 1957 Stanford
Law Review note "Recess Appointments -
Constitutional but Unwise?"]
There has never been a challenge to recess
appointments for federal judges to reach the
Supreme Court. Both the 2nd and 9th
circuits, the only two appeals courts that
have considered the issue, have dismissed
arguments that the Article II recess
appointment power does not encompass
Article III judges. [See United States v.
Allocco [2nd Cir. 1962] and United States v.
Woodley [9th Cir. 1985].]
Responding to the principal claim that a
temporary appointee lacks the independence
of a life-tenured Article III judge, Allocco
stated: "This hypothetical risk must be
weighed against the danger of setting up a
roadblock in the orderly functioning of
government which would result if the
President's recess power were limited." To
the same effect, the 9th Circuit, while
acknowledging that a recess appointee
theoretically may be subject to greater
outside pressure than a confirmed judge,
nevertheless concluded that it must "view
the recess appointee n ot as a d anger tot he
independence of the judiciary, but as the
extraordinary exception to the prescriptions
of Article III."
Make no mistake. I am not advocating that
Bush embark on a campaign of wholesale
recess appointments. And I am not
intimating that I know whether Owen, Pryor,
and, especially now, Estrada even would
accept such appointments. Certainly, the
personal sacrifice involved, without any
assurance of ultimate confirmation, could be
substantial.
High-Stakes and High-Minded
What I am suggesting is that, if the
nominees would agree, and if Bush is
willing to take his case to the people, the
heat generated by recess appointments
would create the opportunity - indeed,
necessity - for the president to lead an
edifying dialogue. This high-stakes and
high-minded discussion would concern the
appropriate role of federal judges in our
judicial system, including those who sit
below the Supreme Court; preferred modes
of constitutional interpretation; and the
boundary that separates the "extreme" from
the "mainstream" in our constitutional
jurisprudence.
In a government that ultimately must stand
or fall based on a shared understanding of
constitutional values and the rule of law,
more rather than less constitutional
conversation is always a good thing.
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Bush Bypasses Senate On Judge
Pickering Named To Appeals Court During Recess
The Washington Post
Saturday, Jan. 17, 2004
Mike Allen and Helen Dewar
President Bush bypassed senators yesterday
and installed Charles W. Pickering Sr. as an
appeals court judge, ending a three-year
battle over a Mississippian viewed by
Democrats as hostile to civil rights.
Republican officials called the decision a
calculated escalation by Bush in his standoff
with Democrats over their use of delaying
tactics to stall several of his most
conservative nominees for lifetime seats on
the federal bench. The move threatened to
poison White House relations with
Democrats further at the start of an election
year.
Bush used his recess-appointment powers to
seat Pickering, 66, a federal district judge in
Hattiesburg, Miss., on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 5th Circuit, based in New
Orleans. Pickering was sworn in last night at
the U.S. District Courthouse in Jackson,
Miss., the state capital, less than three hours
after Bush's announcement.
Such appointments, which the president can
make when lawmakers are out of session,
last until the next Congress takes office - in
this case, next January.
Senate records show the power, usually
exercised with lower-profile nominees, has
been used to elevate j udges only a handful
of times in the past 30 years. Less than a
month before leaving office, President Bill
Clinton used the mechanism to install Roger
L. Gregory as the first black judge on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit,
which includes Maryland and Virginia. Bush
renominated Gregory, who was confirmed
for life.
Pickering was challenged by Democrats
over his 1994 actions from the bench to
reduce the sentence of a man convicted of
burning a cross near the home of an
interracial couple. Republicans contend
Pickering was motivated by concern over
the fairness of sentences meted out in the
case.
Democrats also raised questions about
Pickering's contacts as a state senator in the
1970s with the Mississippi Sovereignty
Commission, which worked to preserve
segregation. Bush has called Pickering "an
advocate of civil rights" and pointed to a
large number of African American leaders in
Mississippi who came forward to declare
their support for him.
Bush, in a written statement issued after he
had departed for Camp David yesterday
afternoon, asserted that a bipartisan majority
of senators supports Pickering and that "if
he were given a vote, he would be
confirmed."
"But a minority of Democratic Senators has
been using unprecedented obstructionist
tactics to prevent him and other qualified
individuals from receiving up-or-down
votes," he said. "Their tactics are
inconsistent with the Senate's constitutional
responsibility and are hurting our judicial
system."
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Sen. Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.), a
Judiciary Committee member, said he took
the appointment as "a finger in the eye."
A Senate Republican leadership aide said
the appointment was intended as a "shot
across the bow" to Democrats after the
White House decided they were paying too
small a price for filibustering the
nominations of Pickering and five other
appeals court nominees, several of whom
Bush sees as potential Supreme Court picks.
But the aide said Bush was "taking a
chance," because Democrats might retaliate
on other nominees they might otherwise
have allowed to be confirmed.
Both parties are likely to make Pickering an
issue in November's election as an engine
for motivating core supporters. Within hours
of Bush's decision, Democrats were
charging that the appointment shows his
reelection could threaten reproductive and
civil rights. Republicans were arguing that
Pickering's dilemma shows why Bush needs
more Republicans int he S enate, where t he
split is 51 Republicans, 48 Democrats and
one independent.
Nominated by Bush soon after he took
office in 2001, Pickering was rejected by the
Senate Judiciary Committee when
Democrats controlled the chamber in 2002.
Bush renominated him last year as soon as
Republicans regained control of the
chamber. The nomination stalled after a
furor over racially inflammatory remarks by
then-Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.),
his main patron, who subsequently resigned
from his leadership post.
Pickering and his allies continued to try to
build support for the nomination. He was
later approved by the Judiciary Committee
on a party-line vote, setting the stage for a
showdown fight on the Senate floor last fall.
As they had done with several other Bush
nominees, Democrats filibustered
Pickering's nomination. On a vote of 54 to
43 in Pickering's favor, the judge's backers
fell six votes short of the 60 needed to end
the stalling tactics and bring the nomination
to a final vote. Bush called the action "a
disgrace."
Democrats condemned Bush's decision,
announced at the start of a holiday weekend.
Senate Minority Leader Thomas A. Daschle
(D-S.D.) said it shows Bush "has no interest
in working in a bipartisan manner to appoint
moderate judges who will uphold the law."
And Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), ranking
minority member of the Judiciary
Committee, called Bush's move a "cynical,
divisive appointment that will further
politicize the federal judiciary."
Several leading Democratic senators
juxtaposed the appointment of Pickering
with Bush's wreath-laying in Atlanta on
Thursday at the grave of Martin Luther King
Jr., on what would have been the slain civil
rights leader's 75th birthday. Sen. Edward
M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) called the
appointment "an insult to Dr. King, an insult
to every African American" and said it
"serves only to emphasize again this
administration's shameful opposition to civil
rights."
Campaigning in Iowa, several of the
Democratic presidential candidates decried
the decision. Former Vermont governor
Howard Dean called the appointment, after
the King visit, "an ultimate hypocrisy." Sen.
John F. Kerry (Mass.) said Bush is
"threatening civil rights on behalf of right-
wing ideologues."
On the Republican side, Lott said
Pickering's nomination had been "stifled by
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special interests who have unfairly smeared
the reputation of a good man."
Republicans said Pickering is likely to retire
when his recess appointment expires -
unless he is confirmed, which the GOP
concedes is unlikely.
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Statement on Appointment of William H. Pryor Jr.
February 20, 2004
Statement by the President
Today, I exercised my constitutional
authority to appoint William H. Pryor Jr. to
serve on the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit. Bill Pryor has
served as the Attorney General of Alabama
since 1997 and has had a distinguished
career as a public servant and practicing
attorney. His impressive record
demonstrates his devotion to the rule of law
and to treating all people equally under the
law. He has received widespread bipartisan
support from those who know him and know
his record. I am proud to name this leading
American lawyer to the appellate bench.
Attorney General Pryor was nominated
more than 10 months a go, b ut s till h as n ot
received an up-or-down vote in the Senate.
A bipartisan majority of Senators supports
his confirmation. If Attorney General Pryor
were given a vote on the floor of the Senate,
he would be confirmed. But a minority of
Democratic Senators has been using
unprecedented obstructionist tactics to
prevent him and other qualified nominees
from receiving up-or-down votes. Their
tactics are inconsistent with the Senate's
constitutional responsibility and are hurting
our judicial system.
As a result of today's recess appointment,
Attorney General Pryor will fill a seat on the
Eleventh Circuit that has been designated a
judicial emergency. He will perform a
valuable service on a court that needs more
judges to do its work with the efficiency the
American people deserve and expect. Again
I call on those in the Senate who are playing
politics with the American judicial system to
stop so that my nominees receive the up-or-
down votes they deserve.
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Understudies
The New Republic
May 26, 2003
Clay Risen
This January, the Bush administration
nominated James Leon Holmes, a Little
Rock lawyer, to sit on Arkansas's Eastern
District Court. On April 10, however,
Holmes's nomination was delayed
indefinitely in the Judiciary Committee after
a group of Democrats, along with moderate
Republican Arlen Specter, balked at his
religious-right provenance. (As the former
president of Arkansas Right to Life and a
longtime anti-abortion a ctivist, H olmes h ad
authored articles arguing that "the woman is
to place herself under the authority of the
man" and comparing the pro-choice
movement to Nazi Germany.) In an almost
unprecedented move, on May 1,
Republicans sent Holmes to the Senate floor
without the Judiciary Committee's
imprimatur.
Ultimately, though, what makes Holmes an
anomaly among President Bush's district
court nominees is neither his far-right
provenance nor the fact that he has made it
to the Senate floor. What's anomalous about
Holmes is that Democrats slowed his
nomination down at all, even temporarily.
While Democratic senators have waged a
few high-profile battles over Bush's
nominees to higher courts-for instance,
Miguel Estrada, Priscilla Owen, and Charles
Pickering-they have p ut up little resistance
to the administration's steady politicization
of the lower federal courts. "What has been
noticed at the appellate level is also
happening at the district court level," says
one aide to a member of the Senate Judiciary
Committee. "It's just no one pays attention."
District courts are the lowest and most
numerous in the federal judicial system, and
as such they are often deemed politically
irrelevant-concerned with, as one staffer to
a member of the Judiciary Committee puts
it, "making widgets." But those widgets are
the building blocks of much of U.S. law.
Because, in most instances, district courts
are the first courts to hear a case, they set the
tone for later appeals. "District courts make,
in most cases, the most important decisions
and the decisions that appellate courts defer
to," says Peter Rubin, a lawyer and president
of the American Constitution Society.
"Should we verify a class action, should we
grant summary judgment-and that's the end
of the case for a lot of people." District
courts can also provide political cover for
more conservative judges at the appellate
and Supreme Court level by reducing the
chances that those courts will be forced to
reverse decisions. "One of the problems,"
says Michael Gerhardt, a professor at the
William and Mary School of Law, "is, if you
don't take ideology into account in the
lower-court nominations, then your higher
judges are forced to reverse more often."
In Louisiana, for example, a recent Bush
appointee to the Eastern District Court, Jay
Zainey-who was unanimously confirmed by
the Senate last year despite a record as an
anti-abortion activist ruled against a woman
who claims she was denied access to
abortion services while in prison. The
woman, known to the court as Victoria W.,
had been sent to prison for a parole violation
and soon after learned from the prison
doctor that she was pregnant. She requested
an abortion but was denied; by the time of
her release, it was too late to obtain one.
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Victoria W. contacted a lawyer and filed suit
in federal court, and the case came before
Zainey in April 2002. Zainey dismissed the
case in a three-page order, refusing even to
hear it. The decision was unprecedented.
"No federal court in the country," said
Victoria W.'s lawyer, Linda Rosenthal, "has
ever held constitutional a prison policy that
intentionally obstructed a prisoner's right to
terminate her pregnancy." Victoria W. is
appealing the verdict, but that appeal will be
heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, which is already
overwhelmingly conservative and will only
grow more so if Bush succeeds in placing
Owen and Pickering on it. By making a
controversial ruling at the district level,
Zainey gives the higher-profile appellate
court room to uphold his ruling while
avoiding the taint of right-wing judicial
activism.
The flip side works as well. A recent ruling
by Sam Haddon, a Bush appointee in
Montana, in favor of an oil- and natural-gas-
exploration company accused of violating
the Clean Water Act (CWA) was overturned
in April by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. In doing so, the appeals court
expanded the CWA's list of pollutants and
opened up the possibility of further suits-
which reinforces its image as an excessively
liberal bench. And, paradoxically, Haddon's
ruling, which experts say represents an
almost unprecedentedly narrow
interpretation of the CWA, will likely
receive much less public scrutiny because it
took place at the district level.
Another reason district court benches matter
is that they serve as "farm teams" for higher
courts. Because appellate nominees who
come from the district courts have federal
judiciary experience, district courts make
excellent places to cultivate future appellate
court nominees and to park potentially
controversial nominees. Take William
Steele. An Alabama magistrate judge, he
was nominated in 2001 to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. But he
soon came under withering fire from a bevy
of civil rights groups, who charged him with
"racial insensitivity" in a number of anti-
discrimination suits. His nomination was
withdrawn, but, in January, Bush nominated
him to Alabama's Southern District Court;
he was confirmed by voice vote in March.
After a few years building a federal judicial
record at the district level, he could be an
almost unstoppable appellate court nominee.
So far, the administration has filled 100
district court seats, and, while most of the
nominations have not been controversial, as
a whole they have been at least as
ideologically oriented as the more high-
profile names at the appellate level. On the
list is Paul Cassell, confirmed to the Utah
District Court in May 2002, who previously
led a campaign to overturn the Supreme
Court's landmark Miranda ruling; Michael
Mills, a Mississippi nominee known for his
anti-abortion views while on the state
supreme court; and Nebraska's Laurie Smith
Camp, who has been an outspoken abortion-
rights opponent. Another frequently cited
appointment is that of Ron Clark, who
recently began his judgeship on Texas's
Eastern District Court. As a member of the
Texas House of Representatives, Clark put
forward a series of bills to limit access to
reproductive-health services, including
placing zoning restrictions on clinics and
instituting mandatory 24-hour waiting
periods. Despite his record on abortion and
his lack of judicial experience, he was
approved by a voice vote in October 2002.
However, Clark was also running for
reelection to the narrowly divided Texas
House, and, if he had immediately accepted
the administration's appointment, he would
have likely ceded the closely contested race
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to a Democrat. So, with Bush's blessing,
Clark refused the appointment until after the
election-winning and then promptly
resigning, an unheard of step that blurs the
line between the White House's political
interests and its duty to promote an
independent judiciary.
There is no formal requirement for how the
president nominates district court nominees;
nevertheless, there are traditional checks and
balances that have evolved over the last 50
years, practices that are being either
rewritten or discarded by the administration.
These include ignoring state judicial
nominating committees, rejecting American
Bar Association ratings, placing Justice
Department political appointees in positions
related to judicial selection, and refusing to
cooperate with home-state senators. Says
one former Justice staffer, "They have
systematically ignored bipartisan
commissions [and] ignored traditions of
consultation that were in place when we got
there and have been in place for years in
order to make these ideological
appointments and political rewards for jobs
well done."
Bush h as come under e specially heavy fire
for ignoring home-state senators when
making his judicial picks, reversing a
tradition that had held since the Eisenhower
administration. In the past, administrations
have either allowed senators from a district's
state to make nominations or have given
them broad sway in the selection, even when
the senators are both from the opposing
party. Several states have even organized
bipartisan nominating committees in an
attempt to institutionalize this coordination.
But, in a number of instances-in
Washington, Hawaii, Wisconsin, and
Florida among others-the administration has
ignored both the senators and, in many
cases, the commissions. In the case of
Florida's Southern District Court, the White
House not only overlooked nominees put
forward by the state's Judicial Nominating
Commission, it also rebuffed concerns about
the process from Democratic Senators Bob
Graham and Bill Nelson. Both senators
criticized the administration publicly for
going ahead with i ts o wn n ominee, C ecilia
Altonaga (though, neither voted against her
when she was confirmed on May 6). "It's a
stunning lack of consultation with the home-
state senators," says one former Justice
staffer. "For years, there was fabulous
cooperation between the senators in Florida
no matter what the party. [. . .] We had no
trouble filling F loridaj udgeships with very
qualified, nonpolitical people, and [Bush]
just ripped it up."
Democrats, for their part, say they are so
busy fighting at the appellate level that a
number of controversial nominees have
slipped through virtually unopposed. [. . .]
As an example, several Democratic staffers
cite John Bates, whom Bush appointed to
the D.C. District Court. A former
independent counsel's office lawyer under
Kenneth S tarr, Bates was n ominated tot he
court in June 2001 and received unanimous
Senate approval in December of that year.
Soon after coming to the bench, he was
assigned to hear Walker v. Cheney, in which
the General Accounting Office (GAO) sued
the vice president for access to documents
detailing meetings with energy-industry
officials. In December, Bates ruled against
the GAO. That ruling, in addition to
effectively closing off public inquiry into the
energy task force, could have a disastrous
long-term impact on congressional oversight
of the executive branch. And it proves
definitively that a district court judge can
have a powerful impact on the nation's
political and legal battles-something the
Bush administration understands all too
well.
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Here's What Less Experience Gets You
The Washington Post
Sunday, March 2, 2003
Michael J. Gerhardt
I do not know Miguel Estrada. Nor do
Democratic senators. Many were
confounded when President George W.
Bush first nominated Estrada in May 2001
to the nation's second-most powerful court,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. Estrada, nominated at the
tender age of 39, had practiced law for less
than a decade. At his confirmations
hearings, he said little about his judicial
philosophy. After his appointment
languished in the Democratic-controlled
Senate and Bush renominated him this year,
Estrada appeared again before the Judiciary
Committee and failed to dispel the mystery
surrounding his views.
Estrada has been singled out by Senate
Democrats, who are filibustering to block a
vote on his nomination. Yet in other
respects, Estrada is not unique. Like many
of Bush's other appellate court nominees, he
is relatively young. Like many of these
younger nominees, he has left virtually no
paper t rail, m aking it difficult to attack h is
record in confirmation hearings.
Statistics show the growing importance of
younger nominees in the selection of judges
for the nation's federal courts of appeal. In
the modem era, the average age of a circuit
court nominee at the time of confirmation
has gone from a high of 55.9 years under
President Dwight D. Eisenhower to a low of
48.7 years under the first President Bush.
The average age of President George W.
Bush's confirmed circuit court nominees
was 50.5 during the 107th Congress, but his
more recent choices show that he wants to
follow his father's example. His circuit court
nominees include not only Estrada, but
Jeffrey S. Sutton (40 when first nominated
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit), Steve Colloton (39 when
nominated to the Eighth Circuit) and
Priscilla Owen (46 when first nominated to
the Fifth Circuit). The average age of the
nominees awaiting confirmation to appellate
seats is 50.1.
Relative youth is not the only virtue the
Bush administration is seeking in its
nominees. The people counseling Bush on
judicial appointments are convinced that his
father erred in appointing some judges,
notably David Souter, who has become a
reliable vote for the Supreme Court's
moderate wing and cast a pivotal vote for
reaffirming Roe v. Wade. Consequently,
Bush's counselors conduct extensive
interviews with prospective nominees about
their judicial philosophies. Many of the
nominees have been active members of the
Federalist Society, established in the early
1980s to organize, cultivate and sharpen
conservative thinking about the
Constitution. Activity within the Federalist
Society constitutes important - and
sometimes the only - evidence of a young
conservative's ideological commitment.
Armed with that commitment, a young
judge might help Bush establish a
conservative legacy that could outlast his
presidency by decades. Yet with
Republicans now in control of the Senate,
judicial nominees have no incentive to
testify openly about their views before the
Judiciary Committee.
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Democrats have seen other nominees
display reticence in talking about judicial
ideology, such as during the Supreme Court
confirmation hearings for staunch
conservatives Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas. Since Bush mentioned during the
2000 presidential campaign that Scalia and
Thomas would be his models if he were to
appoint a Supreme Court justice, Democrats
worry that Estrada, and many of his fellow
nominees, would share the hostility those
justices have shown toward abortion rights,
affirmative action, strict separation of
church and state, and broad federal power to
regulate the economy.
Democrats have cried foul, accusing the
administration and Republican lawmakers of
pursuing an ideological agenda that they
never openly defend. Republicans have
pointed to Estrada's sterling resume and
accused Democrats of making the Honduran
immigrant - who graduated at the top of his
classes at Columbia University and Harvard
Law School, clerked for Justice Anthony
Kennedy and served as an assistant in the
solicitor general's office - the latest victim
of a vicious cycle of payback.
Some trace that cycle back to Republican
senators who believed that President Jimmy
Carter packed the lower federal courts with
women who would use their judicial power
to advance liberal social policies. Others
believe President Ronald Reagan poisoned
the process by pledging to appoint judges
and justices who would overturn liberal
decisions on abortion rights and federalism -
the balance between federal and state
authority. Some view the then-Democratic
Senate's rejection of Robert Bork's
nomination to the Supreme Court as a
watershed event for which t he Republicans
have sought revenge.
In fact, the cycle of payback and ideological
agendas can be traced to the earliest days of
the nation. Every national leader has cared
about the likely ideologies of nominees to
the federal bench. The only way to ensure
that nomines will perform satisfactorily is to
adopt reliable selection criteria, because,
once confirmed, federal judges serve for life,
wield enormous power and are immune to
political retaliation for their decisions.
President George Washington selected
Supreme Court nominees based on their
fidelity to the new Constitution and broad
interpretations of federal power. President
Andrew Jackson based his choices on
nominees' political fealty and strong support
for state sovereignty. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt sought commitment to upholding
the New Deal's constitutional foundations,
and President Lyndon B. Johnson wanted
support for the vigorous protection of civil
rights. Presidents Reagan and George H.W.
Bush based their judicial selections in large
part on nominees' variance with liberal
opinions and devotion to the use of original
intent as a primary source of constitutional
meaning.
In every era, senators have checked
presidents' efforts to shape the composition
and direction of the federal courts. After
Republicans had forced Abe Fortas off the
Supreme Court because of ethical
improprieties, Democrats scuttled his
would-be replacement, President Richard M.
Nixon's nominee Clement Haynsworth, for
his own ethical lapses. Republicans blocked
dozens of President Bill Clinton's judicial
nominees, including Elena Kagan, a Harvard
law professor nominated to the same court
to which Bush has nominated Estrada. One
Clinton nominee, Michigan state judge
Helene White, waited four years without
ever getting a hearing before the Judiciary
Committee. Clinton's nominees were
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opposed because of concerns about their
propensity to read their personal policy
preferences into the law. Republican
senators blocked Clinton's nominees with
procedural tactics. Democrats at that time
complained that every judicial nominee was
entitled to a final vote on the Senate floor.
Republicans responded that the Senate's
failures to take final action on nominations
were expressions of its constitutional
obligation to give its "advice and consent"
on them. They also claimed that the rules of
the game had been constant for decades. For
instance, President Reagan had nominated
Jeff Sessions - now a senator from Alabama
- to a federal district judgeship, but the
Judiciary Committee rejected his nomination
and never forwarded it to the full Senate.
Over the past two decades, the judicial
selection process and confirmation battles
have become more public. Interest groups
now mount campaigns on judicial
nominations, as some groups are doing by
running television ads for and against
Estrada's appointment. Bush courts
Hispanic voters by chastising Democrats for
opposing Estrada, while few Democrats
believe that Bush genuinely cares about
diversifying the federal judiciary.
Estrada's reticence raises anew the questions
of what senators are entitled to know about
the views of a judicial nominee and how
they can find out. Estrada and others argue
that judicial canons of ethics preclude them
from giving answers that would indicate
how they would rule in cases likely to come
before them as judges. The ethical rules
protect judicial independence and guard
against judges' pre-judging matters likely to
come before them. Senators have largely
(but not always) shown their respect for
judicial independence by framing their
questions to elicit information about
nominees' ideologies and approaches, but
not how they would rule in particular cases.
It i s hard to s ce how t he questions E strada
has declined to answer would jeopardize his
independence. He would not identify a
single Supreme Court case with which he
disagreed, and initially wouldn't even name
judges he admires (though he cited three in
writing later). Other Bush judicial nominees
have answered such questions. Reagan and
Bush White House officials asked them of
people under consideration for nomination.
Republican senators have quizzed numerous
Democratic nominees about the Supreme
Court precedents with which they disagree.
Democratic senators are now asking judicial
nominees the same questions.
There are non-controversial answers to the
question of which precedents nominees
support or question. The high court's
unanimous 1954 decision in Brown v. Board
of Education, striking down state-mandated
segregation in public education, is an
obvious choice as a case to admire, while
one obviously wrong decision was
Korematsu v. United States, in which the
court upheld the forced internment of
Japanese Americans on the West Coast after
the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Judicial philosophy - or ideology - matters,
and nominees should be asked their
preferred approaches to constitutional
interpretation and the criteria they would
employ for construing Supreme Court
precedent and determining errors in earlier
decisions that might call for new rulings.
The Bush administration is correct (and
amply supported by many former
Democratic officials) in refusing to supply
internal memoranda from the Justice
Department. But no one is entitled to be a
federal judge simply because he or she
overcame adversity, attended a fine law
128
school and collected some solid work
experience. Senators have the legitimate
authority to weigh the judgment of a
nominee who, if confirmed, will for years be
entrusted with the final word on many of the
important regulatory and constitutional
questions that routinely come before the
nation's second-most powerful court.
Estrada brings a golden resume. Rather than
make its nominee's philosophy a matter of
public record, the administration has sought
to make it a matter of guesswork. In the
Estrada case, the administration has chosen
not to engage in the ideological fray, but to
simply avoid it. In the elusive youthful
Estrada, Bush has found the model judicial
candidate for an era in which ideology
matters deeply, so deeply that it can't be
revealed.
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Activist, Schmactivist
The New York Times
August 15, 2004
Dahlia Lithwick
There is probably nothing I can do or say to
convince you that the words "activist
judge" have no more meaning than the
words "hectic smurlbats." You've heard
"activist judges" so many times - from the
president, from Congress, from the angry
guys on the radio - that you can define it
right along with me. Together then: Liberal
activist judges make law, as opposed to
interpreting it. They ignore the plain
meaning of texts to invent new rights.
Superimposing their moral views onto their
legal reasoning, they brazenly advance the
cause of the fringe liberal elites in the
culture wars.
That certainly sounds right. Justice Antonin
Scalia would say it better, of course. He'd
make reference to the framers and toss in
words like kulturkampf. But it hardly
matters. We all evidently believe that you're
either for the liberal activist judges or
against them. Folks on the left say they
protect minorities from majority tyranny, as
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
did last year in the gay marriage decision.
Folks on the right say they act as unelected
superlegislators. Folks on the left say they
are interpreting a living Constitution. Folks
on the right say they are unmoored from any
fixed point, save, perhaps, the Harvard Law
School.
We can disagree about outcomes, but we
have, at least as a matter of political
language, internalized the fiction that liberal
judges "make" law, while conservative
judges "interpret" it.
A modest proposal, then: Let's invent a new
term right here, today, for judges or judicial
nominees on the right, who claim to be
merely "interpreting" the Constitution,
even when they are refusing to impose
settled law; law they deem unsettled because
it was invented by "liberal activist judges."
And while I am open to better suggestions,
here's a tentative offering: "Re-activist
judges."
Re-activist judges are the ones trying to roll
back time to the 19th century. Re-activists
are the judges who have reactivated
federalism by rediscovering the "dignity"
of states. Re-activists view Lawrence v.
Texas - last year's gay sodomy case - as
having all the jurisprudential force of a Post-
it note. When the United States Court of
Appeals for the 11th Circuit upheld an
Alabama ban on the sale of sex toys last
month, it did so by sidestepping the logic
animating Justice Anthony Kennedy's
opinion in Lawrence. Ignoring Kennedy's
lofty promises of sexual privacy - his
assurance that "there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not
enter" - the 11th Circuit framed the case as
a dust-up over the constitutional right to a
vibrator.
Re-activists like Priscilla Owen, President
Bush's nominee tot he United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, rewrite the
Texas parental notification statute in
abortion cases, to make it vastly harder for
young women to bypass parental consent.
Re-activists like another Bush nominee,
Janice Rogers Brown, have called the
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Supreme Court's shift toward defending
New Deal legislation in 1937 the start of
"the triumph of our socialist revolution."
Re-activist judges have increasingly adopted
the view that their personal religious
convictions somehow obviate the
constitutional divide between church and
state. President Bush's recess appointment
to the 11th Circuit, Bill Pryor, expended
energy as attorney general of Alabama to
support Judge Roy Moore in his quest to
chisel the Ten Commandments directly into
the wall between church and state. Pryor is
entitled to be offended by case law barring
government from establishing sectarian
religion. But what re-activist judges may not
do is use their government office to chip
away at that doctrine.
Re-activist judges are able to present
themselves as "strict constructionists" or
"originalists" by arguing, as does Justice
Clarence Thomas, that any case decided
wrongly (i.e., not in accordance with the
framers of the Constitution) should simply
be e rased, as though erasure is somehow a
passive act. And while there is an urgent
normative debate underlying this issue -
over whether the Constitution should evolve
or stay static - no one ought to be allowed to
claim that the act of clubbing a live
Constitution to death isn't activism.
So, judicial re-activism. It doesn't exactly
trip off the tongue, I know. But let's put it
out there anyhow, and attempt to level the
rhetorical playing field before November.
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The Case of the Gradually Disappearing Supreme Court
The National Journal
June 19, 2004
Stuart Taylor Jr.
July 1, 2008 - With the retirement of 88-
year-old Justice John Paul Stevens today,
the Supreme Court's membership dwindled
to four. The remaining two liberals (Stephen
Breyer and David Souter) and two
conservatives (Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas) are almost certain to deadlock on
big issues including abortion, affirmative
action, gay rights, religion, and presidential
war powers. So any tie-breaking
replacement for Stevens would be in a
position to rewrite vast areas of
constitutional law. This, in turn, almost
guarantees that no nominee in the
foreseeable future will have much chance of
getting past the Senate filibusters that have
blocked all eight of the men and women
named by the president since the retirements
in 2005 of Chief Justice William Rehnquist
and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, at the
ages of 80 and 75, and the retirements in
2007 of Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Anthony Kennedy, at the ages of 74 and 71.
No matter who wins the 2008 presidential
election, the Senate is once again likely to
be so closely divided that senators in the
opposing party will easily muster the 41
votes to sustain a filibuster against any
nominee who does not pass their litmus
tests. And any nominee who can pass the
Democratic test would fail the Republican
test, and vice versa.
Indeed, experts say it's conceivable that the
Court's membership could eventually shrink
to zero, unless and until one party or the
other can muster a decisive Senate majority.
(The Court would already be out of business
had it not reduced the quorum required by
its rules from six to five last year and then to
four this year.) Whoever wins the 2008
presidential election will once again be
under enormous pressure to pick nominees
acceptable to his political base - and
doomed to be blocked by filibusters - rather
than seek a deal with opposition senators to
break the logjam.
Some even speak of a slow-motion Supreme
Court suicide over the past five or six
decades. By steadily aggrandizing their own
powers, both liberal and conservative
justices have made the Court into a wide-
ranging superlegislature, imposing on the
nation the personal political preferences of
whichever group can get five votes in the
guise of construing the Constitution. This in
turn has transformed Senate confirmation
battles into plebiscites on the nation's most-
divisive issues, almost as consequential and
bitterly contested as presidential elections. It
has made increasingly anachronistic the
traditional refusal of nominees - now seen
as mere candidates for political office - to
discuss their views. It has galvanized
conservative and liberal activists alike to
attack any nominee who fails their tests of
ideological purity. And when combined with
the Senate's deep partisan split and the
legitimization of the filibuster as a device to
block any nominee who falls shy of 60
votes, these trends have produced a
stalemate that may threaten the Court's very
existence.
The downward spiral of partisan bickering
over judicial nominees is rooted in the
conservative backlash against the Warren
Court's well-intentioned assumption of vast
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and unprecedented powers to expand
criminal defendants' rights, take over school
districts in pursuit of desegregation, redraw
election districts, ban school prayer, and
more. Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and
George W. Bush all campaigned on vows to
put more conservative judges on the bench.
They were only partly successful. Nixon put
the conservative Rehnquist and Chief Justice
Warren Burger on the Court. But he also
chose Justice Harry Blackmun, who wrote
Roe v. Wade in 1973 and had become the
most liberal justice by the time he retired in
1994, and the more moderate Lewis Powell,
who voted with the liberals on abortion,
affirmative action, and religion. Stevens, a
Gerald Ford appointee, also ended up in the
liberal bloc. And President Carter stocked
lower courts with liberals.
Reagan's first Supreme Court appointee, the
ideologically amorphous Sandra Day
O'Connor in 1981, ended up voting much
like Powell. Reagan did make the Court
more conservative by elevating Rehnquist to
chief justice and appointing the conservative
Scalia in 1986. But Reagan's 1987 bid to
push the Court decisively to the right, by
choosing conservative crusader Robert Bork
to succeed Powell, provoked a titanic
confirmation battle that ended in a 58-42
defeat by the newly Democratic Senate. In
the process, Senate Democrats made "to
Bork" a verb and set a precedent for
opposing even eminently qualified nominees
solely (or at least primarily) because of
political disagreements with their
philosophies. Reagan ended up appointing a
more moderate judge, Kennedy, who ended
up joining O'Connor - and the liberals - on
big social issues including abortion rights,
religion, and gay rights.
Similarly, while the first President Bush
pushed the Court to the right by choosing
the fervently conservative Thomas in 1991,
he had inadvertently pushed it to the left the
previous year with his first appointee,
Souter. Picked because he had no publicly
expressed views to galvanize opposition,
this " stealth n ominee" proved to be solidly
liberal. And when Souter joined Kennedy
and O'Connor in a 1992 opinion that largely
reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, bitterly
disappointed conservatives vowed that there
would be "no more Souters."
President Clinton, uninterested in spending
political capital to mold the courts, chose
moderately liberal judges Ginsburg and
Breyer. But this did not stop Republicans
from escalating the judicial wars during
Clinton's second term by using their control
of the Senate and various stalling tactics to
block many qualified lower-court nominees
who would have been confirmed in up-or-
down votes.
Meanwhile, during the 1990s, the more
conservative justices (often joined by
O'Connor and Kennedy) became
increasingly aggressive in striking down
civil-rights provisions and other acts of
Congress based on constitutionally
questionable notions of states' rights. This in
turn fueled a liberal backlash against "right-
wing judicial activism."
The second President Bush touched off a
bitter, protracted battle with Senate
Democrats - who were spoiling for revenge
by choosing strongly conservative
nominees for federal appellate vacancies,
many of which would previously have been
filled by Clinton nominees but for
Republican obstructionism. The Democrats'
loss of Senate control in 2002 left them with
only one blocking tactic: the filibuster,
which had never before been systematically
used to block, on ideological grounds,
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nominees who would otherwise have been
confirmed. And filibuster they did.
In the 2004 campaign, with the Supreme
Court closely balanced on issues including
racial preferences, gay rights, abortion
rights, and religion, Bush and John Kerry
were implored by their conservative and
liberal bases to pledge to put on the Court
only people who had publicly espoused
views rejecting (in Bush's case) or
embracing (in Kerry's case) Roe v. Wade.
By the campaign's closing weeks, each
candidate had come very close to doing just
that. Even moderate centrists, and Souter-
like "stealth" candidates, were off-limits
and, in any event, unconfirmable, because
conservative and liberal groups were
determined to avoid the kind of surprises
that Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter had given
Republicans.
The winner of the 2004 election was thus
committed to choosing nominees who were
sure to be blocked by filibusters. And the
widespread assumption that a Hispanic
nominee could skate through because of the
opposition party's fear of offending a key
voting bloc proved incorrect. By the time
ideological opponents had finished trashing
every controversial aspect of every
nominee's record, in multimillion-dollar ad
campaigns featuring distortions and
denunciations by various Hispanic
"leaders," Hispanic voters were so split and
confused that opponents felt safe to
filibuster.
This made almost inevitable the filibusters
in 2005 of the first two nominees to replace
Rehnquist and O'Connor, and then of the
second two. Nor was it a great surprise when
the president - vowing never to "knuckle
under" on a "core presidential prerogative" -
spurned proposed trades in which the Senate
would confirm one nominee of his choosing
and another picked by the other party.
This uncompromising stance kept the
president's political base happy. It also had
the not-unwelcome side effect of insulating
from any further Supreme Court second-
guessing the president's claims of vastly
expanded power to override the Bill of
Rights and congressional constraints in the
name of the war against terrorism. Since the
Court began shrinking - to seven members
in 2005, five in 2007, and now a stalemated
four - both its prestige and its will to take on
a wartime president have diminished. "I
can't say I miss them much," the president
has reportedly said of the departed justices.
So at a time when we desperately need a
judicial check on executive power, the
justices - with a push from the president and
the Senate - may have taken themselves out
of the game.
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